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として、2015 年 6 月 30 日から 7 月 2 日にかけて開催され、第二部は 2015 年 11 月 13 日
にハーヴァード大学において、同大のライシャワー日本研究所との共催で開かれた。テー
マは、前者が「失われた 20 年と日本研究のこれから」であり、後者が「失われた 20 年と
日本社会の変容」である。時間と場所を異にしていたとはいえ、ともにいわゆる「失われ
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Ⅱ 失われた 20 年と日本社会の変容



































































2 　例えば、町村信孝『保守の論理――「凜として美しい日本」をつくる』PHP 硏究所、2005 年。






































7 　安倍晋三『日本の決意』新潮社、2014 年、第 6 章。





学研究』第 84 集、韓国日語日文学会、2013 年；「高度大衆社会日本と保守主義――西部邁の保



































































14　Anthony Quinton, The Politics of Imperfection: the Religious and Secular Traditions of Con︲









































（西部邁『戦争論』日本文芸社、1991 年、第 1 部「戦争・国家・人間」）。
18　安倍も「開かれた保守主義」を標榜している（安倍晋三『新しい国へ』、22 頁）。























































































































26　福田恆存「戦争と平和と」『福田恆存全集』第 3 巻、52―56 頁。




















































































































士「平衡感覚について」（1947）『岸田國士全集』第 10 巻、新潮社、1955 年、222―223 頁）。















































































































55　佐伯啓思『国家についての考察』、第 3 章、第 4 章；佐伯啓思『成長経済の終焉』ダイヤモン
ド社、2003 年、113―123 頁。
56　小林秀雄「伝統について」『小林秀雄全集』第 7 巻、新潮社、2001 年、260 頁 ; 小林秀雄「伝












































































































































































71　本稿の草稿は、2015 年 6 月 29 日第 22 回日文研国際シンポジウム「失われた 20 年と日本研究
のこれから」で報告され、韓国語で公刊された（「保守の美学――「ポスト戦後」日本の保守
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The Politics of Loss in the Lost Decades:  
The Ehime Maru Incident as a Halfway Point 1
David LEHENY
The public record contains little information on whether Mori Yoshirō won or lost his 
most famous game of golf. He certainly seemed intent on finishing it, though perhaps 
at some cost to his checkered political career. By the time he made headlines on Feb 
10, 2001 for finishing his round on the links even after hearing news that an American 
nuclear submarine had collided with a Japanese fisheries training boat filled with high 
school students, Mori had already become a singularly unpopular prime minister, even 
by Japanese standards. Famously turning phrases uniting nation and emperor that in-
voked wartime rhetoric, and occasionally evoking a stack of bowling balls covered by 
a rugby shirt, Mori hit a new low by seeming both spectacularly callous and mystify-
ingly unready to lead in the midst of an emerging, if by now largely forgotten, crisis in 
the US-Japan relationship. While he remained in office for two months following the 
sinking of the Ehime Maru and the loss of nine Japanese onboard, Mori was quickly 
seen as the lamest of ducks, occasionally quacking for his final two months in office 
about his determination not to resign but shorn of virtually all support even within 
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party （LDP）. 2 
　　When he was replaced in April 2001 by his rapidly storied successor, Koizumi 
Jun’ichirō, Mori’s place as the last gasp of the LDP’s traditional ruling style seemed 
fully cemented, with the maverick populist Koizumi appearing to represent a collec-
tive step beyond what was by then known as Japan’s “lost decade.” 3 Indeed, the clois-
tered old-boys’ club of pork-barrel politics and backroom deals （like the one among 
several party leaders that had put Mori in charge following Prime Minister Obuchi 
1 　The author thanks Nanyan Guo and Alexander Zahlten for their helpful comments on an 
earlier draft at the Nichibunken Symposium, July 2015.
2 　For one representative contemporary account, see “Mori shushō, gorufu taijin seikyoku ― Ji-
mintō nai kara mo barizōgon” ［Mori Catches Hell from Even Within the LDP, with Calls to 
Step Down after the Golf Incident］, AERA, February 26, 2001, p. 16.
3 　The Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo focused Vol. 2 of its 失われた 10 年 
project on political transformations, focusing to no small degree on Koizumi’s leadership. See 
‘Ushinawareta 10-nen’ o koete II: Koizumi kaikaku e no jidai ［Overcoming the Lost Decade, 
Vol. II: The Era Leading to the Koizumi Reforms］ （Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2006）.
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Keizō’s  debilitating stroke, which would later prove to be fatal） was seen to be a core 
feature of party stability during Japan’s long era of postwar growth, particularly in 
the 1970s and 1980s. It was, however, ostensibly incapable of creating bold or pain-
ful-but-necessary initiatives in the wake of the puncturing of Japan’s late 1980s Bubble 
Economy. And so Koizumi ― the neoliberal, the nationalist, the leader, the charismatic 
and singular voice ― could embody various potential hopes and fears about where the 
lost ten years had left Japan. 
　　It is nearly equally tempting, more than ten years later, to assign similar weight 
to the 2013 return to power of Koizumi’s initially short-lived successor, Abe Shinzō. 
After all, whether we consider Abe’s frothy blends of nostalgia and dynamic hawkish-
ness, or of his expansive monetary policies and historical revisionism, or of his diplo-
matic activism and opposition to progressive mobilization at home, one might―
depending on one’s preoccupations―see the hallmarks of where Japan had to end up 
after twenty years of limited economic growth, reshuffling of labor markets, continued 
reliance on the United States, and widening uncertainty regarding opportunities out-
side of a narrowing set of economic, educational, and employment relations. If we are 
not concerned primarily about presentism in current discussions of, say, 2001, we 
ought at least be worried about the tendency toward teleology―that 2001 can be 
made comprehensible only because of its place in a process that led inexorably and 
necessarily to the Japan that Abe Shinzō leads and seemingly wants to reshape.
　　For this reason, I focus in this paper on a moment that seemed for a time to be a 
turning point, the moment that ushered in the post-“Lost Decade,” before it became an 
extended lost two decades. Nearly forgotten today―save for a few small monuments 
in Uwajima, the coastal town whose fisheries high school lost four of its students in 
the ocean south of Honolulu that afternoon in 2001―the Ehime Maru incident was de-
scribed at the time as a genuine crisis for the US-Japan relationship, one resolved 
through the heady work of the two governments and by the care and consideration 
given to Japanese sensibilities by the US Navy and civil society organizations, espe-
cially those led by Japanese-Americans. If it mattered politically, it was mostly as a 
coup de grâce to Mori’s career as prime minister, therefore triggering the unlikely 
election of Koizumi as his successor. But in retrospect it captures and intertwines, at 
a rough mid-point of the lost two decades, two features that help to define the era: the 
ease with which the nation could be reified through the representation of a unified na-
tional emotion, as well as the persistent reminders of the limits on national action. In-
deed, representations at home and abroad of national grief following the Ehime Maru’s 
sinking provide a glimpse of the questions of national will, political efficacy, and per-
sonal tragedy that have reappeared periodically, most dramatically after the 2011 tsu-
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nami and nuclear disaster. That the collision was so quickly forgotten, particularly 
after Koizumi’s mobilization of Japanese security forces after the 9/11 attacks, only 
adds to its potential relevance as a milestone of loss in Japan’s lost decades. After all, 
it is relatively natural to ascribe emotional weight to the lost decades: anxiety, despair, 
unease, and so forth. But it is worth considering what is disclosed by these represen-
tations, and what it means to suggest that losses not only exist, but are felt by the na-
tional body.
The Politics of the Lost Decades
Koizumi’s rise so completely eclipsed his immediate predecessors that it is easy now 
to forget how unlikely it was. Concerned about his rapidly declining popularity, the 
LDP pushed for Mori to resign and eagerly called for a party leadership, using new 
rules meant to underscore the responsiveness to public demand in the wake of the 
Mori disaster. Rather than allowing only Diet members to choose the prime minister, 
as LDP rules had before 1998, and rather than giving Diet members more voting 
power than prefectural LDP members, as had been the case between 1998 and 2001, 
the post-Mori rules afforded prefectural members more clout than the Diet members 
themselves. Koizumi took his message directly to local voters, who flocked to him 
over the clear favorite among party leaders, former Prime minister Hashimoto 
Ryūtarō. 4 Selected in a backroom deal made all the more shoddy and graceless by 
Obuchi’s coma, Mori inadvertently provoked a singularly democratic moment in the 
LDP’s long history. Koizumi’s personal charisma worried his opponents, particularly 
on the left, because of the rightist populism he seemed to share with George W. Bush 
and other demagogues. But his style provoked for many, especially in the Western 
media, 5 the idea of a fundamental change: perhaps not one reducible to Koizumi him-
self, but emblematic of institutional and economic shifts that made enforced austerity 
possible, remilitarization imaginable, and the end of the lost decade seemingly within 
reach. Indeed, 
　　Mori’s name, in contrast, more often comes up alongside those of other short-lived 
prime ministers known as much for the disastrous and speedy ends of their tenure as 
for anything they had ostensibly achieved in office. With his single-digit approval rat-
4 　Ikuo Kabashima and Gill Steel cover this episode and its implications extensively in Changing 
Politics in Japan （Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010）.
5 　See, for example, “The Man Who Remade Japan,” The Economist, September 14, 2006 
（http://www.economist.com/node/7916942. Accessed November 30, 2015）. 
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ings at the time of his departure, Mori may lie at the edge of a bell curve, but he is 
nearly matched by Asō Tarō, Hatoyama Yukio, and, of course, the almost forgotten 
Uno Sōsuke, who managed to remain in power for two months in 1989 before capitu-
lating to popular demand and resigning after weekly magazines revealed he had been 
inappropriately stingy with his mistress. And they are together emblematic of a politi-
cal system depicted variously as stagnant, rudderless, and yet somehow always in cri-
sis. For at least a few years, Prime Minister Koizumi’s appearance on the scene was 
depicted as an epochal event, with Koizumi himself cannily running against enemies in 
the supposedly unified LDP even more fervently than against the comically disorga-
nized opposition, which was treated as barely an afterthought. His subsequent 2004 
campaign slogan ― “Change the LDP, Change Japan” ― emphasized his iconoclastic 
nature, as did his promise of short-term pain through neoliberal financial and budget-
ary reforms in order to accomplish long-term solvency. The return of a revolving-door 
premiership after Koizumi’s resignation in 2006 hinted that perhaps observers had 
been wrong to invest so much hope in Koizumi and his consequences. The story of na-
tional stagnation returned unblemished, waiting for similarly revolutionary moments 
to pull the country from its doldrums: the 2009 victory of the 
Democratic Party of Japan （DPJ）, or Prime Minister Abe’s nationalism and expansion-
ary Abenomics. It would require someone to take action.
　　In her superb overview of political and social debates in the first of Japan’s two 
lost decades, Tomiko Yoda writes, “It is the terrifying prospect of disappearance, not 
so much of the master narrative but of the desire （and agency） that used to generate 
it, that calls for the apparition of the modern today.” 6 This reading sits uneasily along-
side political accounts of the lost decades, which revolve largely around the machina-
tions, institutional decisions, and strategies of self-interested political actors rewriting 
the Japanese electoral practices, bureaucratic rules, and financial policies, all of them 
leaving powerful legacies that affect options and choices today. The postwar 
multi-member-districts with single-nontransferable-votes （MMD/SNTV） electoral sys-
tem became a mixed single-member-district/proportional-representation system, af-
fecting party strategies and compsotion. 7 Public spending targeted at particular 
6 　Tomiko Yoda, “A Roadmap to Millennial Japan,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 99 : 4 （Fall 
2000）, pp. 629―668, at 664.
7 　For two good overviews, see Ellis S. Krauss and Robert Pekkanen, “Explaining Party Adap-
tation to Electoral Reform: The Discreet Charm of the LDP?” Journal of Japanese Studies 
30 :1 （2004）, pp. 1―34; Ethan Scheiner, “Does Electoral System Reform Work? Electoral Sys-
tem Lessons from Reforms of the 1990s,” Annual Review of Political Science 11 （2008）, pp. 
161―81.
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constituencies declined through the period, replaced by more programmatic spending, 
shifting incentives for politicians and voters alike. 8 The need to reach voters on issues 
of national rather than regional interest may have driven important changes in foreign 
policy initiatives of key leaders. 9 In this more formal reading of institutions, what has 
been “lost” has been the kind of political flexibility and pork-barrel payouts enabled by 
long-term economic growth, as well as the voting system that militated against the 
formation of a stable opposition party capable of commanding an electoral majority. 
Yoda’s argument, however, puts priority on the representation of a public sense of na-
tional powerlessness, echoing important work by a number of Japanese scholars who 
aim both to problematize and to engage seriously what ― not just economic, but rather 
cultural, spiritual, emotional ― was seemingly lost in the lost decades.10
Recovering the Ehime Maru
The Ehime Maru story has since been described as one of recovery and mutual un-
derstanding, but for many months the media focused primarily on loss: personal, com-
munal, and national. Several of the basic facts of the accident are in little dispute:  in 
the afternoon （local time） of February 9, 2010, the Ehime Maru, owned by Uwajima 
Fisheries High School in coastal Ehime prefecture and operated for long-range fishing 
training, was an hour off the coast of Honolulu, where it had briefly stopped for main-
tenance, when it was suddenly struck from below by the USS Greenville, a US Navy 
nuclear submarine executing a rapid ascent. The Greenville’s commander, Scott Wad-
dle, had commanded the ballast blow to simulate evasive maneuvers in order to enter-
tain civilian VIPs―many of them connected through political donations to the new 
President, George W. Bush―on board as part of the Navy’s Distinguished Visitors 
8 　Gregory W. Noble, “The Decline of Particularism in Japanese Politics,” Journal of East Asian 
Studies 10 （2010）, pp. 239―273.
9 　Frances M. Rosenbluth, Jun Saito, and Annalisa Zinn, “Japan’s New Nationalism: The Interna-
tional and Domestic Politics of an Assertive Foreign Policy.” In Masaru Kohno and Frances 
M. Rosenbluth （eds.） Japan and the World: Japan’s Contemporary Geopolitical Challenges 
（New Haven: Yale Council on East Asian Studies, 2008）, pp. 229―250.
10　There are exceptions, such as Uno Shigeki’s “1990 nendai nihon no shakai kagaku: Jiko hansei 
to sono keishō” ［Japan’s Social Sciences in the 1990s: Self-Reflection and its Progression］, 
Shakai kagaku kenkyū 58: 1 （September 2006）, pp. 99―123. Much of the more provocative and 
critical work on the politics of the lost decades in Japanese comes from history, sociology, 
and cultural studies. See, for example, Sengo Nihon Sutadi-zu ［Postwar Japanese Studies］, 
eds. Iwasaki Minoru, Ueno Chizuko, Kitada Akihiro, Komori Yōichi, and Narita Ryūichi. 
Tokyo: Kinokuniya Shoten, 2008.
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Program, a public relations effort meant to build and maintain the Navy’s connections 
with powerful political, economic, and journalistic voices. The Ehime Maru was broken 
nearly in half, with its nine victims apparently unable to escape the vessel because the 
ruptured oil lines had made it impossible to grip the railings that might have allowed 
them to pull themselves to safety. The Greenville immediately called for help from the 
Coast Guard and did not approach the survivors, many of them in life rafts and cling-
ing to floating debris, reportedly because moving closer would have produced waves 
that could have further imperiled them.11 In the months that followed, Waddle and 
two others were punished, Waddle with an honorable discharge and the other officers 
with demotion, but there were no criminal charges filed, most likely because doing so 
would have encouraged Waddle and his subordinates to implicate the Distinguished 
Visitors’ Program as a mitigating factor. The US Navy paid compensation to the vic-
tims’ families as well as to Ehime Prefecture, allowing for the building of a new Ehime 
Maru. Most dramatically, it engaged in an expensive and technically difficult but suc-
cessful raising and search of the Ehime Maru, allowing for the reclamation of eight of 
the nine victims in October-November 2001. 
　　This decision―which came after substantial debate within the United States, in-
cluding angry outcry that repeated apologies from the US Navy, the Department of 
Defense, Department of State, and even President Bush had been insufficient to quell 
public outcry in Japan―was trumpeted by both governments as reflecting American 
recognition of Japan’s national affective needs. While Japanese political figures debated 
how far to push the United States, and to do what, one key area of agreement was 
about the distinctiveness of Japanese views of family and death.  Where Americans 
were depicted as rational and clinical in their approach to death, Japanese were emo-
tionally invested in their loved ones, particularly in the need to have bodies returned 
so that they might be cremated and buried according to Buddhist traditions.12 Ameri-
can representatives were quick to highlight these differences, and therefore the care 
that the United States was putting into Japanese perspectives of death showed just 
how compassionate and decent an ally it was. Ambassador Thomas Foley, who had 
been scheduled to leave Japan because of the end of the Clinton administration, stayed 
on for additional weeks to manage the crisis. Responding to a question from a Japa-
11　National Transportation Safety Board, “Marine Accident Brief” （No. DCA―01―MM―022）, Sep-
tember 29, 2005, pp. 1― 2, 25―27
12　See particularly Nawa Kiyotaka, “Itai to reikon: Ehime Maru jiken yori miru” ［Dead Bodies 
and Souls: Examining the Ehime Maru Case］, Taishō Daigaku Sōgō Bukkyō Kenkyūjo nenpō 
［Annual of the Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism］ 27 （March 2005）, pp. 112―
115.
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nese journalist that invoked the American decision to leave the bodies of the dead in 
the Japanese attack in December 1941 at the bottom of Pearl Harbor, Foley answered:
Well, I think it is sometimes very difficult for people in each culture to fully ap-
preciate and understand the attitudes in other cultures. When John F. Kennedy, 
Jr., and his wife were lost in an aircraft accident, they had a ceremony at sea, 
commending their bodies to the deep in effect. As in the case that you mention, 
the USS Arizona, we often regard the bodies of those lost at sea as a special mat-
ter for respect and that there is more attention and demand often; and it is an un-
derstandable but different part of the culture in Japan to recover the bodies at 
virtually every opportunity where it’s possible.
This differentiation was repeated extensively in Japan, and became a signal point unit-
ing left and right in the discussion of the incident. In one heated exchange in the Diet, 
Japan Socialist Party stalwart Den Hideo argued that the government needed to put 
more pressure on the United States to respect Japanese feelings:
At the same time, it’s been said that there are cultural differences in the ways in 
which the American side and the Japanese side are approaching this, and I feel 
the same way.  Actually, for Japanese people, family-centeredness （kazoku-shugi） 
is, so to speak, extremely important. You could probably say the same about all of 
Asia. America is all about individualism, so even when family members die, it’s 
sad and regrettable, but it’s still seen from the perspective of individualism. And 
that’s different from Japan.
.... And I actually think that in a sense, it’s the perfect opportunity to give a piece 
of our mind to the Americans, to explain without restraining ourselves how Japa-
nese feel and think. Americans are under the impression that they themselves 
are the world’s “Number One” （nambā wan） in all matters. And isn’t it about 
time for us to say, no, that American democracy, the culture of America, and of 
Americans, simply isn’t the best in the world?13
Foreign Minister Kōno Yohei, clearly trying to limit the damage to the US-Japan rela-
tionship, responded generally about US behavior, emphasizing the care that the Amer-
13　Kokkai gijiroku, Sangi-in Gaikō Bōei Iinkai ［Minutes from the House of Councillors Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs and Defense］ February 27, 2001.
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icans had put into the disaster response and what it said about the recognition of 
Japanese needs:
I think it’s definitely correct to make sure that the United States is thinking about 
how to deal with this problem while obviously taking care to consider the feelings 
of the Japanese people, or perhaps Japan’s spiritual culture. In particular, Ambas-
sador Foley has demonstrated a great deal of heart-felt consideration （kokoro 
zukai）. He’s been ambassador here for an awfully long time and was supposed to 
return home, having finished his term at the end of this month, but he said that 
he would stay on a little longer because of this problem that occurred right before 
his departure. Of course, in America, there are people like this who really under-
stand Japan, though I know that there’s a part of America that can’t understand. 
But I believe it’s necessary to take efforts to make them understand.14
　　And so when the United States raised the boat in an operation sufficiently de-
manding and expensive that the Discovery Channel made a documentary 15 about it, 
emphasizing the skill and courage of Navy divers, the recovery would be understood 
as a successful case of crisis management: sending a “costly signal” to an ally to 
demonstrate concern and understanding .16 Professor George Tanabe, a specialist on 
Japanese religion at the University of Hawaii, helped to advise the Navy on the need 
to raise the bodies as well as their proper treatment under Buddhist doctrine;17 But 
14　Kokkai gijiroku, Sangi-in Gaikō Bōei Iinkai ［Minutes from the House of Councillors Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs and Defense］, February 27, 2001.
15　Deep Salvage: Raising the Ehime Maru （dir. Herrie ten Cate, 2003）. See video at: http://
www.discovery.com/tv-shows/discovery-presents/videos/deep-salvage-recovery-divers/
16　Curtis H. Martin, “The Sinking of the Ehime Maru: The Interaction of Culture, Security In-
terests and Domestic Politics in an Alliance Crisis,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 5 : 2 
（2004）, pp.287―310.
17　George J. Tanabe, Jr. “Japanese Need Body Remains of Ehime Maru Victims,” The Honolulu 
Advertiser, February 25, 2001. Available online at: http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/2001/
Feb/25/225opinion17.html. Accessed March 19, 2011. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomat 
would later write a follow-up article for a publication that enthusiastically reported on the 
role of civil society organizations, including those of Japanese-Americans, in explaining Japa-
nese customs to Americans in the wake of the accident. See Nakamura Kuniko, “Kenkyū 
nōto: Bei-taiheiyō gun no dōmei manejimento taisaku to shimin shakai to no renkei―Ehime 
Maru jiko to sono ato no yūkō kankei” ［Research Note: The Connections between Civil Soci-
ety and Management of the US Naval Pacific Alliance―The Ehime Maru Accident and 
Friendly Relations Afterward］, Gaimushō chōsa geppō ［Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research 
Monthly］, FY 2008, No. 3 （February 2009）, pp. 33―55. 
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the discursive frame on which this understanding was built was shaky at best. Japa-
nese are lost at sea every year―often in accidents involving fishing boats―and the 
Japanese Coast Guard’s search and recovery guidelines are similar to those of the 
United States: guided by current, temperature, expense, likelihood of discovery, and so 
forth. Similarly, the United States is hardly the dry-eyed, unsentimental manager of 
dead bodies both governments suggested; leaving aside continuing （!） efforts to locate 
the remains of soldiers missing in action since the Vietnam War, even Foley’s example 
of John Kennedy Jr.’s death is misleading. The bodies were commended to the deep, 
but only after the plane had been raised and there had been a funeral for the three 
victims of the air crash on board a Navy vessel.  
　　There is also the legitimate question of cost. The one price that the US Navy 
seemed unwilling to pay was anything that might have jeopardized the Distinguished 
Visitors Program, in which VIPs are invited on board Navy vessels to meet the crew, 
dine with officers, and see what more than a billion dollars each year can produce. Ad-
ditionally, the $60 million price tag of the recovery operation included as its largest 
outlay a contract for the use of the oil exploration vehicle Rockwater II to handle the 
raising and movement of the Ehime Maru to a shallow water site to search for bodies. 
While Halliburton was not yet the household name it would later become because of 
its deep ties to Vice-President Richard Cheney and its role in the Iraq War, it was a 
politically well-connected oil firm that happened to own, through its subsidiary, the 
Rockwater II.18 
　　Despite these more sordid aspects of the US operation, it was an opportunity for 
some in Japan to celebrate the alliance. Commander Hayashi Hideki, the Japan Mari-
time Self-Defense Force’s liaison to the US Navy in the operation, wrote an extraordi-
narily personal account of the effort, reporting that the American sailors cried and 
waved to the Japanese families when watching them through flowers into the ocean 
near the spot of the recovery: “I will never forget what I learned from them about the 
wonderful tradition of ‘honor’ （meiyo） of the US Navy.”19 
　　While the family members of the victims ― or at least the eight who were found 
― were by all accounts glad to have their bodies returned for funerals, they still ex-
18　Greg Baumann, “Ehime Maru Recovery Successful,” Faceplate: The Official Newsletter for the 
Divers and Salvors of the United States Navy 6: 1 （March 2002）, pp. 3―5, at 4. See also Captain 
Charles A. Bartholomew and Commander William I. Milwee, Jr., Mud, Muscle, and Miracles: 
Marine Salvage in the United States Navy, 2 nd Edition （Washington, DC: Department of the 
Navy Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval History & Heritage Command, 2009）, p. 457.
19　Hayashi Hideki, “‘Meiyo’ to wa nani ka: Ehime Maru jiko o tsūyaku to shite mitodoketa kaijō-
jieikan no omoi,” Seiron, February 2003, pp. 318―327, at 326.
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pressed outrage over the Navy’s unwillingness to prosecute Waddle. And of course 
their grief was too complex and open-ended to allow for the “closure” that Waddle’s 
subsequent book The Right Thing argued he had brought to the families by visiting 
Japan more than a year after the accident and laying a wreath at a memorial to the 
lost students and sailors.20 Agreeing to meet with Waddle, but at a hotel in Tokyo 
rather than anywhere in Uwajima, the informal leader of the families, Terada Masumi, 
later reported that she experienced jiseki, or self-reproach, because she found herself 
unable to forgive Waddle despite his breaking down in tears and expressing remorse 
when she showed him photos of her son Yūsuke. Her grief, however, ran against the 
simplifying claims of both governments, as well as of the rumored efforts of leaders 
even in Uwajima to encourage the families, who had received financial contribution 
and in most cases the bodies of their sons, to stop pushing for more―the criminal con-
viction of Captain Waddle, the elimination of the Distinguished Visitors Program―
than the honorable way in which the United States Navy had ostensibly comported 
itself .21
　　In March 2001 testimony to the Diet, one of Japan’s leading international relations 
scholars, Soeya Yoshihide, discussed his own visit, at the invitation of the United 
States Navy weeks after the accident, to Honolulu, where he was allowed to tour a nu-
clear submarine of the same class as the Greenville, with explanations of the subma-
rine’s actions, purposes, and capabilities. He mentioned that the Japanese visitors had 
been “handled sensitively” （senshitibu ni atsukatteiru）, just as they had in the after-
math of the notorious 1995 rape of a schoolgirl in Okinawa by three American service 
members. He would in the end focus on concerns surrounding shutaisei, which one 
might define as subjectivity, or autonomy, or, as I think may be appropriate here, as 
agency. Soeya argues that this is a common concern across Japan’s political landscape, 
from both the right and the left, though with a pervasive sense that the US-Japan alli-
ance itself has robbed Japan of its autonomy. Soeya disagrees, arguing that battles be-
tween left and right, frequently targeting the United States, have prevented Japan 
from building a middle-ground consensus that will actually generate agency in the 
event of an emergency .22 
　　Soeya’s explicitly moderate position in some ways avoids easy criticism of the 
20　Scott Waddle （with Ken Abraham）, The Right Thing （Nashville: Integrity Publishers, 2002）.
21　Ikeda Naoki, “Ehime de nani ga okotta ka?” ［What Happened in Ehime］, Ōsaka no machi 53 
（2003）.
22　Kokkai gijiroku, Sangi-in Kokusai mondai ni kansuru Chōsakai ［Minutes of the House of 
Councillors Survey Group on International Issues］, March 7 , 2001.
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United States and its handling of the crisis. It does, however, invoke questions of na-
tional agency that lay at the core of the accident and its aftermath. Two key demands 
from the victims’ families were left unmet: the criminal prosecution of Captain Waddle 
and the abolition of the Distinguished Visitors’ program. Instead, what Japan got was 
something akin to the demand from MP Den: a recognition of and respect, even sensi-
tivity, toward the common emotional needs of the Japanese people. The construction 
and representation of national emotion, as well as its acknowledgment by the United 
States government, together became nearly a substitute for the agency that critics 
across the political spectrum had long demanded.
From Mori to Koizumi and Beyond
Former Prime Minister Mori has said that the whole Ehime Maru golf incident was 
misconstrued, that the information he was given while on the golf course was minimal 
and that he was told not to rush back to the Prime Minister’s office until more details 
had come through.23 It is not clear that his decision forced him to lose his job; after all, 
his dwindling popularity might have made it difficult for him to stay in power even 
had he dropped his club on the green, reached for his phone, and demanded that Am-
bassador Foley meet him immediately at the Prime Minister’s Office. But it would 
have felt right, and would certainly have seemed to represent a moment of leadership 
in action, the kind of agency that Japanese leaders have so frequently been accused of 
abdicating.
　　National emotion―a collective feeling, one expressed by officials and embodied by 
a state―is of course a kind of fiction, even if most Japanese were understandably sad-
dened by the deaths of the nine men and boys, and angered by the revelation that 
they had been killed by a US nuclear submarine performing an exciting emergency 
maneuver to entertain wealthy guests. So too is the notion of national agency, as if 
policies flow from the collective and deliberate actions of a country as a whole. But 
the articulation of a common mood and the presumption of a unified subjectivity to-
gether give the nation its force. Mori’s decision to continue playing golf may even cap-
ture exactly how constrained Japan’s choices were at that moment. And, if so, it may 
suggest why hope has been produced among many observers, both within Japan and 
23　Mori “Mori Yoshirō motoshushō ― Ehime Maru jiken no sai ni gorufu tsuzuketa riyū o akasu” 
［Former PM Mori Clarifies the Reason He Stayed on the Golf Course during the Ehime 




without, at the moments within the lost decades when it seemed that political figures 
were going to do something―whatever that something might be, and however difficult 
it might be to expect that something to manage the challenges of the contemporary 
global economy, or to offset the inequities of contemporary geopolitics.
　　Some version of the excitement about Koizumi, about the DPJ’s success in 2009, 
and now Prime Minister Abe’s return might well have occurred without the Ehime 
Maru accident and the damage it did to the last of the pre-Koizumi LDP prime minis-
ters. But if the collision and its aftermath should be seen as less than a turning point 
in Japanese politics, they certainly reflect other than good-hearted alliance manage-
ment. They might instead be seen together as a temporary moment of reckoning at 
the midpoint of the lost two decades: one that emphasized the durable constraints on 
national agency even as it reaffirmed the affective ties that were supposed to have 
produced it. That it did so ten years before the March 11 disaster suggests that the 
lost decades are perhaps less about loss―certainly not the personal losses of victims 
and their families―than about repetition, in the continual reminders of the limits of 






　1990 年前後にバブルがはじけて、日本は「失われた 20 年」と呼ばれる経済衰退の時
代に入った。2011 年 3 月 11 日に起きた東日本大震災と福島第一原子力発電所事故に
よって、日本はすでに「失われた 30 年」めに入ったという見方も示された。しかし、



















軍事力を維持してきた 3 。2011 年福島原発事故が発生した後、日本の政治家は、原発で
核ポテンシャルを保ち、そのうえで核武装を擁護するなど、抑圧された軍国主義的な欲
1 　Kuang-hsing Chen, Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization （Durham and London: Duke 















































































































孫の J は 9・11 事件に巻きこまれ亡くなった。米兵個人の家族の歴史は、アメリカ新帝
国主義の系譜を沿ったものなのだ。東京に生まれ育ったＭという男性は、J の死に対し
て以下のようにコメントする。

































女性が殺される事件が、ター坊が 51 歳の時自殺するまで、ほぼ 10 年おきに、5 回に及
9 　目取真俊『眼の奥の森』、138 頁。
10　Masao Miyoshi, 2005, “A Borderless World? From Colonialism to Transnationalism and the 
Decline of the Nation-State,” Global/Local: Cultural Production and the Transnational Imagi-
nary （Durham and London: Duke University Press）, p78―106.
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15　Michael Rothberg, “Beyond Tancred and Clorinda — Trauma Studies for Implicated Subject,” 


























































の経験を同時に生み出す、一つのシステムの受益者（Beneficiaries of a system that gen-








ないのだ。福島原発事故から四年が過ぎた 2015 年、8 月に九州電力川内原発が再稼動












　2015 年は日本の外交史にとって有意義な記念日の多い一年であった。40 年前の 1975
年に日本は初めて先進国首脳会議（G 6 ）に参加した。50 年前の 1965 年、日韓条約が
結ばれた。70 年前の 1945 年、第二次世界大戦が終わった。80 年前の 1935 年、日本の
国際連盟からの脱退が正式に発効した。90 年前の 1925 年には日ソ基本条約が結ばれ、
日ソ国交が正常化し、日本軍は 1918 年以来占領していた樺太北部から撤兵した。100


















































て、2000 年代に入ると、日本の国際イメージも変わった。1995 年度の WHO 世界保健
報告によると、日本人は誰よりも長生きし、誰よりも一人あたりの GNP が高かった。
長い間、国際的に注目された環境問題もそのうちよくなった。10 年後の 2005 年に米国
のイェール大学とコロンビア大学はダボスの世界経済フォーラムで「環境持続可能性指
数」（ESI）を提唱し、「今後の数十年間その環境を保護できる」国のランキングを決め




年、1993 年に 1 位となった。つまり、豊かになった戦後日本は確かに国際的に生活大
国、すなわち生活がしやすい国として認められたのである。

























































　2014 年度の BBC の世界世論調査を見ると、世界人気ランキングで日本は 6 位だっ






















































べく、1993 年と 1998 年に第一回・第二回の「日本語教育機関調査」を行い、そして、
2003 年度からは 3 年おきに定期的にそれを実施するようになった。これらの公開され
た調査報告書に基づき、筆者は表 1 世界上位五カ国日本語教育機関数と、表 2 世界上位
五カ国日本語教育教員数にまとめた。
　表 1 によると、ここ 20 年来の中国の日本語教育機関数は、高（1993 年度）→低（1998
年度・2003 年度）→高（2006 年度・2009 年度・2012 年度）というラインを呈し、かつて
（1993 年度）世界をリードしていた機関数は、その後、韓国（1998 年度～ 2012 年度）、
オーストラリア（1998 年度～ 2006 年度）、アメリカ（1998 年度・2003 年度）、インドネシ




1993 1998 2003 2006 2009 2012
中国 1229 1098 　936 1544 1708 1800
韓国 1117 2660 3333 3579 3799 3914
オーストラリア 1155 1744 2209 1692 1245 1401
米国 　602 1522 1254 1092 1206 1449
インドネシア 　460 　413 　608 1084 1988 2346
60
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ア（2009 年度・2012 年度）等に追い越され、2012 年最近の調査では、機関数は韓国・イ
ンドネシアに継ぐ三位となっていることがわかった。
　一方、表 2 では、全体として中国の日本語教育教員数は増加する傾向が見られた。
1998 年度（5156 人）は前の調査年度（1993 年度、5289 人）に比較すれば、133 人減にな
るが、2003 年度からは増加する一方であった。2003 年度（6031 人）は 1998 年度（5156
人）に対し、約千人の増加で、その後は、千人台（2009 年度 15613 人→ 2012 年度 16752
人、1139 人増）か、2000 人台（2006 年度 12907 人→ 2009 年度 15613 人、2706 人増）の増
加で推移して、留まることを知らない成長ぶりを見せた。特に 2006 年度の 12907 人








1993 1998 2003 2006 2009 2012
中国 5289 5156 6031 12907 15613 16752
韓国 2944 5604 6231 7432 6577 17817
オーストラリア 2428 3131 3625 2935 2547 2685
米国 1597 2850 3158 3217 3541 4270
インドネシア 　998 1159 1702 2651 4089 4538
　次に日本語学習者数を見てみよう。表 3 にみられるように、中国の日本語学習者数は
急速に伸びて、2012 年度の調査で 100 万人台を越えて、初めて世界一の韓国を上回っ
た。
　このような日本語教育機関数、教員数、そして日本語学習者数の急増は、中国に新設
された日本語学科数とも正比例をなしていると考えられる。図 1 は筆者が中国 4 年制大
学に新設された日本語学科数に対する調査結果である。それによると、20 世紀 90 年代
までわずかしかない増加数は 2 、2000 年から 2012 年にかけて、12 年間連続して毎年 2
桁の勢いで開設され、その数は総計 338 校に上っている。特に、2002 年から 2006 年ま
での 5 年間は、毎年 30～40 校ほどの「ベビー」が誕生し、合わせて 182 校に日本語学
科が開設され、「ベビーブーム」の時代と言ってもあながち不当な形容ではないであろ
う。
　このような爆発的な増加につれて、中国の 4 年制大学日本語学科数は、2013 年 7 月
付で 506 校にも達し、外国語学科の中で英語（994 校）に継ぐ、動かしがたい存在とな














































び率を見せた。最近の調査では、2011 年現在、全国で 95 校に修士課程が設置され、そ
のうちの 78 校は 90 年代以降に新設されたということがわかった 5 。
2 　ちなみに、新中国成立後から 1985 年まで中国大陸では 46 校の日本語教育専門機関が設置され
た。その内訳は 1949～1966 年 14 校、1970～1976 年 18 校、1976～1985 年 14 校。以上総計、
総合大学 21 校、外向型（外国語・対外貿易）大学 14 校、師範大学 10 校、理工大学 1 校。詳
細は伏泉『新中国日語高等教育歴史研究』（上海外国語大学博士論文、2013 年）に詳しい。
3 　日本語、英語、ロシア語の学科数は、2013 年 7 月 13 日、「教育部 2013―2017 年高等学校外語
専業教学指導委員会成立大会」における教育部高等教育司副司長劉貴芹の発表による。
4 　そのうちの 1995 年度と 1999 年度の統計は見当たらない。
5 　伏泉『新中国日語高等教育歴史研究』上海外国語大学博士論文、2013 年。
表 ３　各国・〈地域〉の学習者数
2012 年順位 2009 年順位 国・〈地域〉
学習者（人）
増減率（％）
2012 年 2009 年
1 2 中国 1，046，490 827，171 26．5
2 3 インドネシア 872，411 716，353 21．8
3 1 韓国 840，187 964，014 － 12．8
4 4 オーストラリア 296，672 275，710 7．6
5 5 〈台湾〉 233，417 247，641 － 5．7
6 6 米国 155，939 141，244 10．4
7 7 タイ 129，616 78，802 64．5
8 8 ベトナム 46，762 44，272 5．6
9 11 マレーシア 33，077 22，856 44．7

























　（ 4 ）中国社会科学院日本研究所編『日本学刊』2015 年増刊、2015 年 1 月。

























南燕『世界の日本研究 2014』2015 年 3 月）、劉岳兵「中日文化交流史研究的回顧与展望」














している。筆者は 1996 年と 2009 年に行われた第二次・第三次全国日本研究調査に基づ
8 　当論文は『中国的日本史研究』（2000 年）以外に、『中国的中日関係史研究』（2000 年）、『中国
的日本研究雑誌史』（2001 年）にも所収。そして、日本語版としては、『中国人の日本研究
――相互理解のための思索と実践』（法政大学国際日本学研究所センター、2009 年）に所収。





11　「近 10 年国内日語教学研究的現状考察」（張佩霞、呉宇馳『日語学習与研究』2013 年第 6 号）、
「2012―2013 年中国的日語語言学研究」（李運博、同）、「2012―2013 年中国的日本文学研究」楊
威、同）、「2012 年中国的日本文化研究」（王宝平、同）、「2013―2014 年中国的日本文化研究」（王





項目／年度 1996 年 13 2009 年 14
研究機構
東北地方 　　24 　16
華北地方 15 　　40 　27
華東地方 16 　　21 　24
その他 　　13 　18
小計 　　98 　85









































済、企業）は圧倒的に多かった。中国では 1978 年 12 月に中国共産党第十一期中央委員
会第三回全体会議という画期的な会議が開かれ、改革開放路線を採用し、中国の特色を
持つ社会主義市場経済の建設を進めることになった。三段階説はおおむねこれを出発点




























年の調査では、30 才未満は 9 ％、30～39 才は 26 ％、40～49 才は 30 ％、50～59 才は
22 ％、60 才以上（定年者も含む）はわずか 8 ％しか占めていない。そして、1996 年に
行われた調査に比較して、博士学位取得者は 52 名から一躍して 370 名に上昇して、日






















収。氏はほぼ同じ時期に『環球時報』（2009 年 8 月 28 日）に寄せた文章「対日研究、不必那
么功利」［対日研究、功利的必要なし］で、最近中国の功利的日本研究を鋭く批判している。
その直接的な批判は、ただちに中国社会科学院馮昭奎、林昶両氏から「中国対日研究、得全面
























　・丑陋的日本人 : 日本文化的明与暗、馬駅他、山東画報出版社、2006 年































　・人間開眼 : 日本文化病理学、湯禎兆、三聯書店、2015 年
　・日本文化第 2 輯、王静、中国伝媒大学出版社、2015 年
　詳細の分析は小論の主旨ではないが、90 年代後半から徐々に増えて、今世紀に入っ
て以降、ますます加速して、毎年のように誕生していることが明らかになった。そのう






























5 は筆者がこの 35 年間に中国で発表された「日本文化」に関する論文数に対する調査
結果である 25。
表 5　中国学術雑誌掲載「日本文化」関係論文数（１979～２0１4）
年度 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
本数 11 19 13 5 18 26 27 30 45 65 63 73 72 77 72
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
18 19 28 78 162 188 206 242 281 327 340 308 418 552 540
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
623 678 672 582 383 210
　表 5 に依拠すれば、次の三段階をたどってきたことがいえる。第一段階は出発期。
1979 年～ 1997 年の 18 年間に当たり、5 本（1982 年）～ 78 本（1997 年）の区間で推移
した。第二段階は急増期。1998 年・1999 年で百本台を突破して以来、200 本台（2000～
2002 年）、300 本 台（2003～2005 年）、400 本 台（2006 年）、500 台（2007 年・2008 年） と
右肩上がりに増長するばかりで、そして、2009～2011 年では 600 本台のピークを迎え





















































輯 5 巻、第 2 輯 6 巻）を刊行して、域外漢籍の研究にリーダーシップを発揮している。
　研究と同時に、海外所蔵漢籍の復刻もますます盛大に行われる動向が見られた。
　（ 1 ）日本宮内庁書陵部蔵宋元版漢籍影印叢書、安平秋編、第 1 輯 14 種 151 冊、2001
年、第 2 輯 7 種 73 冊、2003 年、ともに線装書局。
　（ 2 ）日本宮内庁書陵部蔵宋元版漢籍選刊、66 種 170 册、全国高等院校古籍整理研究
工作委員会、上海古籍出版社、2012 年。
　（ 3 ）日本所蔵稀見中国戯曲文献叢刊、18 册、黄仕忠他編、広西師範大学出版社、
2006 年。
　（ 4 ）域外漢籍珍本文庫、3 輯 647 冊既出、中国社会科学院歴史所編、西南師範大学
出版社・人民出版社、2009 より継続中。
　（ 5 ）和刻本中国古逸書叢刊、70 册、金程宇編、鳳凰出版社、2012 年。
　（ 6 ）日本漢文史籍叢刊、周斌編、第 1 輯（紀伝体）19 冊、2012 年、第 2 輯（編年・
紀記本末体）42 冊、2014 年、第 3 輯（雑史・史表）28 冊、2014 年、第 4 輯（伝記・系譜）
31 冊、2014 年、上海交通大学出版社。
　（ 7 ）日本国会図書館蔵宋元本漢籍選刊、8 冊、劉玉才・稲畑耕一郎編、鳳凰出版社、
2013 年。
　（ 8 ）日本東京大学東洋文化研究所双紅堂文庫蔵稀見中国鈔本曲本彙刊、32 冊、黄仕
忠・大木康編、広西師範大学出版社、2013 年。



















































ても、なぜ、かつての「失われた 10 年」がいつの間にか「失われた 20 年」になってし
まったのかというようなことを問題にしようというのではない（ちなみに、デジタルの










人は 1997 年の「Japan is interesting because Japan is not interesting」という講演で次
のように断言する。
I felt almost suffocated in Japan during the 1980s, when people seemed to be eu-
phoric and Japanese capitalism seemed triumphant. Fortunately, the system is 
now （in the early 90’s, with the burst of the ‘bubble-economy’） collapsing. At the 
same time there is a growing repulsion towards global capitalism, which under-























The expanse of the borderless market is, of course, not ‘out there’ somewhere 
outside Japan but is spreading within it, through the very forces that are trans-
forming the corporate governance and the employment practices in Japanese 
companies or in neoliberal measures that are eroding the public sector and ser-

















　今年 2015 年 4 月に舟橋洋一とバラック・カシュナー（Barak Kushner）によって編集





“Making Sense of the Lost Decades: Workplaces and Schools, Men and Women, Young 
and Old, Rich and Poor” という論文も入っている。ゴードンはこのなかで「discourse 






も、彼は “the changes have not been unidirectional: for some they are negative and need to 







題は “the ways in which the facts and the changes are construed are inevitably politi-
cal” （Gordon 2015: 84）ということである。ゴードンは、社会の「外部」「下部」「周縁」
にいる人たちの見方や行動を重要視する。彼らはまさに「失われた」という考えから身
を離し、そうすることによって政自らの治的な挑戦を表現しようとする人たちである











































プ レ ケ ア
安定になる。（ｃ）さらにその不
































の Youth Movements, Trauma and Alternative Space in Contemporary Japan というテ
クストと私自身による観察調査である。カッセゴールの研究調査の中心に置かれるの
は、数多くの具体的活動と多岐多様なプロテスト運動で、ここに precariousness も入
る。彼はこれらを 2004 年から 2012 年にかけて東京、大阪、京都で調査している。
During my stay in Kyoto 2009―2010 I visited the café or attended events arranged 
by the union several times a month. Not only was it a pleasant hangout. It was 
also a convenient hub for getting to know activism in Kansai ― the area around 
Kyoto and Osaka. （Cassegård 2014: 2 ）
　この当事者たちとの直接交流は同時に “produced by activists ― books, articles, pam-




［…］I will use the term freeter in a wide sense, to refer to young people charac-
terised by precarity, i.e. a lack of secure employment resulting in a precarious ex-
istence. To be a freeter is not to have a particular type of employment, but to 
belong to a stratum of people who may drift in and out of studies, unemployment, 
dispatch work or other forms of irregular work or states of withdrawal. Students, 
young academics, artists, and young homeless people can all be part of this stra-
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tum, as well as dispatch workers, part-time working housewives and social with-




次のような意図があった。一般には、日本は 1960 年代 70 年代のラディカルな学生運動



















Empowerment occurs when people regain the sense that their actions and opin-
ions matter and that they have the power to influence things in society which 










However, the setting up of alternative spaces can create its own set of dilemmas. 
To promote the process of empowerment, they need to be ‘safe’ spaces where 
subalterns1 and marginal discourses can be sheltered from criticism from main-
stream society, but they also need to function as bases for reengaging with main-
stream society, often through protest or public confrontation. Between those tasks 
tensions can arise. A movement that overemphasizes protest risks alienating the 
subalterns, while one that rests satisfied with providing a ‘safe’ arena will be un-




















グ ッ ド・ラ イ フ
き生活に向けた東京高円寺商店街での共同
1 　この「サバルタン」という言葉で著者カッセゴールが理解しているのは一般に次のような人た
ちのことである。“［…］ they were usually seen as unable to participate fully in society or to 
make themselves heard effectively in the mainstream public sphere. Among them one finds 
the mentally ill as well as young people referred to through labels such as futōkō （school 
refusers）, hikikomori （social withdrawers） or nīto （NEET, ‘Not in Employment, Education, 































松本は東京国立のある地下バーで「Sound across the line」という名の催し物を組織し
たが、そこでは香港の Hidden Agenda というグループの活動家で音楽家の Ah-Kok が
こう発言している。
We are not activists who are fighting against the government, the state. We just 
want that they give us space, scope, where we can create our own life. Just let us 
be!











ナム反戦運動のシンボルともなっていたものである（cf. Cassegård 2014: 67―68）。2003
年には新しいプロテストの形態として、いわゆるサウンド・デモが登場したが、それに
続いて新しく起ったプレカリアート化運動が生まれ、フリーターやプレカリアートのた
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Source Book）を綜合して用いました）。日本が連合国の占領から名目上の独立をした 1952 年
には一人当たりの国内総生産（GDP）で通貨の購買力で補正された値（Per capita gross 
domestic product purchasing power parity value, GDP-PPP）からみると、合州国の一人当た







で、その後の展開を見てみましょう。1950 年代から 1970 年代にかけて日本経済は急速の成長
を遂げ、今から 42 年前の 1982 年には一人当たりの GDP-PPP で合州国のほぼ 70 ％に達して
います（ここで比較されているのは一人当たり国内総生産であり、購買力平価の修正を経たも
のです。名目の値でいえば、おそらく合州国の水準の 90 ％近くまでいっていたでしょう）。他
方、日本との比較で、中国の一人当たりの GDP-PPP は日本の約 30 分の 1 、韓国のそれは約 3
分の 1 、台湾のそれは半分弱です。その 10 年後の 1992 年には、日本の経済はバブル期の成長
を遂げ、一人当たり GDP-PPP で合州国のそれの 82 ％に達する一方、中国は日本の 20 分の 1 、
韓国は日本の 45 ％、台湾は 57 ％にまで伸びてきています。さらにその次の 10 年間は日本の
衰退が顕著になります。2002 年になると、一人当たりの GDP-PPP で日本は合州国のそれの
70 ％でそれ以前とはほとんど変わりませんが、中国は日本のそれの 11 ％に、韓国と台湾はそ
れぞれ 71 ％と 81 ％と、日本の所得水準に肉薄してきます。そして 21 世紀になってからの一
昨年（2012）までの 10 年間で、合州国の一人当たり GDP-PPP に対して日本のそれは 69 ％で
やや後退しているのに対して、中国は日本の約 4 分の 1 に、韓国は 89 ％とほぼ日本と同じ所
得水準に達しています。さらに注目すべき点は、台湾が一人当たり GDP-PPP で日本を追い越
して、日本の約 107 ％になっていることです。つまり、台湾の平均的な個人の所得が日本人の
それを 7 ％上回るという事態になっているのです（以下に、参考にした過去 40 年間の一人当
たり平均年収入の IMF 推定値を記しておく。IMF estimates（現時点 US$ 購買力平価換算値）
　　　　1982 年：USA 14，410；中国 327；日本 10，615；韓国 3，040；台湾 4，466.
　　　　1992 年：USA 25，467；中国 1，028；日本 21，057；韓国 9，443；台湾 11，901.
　　　　2002 年：USA 38，123；中国 2，884；日本 26，749；韓国 18，878；台湾 21，613.












































典的な著作を上げておきます。Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes 






















10　より詳しくは、Transnational Network for Critical Inter-Asian Cultural Studies の宣言文とし





























1 　柄谷行人『世界史の構造』（岩波書店、2010 年、420―421 頁）、同『「世界史の構造」を読む』
（インスクリプト、2011 年、343 頁）などを参照。
2 　鵜飼哲「新たなアジア的対話のために」『現代思想』第 33 巻第 6 号、2005 年、38 頁。
3 　同上、39 頁。
4 　高橋哲哉「応答の失敗」『現代思想』第 33 巻第 6 号、2005 年、48 頁。





































7 　米谷匡史「ポスト東アジア」『現代思想』第 33 巻第 6 号、2005 年。
8 　竹内好「近代の超克」（1959）『日本とアジア』筑摩書房、1966 年、172 頁。
9 　韓国における日本研究の歴史と現状については、陳昌洙編『韓国 日本学의 現況과 課題』（한
울아카데미、2007 年）、趙寛子「1990 年代以降の韓国の日本研究――制度と視線の変化」（『世








































































































　しかも 4 月 27 日に李承晩の降伏を勝ちとった後は、革命の混乱した事態の収拾
において、青年学徒だからこそ可能であったろうが、見方によってはやりすぎだと
18　呉尚源「無明記（三）」『思想界』第 100 号、1961 年、416―417 頁。


































20　「合理的 経済樹立만이 民主革命의 課業이다」『青脈』第 3 巻第 2 号、1966 年、194 頁。
21　この過程については、拙稿前掲「ポピュリズム」の行方――韓国小説『糞礼記』を読む」を参
照されたい。



































































30　西川長夫『パリ五月革命私論――転換点としての 68 年』平凡社、2011 年。なお、西川と「私
論」の問題については、拙稿「ボナパルティズム論から私論へ――西川長夫の「国民国家論」



































33　「젊은獅子들 다시象牙塔으로」『京郷新聞』1960 年 4 月 29 日。













10 に石坂の作品は四つもランクインし、1966 年と 67 年のトップ 10 には三浦や五味
川、石原などの小説が八つも含まれている 38。では、なぜこれほど日本の小説が売れた
37　前掲「座談 4 月革命과 60 年代를 다시 생각한다」、30―31 頁。
38　李稔子『韓国出版과 베스트셀러、1883～1996』京仁文化社、1998 年、347―353 頁。
写真 1　アリラン出版社が刊行した『現代日本代表作家 20 人集』の新聞広告（『東亜日報』1960 年 10
月 14 日）
































39　前掲「座談 4 月革命과 60 年代를 다시 생각한다」、31―32 頁。
40　千政煥・権보드래前掲『1960 年을 묻다』、529 頁。
41　「日本 트러블〈 6 〉번지는 倭色 무드」『東亜日報』1964 年 2 月 6 日。
































送をつづけるという設定の『総督の声』連作を 1967 年から 76 年にかけて発表する。以
44　前掲「座談 4 月革命과 60 年代를 다시 생각한다」、65―66 頁。
45　M・ブランショ（1983 年）『明かしえぬ共同体』西谷修訳、ちくま学芸文庫、1997 年、66 頁。
46　五十嵐恵邦『敗戦と戦後のあいだで――遅れて帰りし者たち』筑摩書房、2012 年、53・52 頁。




























48　崔仁勲「総督의 소리（ 1 ）」（1967 年）『崔仁勲全集 9 』文学과知性社、1976 年、96―100 頁。

113
The Potential of Japanese Studies as a Global Knowledge-generating Mechanism




It may be a historical coincidence that the bubble economy of Japan crashed roughly 
at the same time when the Cold War ended. In any case, these two events are not 
usually related to each other in scholarly discussions despite their respectively recog-
nized historical significance. But when situating our understanding of the post-crash 
socio-economic conditions of Japan, now objectified as the “lost two decades,” into the 
broad context of transformations from Cold War to post-Cold War periods, especially 
the overarching discursive shift from the modernization theory to that of globalization, 
we obtain a historical perspective that can not only complicate our understanding of 
Japan’s past twenty years but also enable us to start to imagine new possibilities the 
“lost two decades” may have been impregnating. In this essay, I explore how certain 
changes in Japan and the world in the past two decades might have enabled a new 
imagining of Japanese Studies beyond the entrenched conception of a discipline 
shaped by political and national interests to be a global knowledge-generating mecha-
nism.
　　It may sound counterintuitive to try to identify a “global” potential in a discipline 
that takes a nation-state （its history, society, culture, language） as its object of study. 
Isn’t this kind of potential more easily found in such disciplines as sociology or philoso-
phy whose subjects are general and not territorially delimited? As I will argue in the 
essay, however, Japanese Studies, understood as studies of Japan both outside and 
within Japan, embodies the quintessential features of humanities studies that lay at 
the foundation of modern scholarship and education. As such, studies of Japan is a 
branch of modern knowledge production energized by universalistic ideals of human-
ism while simultaneously shaped by national and other particularistic agenda and 
goals. I would like to identify the practical significance of those universalistic ideals in 
Japanese Studies and bear them upon the ongoing discursive and institutional dynam-
ics of globalization in and outside Japan so as to tease out an arguably unprecedented 
possibility, a possibility of the formation of a consciousness and mode of knowledge 
that go beyond the horizon of the nation, which is a potential likely to be realized in 
the practice of an emerging global academia.
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　　Key for appreciating this unprecedented potential is the understanding of two 
main features of modern knowledge production. First, from the very beginning, there 
has been a tension between humanistic studies based on the universalistic category of 
humanitas that enabled the implementation of modern knowledge production all over 
the world on the one hand, and the exclusive and particularistic national framework 
within which modern knowledge has been conceived and produced on the other. Sec-
ond, modern humanistic studies acquired its Other, the anthropos from the beginning. 
The humanitas-anthropos figuration constituted one key epistemological principle un-
derlying modern knowledge production. Connecting studies of Japan as an academic 
discipline to humanitas-nation nexus on the one hand and to the humanitas-anthropos 
figuration on the other then requires a historical examination that goes back to 
18th-century Europe.
Humanism, Anthropos, and the Nation-state
The term “humanism” was first employed （as humanismus） by late 18th and early 
19th century German scholars to designate the Renaissance emphasis on classical 
studies in education while calling themselves “neohumanists” （neuhumanismus）. For 
the German scholars, at the basis of Renaissance humanism was the idea of humanitas, 
which meant the development of human virtue, in all its forms, to its fullest extent. 
While Renaissance made a shift away from the divine toward the human being thus 
giving birth to an implicit sense of the individual, however, it is not until the late 18th 
century that the theory of the integral, autonomous individual began to take shape. 
Classical liberalist theorists such as john Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau played im-
portant role in the development of the idea of the individual. This individual was con-
ceived of as a being in whom certain rights reside and of whom certain obligations, 
conditioned by learning and culture, are expected （Grafton 2010, 465）. The German 
neohumanists such as Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 
and Friedrich Schiller stressed the importance of this conception of the human individ-
ual. Disenchanted with traditional religion, these thinkers drew inspiration from the 
ancient Greek world, which they idealized, finding there a love of harmony and 
beauty. Humankind then could dedicate itself to the pursuit of beauty and virtue for 
their full realization in one’s self, and without the structures of organized religion 
（Grafton 2010, Fujita 1998, 1169）. 
　　This pursuit was known in German as Bildung. By the end of the 18th century, 
Bildung has been imbued with not only spiritual but also philosophical and political 
connotations （James A. Good）. It was associated with liberation of the mind from tra-
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dition and superstition, and through Hegel’s dialectical philosophy became connected 
to the realization of the universal World-spirit. Hegel was concerned with Bildung as 
the self-development of the individual human spirit as well as the self-development of 
the human race. Bildung requires self-knowledge, discerning one’s own talents by dis-
covering activities that bring satisfaction and fulfillment. And the greatest sort of ful-
fillment for Hegel is activity that promotes Bildung for one’s society. As such, Bildung 
meant that philosophy and education are virtually synonymous terms that designate 
an ongoing process of both personal and cultural maturation （James A. Good）. In this 
connection of the individual with culture and society, Bildung came to be associated 
with the liberation of the German people from a pre-modern political system of small 
feudal states that owed allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire. The universalistic the-
ory of the individual and its fulfillment came to be connected to the particularistic idea 
of the German people and nation. 
　　Indeed, when early 19th century Prussian thinkers such as Wilhelm von Humboldt 
and Johann Gottlieb Fichte translated these ideas into a pedagogical program that 
sought to promote humanistic and individualistic values, unify teaching and research, 
and institutionalize freedom of research and study, they were responding to a political 
crisis resulted from the defeat of Prussia by France in the Napoleon Wars of 1806. 
The reason of defeat was identified as the lack of spontaneous motivation on the part 
of the general populace to defend the state. That is, there lacked a German nation. To 
create the German nation involved three major projects: rebuilding the military, mak-
ing a constitution, and implementing national education. As such, neohumanism from 
the beginning was closely tied to the project of nation-building through education 
（Soda 2005）. The neohumanist educator Reinhold Bernhard Jachmann argued in 1812 
that “if the nation should be developed, national education needs to be derived from 
the same source of the highest objective of development of human being and be 
rooted in the basic soil of the national character. There exists but one humanitas （nin-
gensei 人 間 性） and each nation as a totality is its completion” （Soda 2005, 132）. Na-
tional education was discussed in terms of the universal ideal of the highest objective 
of humanity, “It is not borrowing one’s goal from the world but rather to look at one-
self as the goal of the world and strive for the highest objective of humanity. Only 
those schools that maintain their unchanging character by holding on to this objective 
are schools that cultivate true humanity” （Soda 2005, 132）. 
　　Wilhelm von Humboldt made a key contribution to the formation of the idea of 
Bildung and played a major role in the establishment of the modern education system 
with the University of Berlin, established in 1810, at its pinnacle. He regarded the uni-
versity as the noblest facility of national culture and defined scholarship in university 
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to be incessant exploration of unresolved problems. “What is important for the forma-
tion of university and the nation is not only erudition but a spirit that demonstrated 
by the entire range of disciplines and researches enabled by that erudition; in other 
words, a spirit enriched by fruits of the brain” （Soda 2005, 133―134）. For Humboldt, 
scholarship aims for spiritual formation of the individual and based on that spiritual 
formation fostering citizens’ abilities to act in society.
　　Because of this intersection of the universalistic ideal of humanitas with the proj-
ect of nation-building, the conception of humanism developed in the German context 
became well-suited to nation-states in cultivating models of individual and social devel-
opment. It is important to recognize the idealistic and inspiring dimension of this hu-
manism-nation conceptual nexus which may have contributed to its subsequent global 
spread in the nationally distinguished yet isomorphic institutionalization of modern ed-
ucation （e.g., national history, literature, linguistics, ethnography, etc.）. In redirecting 
the cultivation for an ideal individual （also captured by the term “citizen”） to the 
practical and specific purpose of making the national, this conceptual nexus embodies 
a logical contradiction yet a historical interdependence. As it happened, in the second 
half of 19th century, this model of scholarship and education was introduced to other 
European countries as well as the U.S. and Japan. In the U.S., with his work Culture 
and Anarchy （1884）, Matthew Arnold, influenced by Humboldt, argued for an educa-
tion that would produce a deep knowledge of culture and would then lead naturally to 
Bildung, the ennoblement of character （Harpham 2011, 85）. With Arnold, humanism 
gradually morphed into the academic form of the humanities and became linked to the 
liberal arts education at the collegiate level （Harpham 2011, 85―86, Duara 2014）. In 
the case of Japan, the humanitas-nation nexus was introduced to and reformulated in 
Japanese to underscore the modern national educational system in the 1880s. The key 
figure in the creation of this system, the first Minister of Education Mori Arinori （1847
―1889） wrote into middle school textbook the humanitas ideal thus, “the ultimate pur-
pose of humans is to follow truth and seek to become the complete human being” 
（Mori 1972, 425）.
　　Humanitas denotes a process of pursuit of the universal essence of that which is 
human, released from religious restraints and detached from the reference to the ulti-
mate and unreachable Being. It is the pursuit of human knowledge by humans to real-
ize the full humanitas, the essential nature of being humanbeing. As it happened, 
however, humanitas as the self-referential form of knowledge yet was in need of an 
external referent after the Christian God was given up. The very giving up of Christi-
anity at least partly is a result from the relativizing effect of Europeans’ encounter 
with previously unknown culture and societies in their global colonial expansion. 
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These encounters gave rise to an inextricable and fundamentally asymmetrical rela-
tion between humanitas ― people who become through knowing oneself ― and an-
thropos ― people who become through being known, to explain a complex historical 
formation in vastly simplified terms. Anthropos cannot escape the status of being the 
object of anthropological knowledge, while humanitas is never defined from without 
but rather manifests itself as the subject of all knowledge （Sakai 2010, Nishitani, 4）. 
Overtime the humanitas-anthropos formation overlapped with the essentialized binary 
categories of the West and the non-West. The 19th century saw this overlapped epis-
temological mechanism gave rise to the basic modern disciplinary distribution in 
knowledge production that largely remain with us today: sociology, economics, and po-
litical science are about oneself by the West as humanitas whereas Orientalism and 
anthropology are about the Other, the anthropos, as object of study by the West （Ma-
suzawa 2005, 15―17）.
Post-WWII Japanese Studies and Modernization Theory
Postwar studies of Japan in the U.S. and Japan exemplify respectively the humani-
tas-anthropos and humanitas-nation nexus in objectifying Japan as an object of knowl-
edge. The Cold War constituted the historical context for the practice of what 
Prasenjit Duara calls the imperialism of the nation-state, which manifested in the im-
position of designs for enlightenment upon emergent nations by an enormously supe-
rior national power backed by military force （Duara 2010, 90）. The U.S.-Japan 
relationship reflected this new form of imperialism. The US recognized that Japan’s 
economic growth was a potent force that might bring stability not just to Japan itself 
but also to the region more widely. This included the vital role Japan could play to 
stemming the tide of communism which could be aggravated by poverty. It is in the 
interest of the US that Japan be manipulated to appear as a demonstration of what 
the western style liberal-capitalist model of modernization could achieve in practice. 
From the 1950s, studies of Japan in the U.S. advocated modernization theory and tried 
to shape scholarship on Japan to show how and why Japan was able to modernize and 
develop so successfully. This politically motivated agenda brushed aside alternative re-
search concerns and issues of scholars in Japan and the U.S.
　　In creating a research agenda and imposing that on the object of Japan, Japanese 
Studies during the postwar period betrays operations of the humanitas-anthropos figu-
ration. To the extent that area studies have been tied to the strategic and political 
consideration of the U.S., it may be said that Japanese studies in the U.S. operated on 
the premise of a separation of humanitas the knowing subject from anthropos the ob-
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ject to be known. During the past three decades, however, scholars have waged con-
sistent critique of area studies in particular Japanese studies as a form of knowledge 
production in close association with, and in the service to political agenda （Dower 
1975, Harootunian 2000, Miyoshi and Harootunian 2002, Sakai 2007）. Without recount-
ing this critique in detail here, I will briefly quote the incisive observation by the 
scholar of Japan, Naoki Sakai, on the humanitus-anthropos figuration as an operative 
mode of knowledge production in Asian studies, “Things Asiatic were first brought to 
scholarly attention through being recognized as ‘different and therefore Asian’. There-
fore, and form the presumed vantage point of the West, ‘being different from us’ and 
‘being Asian’ were tacitly taken to be synonymous in an anthropologizing gesture” 
（Sakai 2010, 457）.
　　In Japan, the postwar self-reflective scholarship on Japan’s democracy and mod-
ernization, represented by Maruyama Masao and Ōtsuka Hisao, could be seen as the 
most manifest scholarship of humanitas in their abiding concern with the formation of 
the modern individual as citizen. In applying the West as the referent for Japan’s democ-
racy and modernization while taking for granted the existence of the Japanese nation 
（minzoku 民族）, with or without the emperor, their study of Japan, like the Marxist 
scholarship, corresponded well with modernization-centered studies of Japan in the 
U.S. 
Globalization and Beyond Area Studies
In the wake of the end of Cold War in 1990, modernization theory gave way to the 
new theory of economic globalization of a strong neo-liberal bent. Globalization theory 
prescribes more than it describes. It advocate a new alignment of political and eco-
nomic interests at the global level in the creation of a new global political economic 
regime with a distinct American template of neoliberalism （Antonio 2007）. Source of 
power shifted in the 1990s from the state’s concern with Cold War boundary security 
to transnational corporations that saw no geographic limit on their interests （Cum-
mings 2000）. This however should not be interpreted as having resulted in the decline 
of the nation-state but rather should be seen as having propelled the nation-state’s 
changes in form. Nation-state remains a key player in engineering social-economic 
changes and global capitalism operates through the framework of the nation-state sys-
tem. Cultural imperatives in the nation-state remain largely unchanged: peace, justice 
and growth/development, but in attaining those goals a new type of discourse has 
emerged in the wake of the end of Cold War that recognizes multiculturality and di-
versity of society and nation, as well as enablind new ways in which the identity of 
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selves can become differentiated to assume a variety of forms and modes of represen-
tation: the national, class, religious, gender, etc. 
　　At the same time, large protests by various groups from around the world at the 
World Trade Organization meetings since 1999 and the recent worldwide Occupy 
Movement symbolize a critical transnationally formulated response to globalizing capi-
talism. These more vocal events are accompanied by the widespread, multi-front op-
position to the neo-liberal doctrine of the so-called Washington Consensus. We may 
also mention the strong opposition in Japan to the Trans-Pacific Partnership （TPP） 
despite the fact this opposition is mainly out of the view of protecting national indus-
tries and domestic market which are in themselves important but nation-focused. In 
looking at these changes, it makes sense to assume a subjective and cultural dimen-
sion of globalization and to ask whether we can identify a certain consciousness of 
that which is called globalization. Marking this consciousness is a critical stance to-
ward the neo-liberal economic globalization. If the latter is represented by the slogan 
“the world is flat” popularized by the globalization advocator the U.S. journalist 
Thomas Friedman, in opposition to this uniformity and imagined equality is a new 
global consciousness celebrating and advocating heterogeneity based on critique of so-
cial and economic inequality. It is hard to tell which one, the neo-liberal capitalist glo-
balization or the critical consciousness come first, or between consciousness and 
reality is a dialectically intersecting formative process. In any case, assuming such a 
consciousness that is grounded on specific conditions of possibility is meaningful be-
cause possessing this consciousness makes it possible for one to formulate agenda and 
take initiatives to enact changes as part of the process. That is, it makes sense to con-
template if we can imagine a potential of a new type of consciousness, under the post-
Cold War conditions of globalization, which is able to relativize and change, even 
eventually transcend, the institutional and epistemic framework of the capitalist na-
tion-state world system.
　　The departure of modernization theory in Japanese Studies in the US meant the 
departure of a major political agenda that shaped studies of Japan. The past two de-
cades saw flourishing postcolonial and postmodern theories and cultural studies that 
informed and energized studies of Japan, just as more and more students of non-West-
ern origin joined university education in the U.S., making classrooms increasingly a 
transnational space. Resulted from assimilation of these theoretical insights is the now 
widely shared reflective awareness of the politicality of one’s position and stance in ac-
ademic research, an awareness resembling the self-awareness of humanitas as a 
knowing subject studying oneself. Key to this awareness is the critique of nationalism 
and the nation-state as the quintessential modern form of political power, a critique 
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that characterized Japanese Studies in the past two decades or so. This critique called 
into question the basic assumption （the national society） of modernization theory. In 
this sense, the globalization era （and the “lost two decades”） signifies certain signifi-
cant new development in academic study. 
　　These ideological and cultural changes contributed to shift in definition of area 
studies from in terms of national strategic interest to globalization. In a special mes-
sage for the annual conference of NAFSA: Association of International Educators in 
May 2015, the U.S. Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, expresses the stance of the 
U.S. government with regard to international education while making reference to 
area studies, “in the 21st century, a quality education is an international education. 
That’s why we developed the International Education Strategy which will guide the 
Department of Education toward its international future. We continue to support 
study abroad, area studies, and foreign language learning … .It is more important than 
ever that our college graduates will be able to not only compete with graduates from 
around the world, but are able to collaborate with people from different cultural back-
grounds” （NAFSA website）. Needless to say, Duncan is talking about the need for 
globalization from the perspective of the American government and out of the concern 
with how international education will reinforce the power of the U.S. in the new con-
text of globalization. Nevertheless, the articulation of conscious reorientation of educa-
tion to post-Cold War global condition is notable. 
　　These changes could lead, and indeed have led, to the gradual dissipation of the 
humanitas-anthropos figuration that marked area studies in postwar U.S. Calling into 
question the political nature of area studies went in tandem with critical scholarship 
of postcolonial, ethnic, cultural, and gender studies as well as diversification of both 
faculty and student bodies in U.S. universities. We can understand these changes as 
providing the condition for the possible project of reconceiving humanitus to make it 
adequate for the era of globalization, in other words, as a conceptual tool that connects 
rather than divides as it previously did through such as the humanitas-anthropos figu-
ration. Posing a reimagined humanitas is further encouraged by a new change on a 
global scale. Not just in the U.S., at the global level we see the emergence of a trans-
national academia resulted from increased mobility, institutional accommodation, ex-
pansion of higher education beyond the national frame, foreign faculty hiring, and 
English as the increasingly deculturalized lingua franca of research and education. 
This is an emerging pattern for all the disciplines including Japanese Studies in many 
universities across the world but is particularly clear in case of universities in Asia, in-
cluding Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Singapore. U.S. universities are also expand-
ing outside North America by developing exchanges and collaborations with 
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universities in other continents. 
　　One important dimension to this pattern of connecting in the Asian context is hir-
ing non-native faculty. Many young scholars with PhD degrees from U.S. or European 
universities find jobs in Asian universities which welcome them as a vitally necessary 
asset in their efforts to meet the challenge of the globalization of education （this does 
not mean that there is not also a flow from Asian to European universities）. These 
PhD holders speak English and to different extent share the Western academic cul-
ture, which has humanitas as the foundation, not only among themselves but also with 
educators in Asia with similar thoughts and goals （recent outcry of crisis for the in-
creasingly strained funding for humanities and social sciences disciplines may indeed 
point to the erosion of the status of humanitas as the foundation for knowledge cre-
ation but the consequence remains to be seen）. In the sense that Western-style educa-
tion is positively evaluated by most Asian universities, which to different degree, 
share the West-originated humanitas ideal, and is being modelled upon, this emerging 
transnational academia could serve to connect the previously separate education and 
research in different parts of the world through developing research and education 
collaborations. The role of this global academia in connecting education across the 
world predicates upon re-conceptualizing humanitas to be an executable and concret-
ized definition for mutual sharing. With their transnational background of education, 
this emerging group embodies the tensions of humanitas-anthropos. It is up to them to 
first of all externalize this tension and eventually dissolve it. Needless to say, this is a 
difficult task.
The Lost Two Decades, Education Reform, and Reimagining Japanese Studies
“The lost two decades” is marked by the Japanese government’s efforts to reform 
higher education to respond to the decrease of college-age youth population and the 
perceived long-term crisis in decline of international competitiveness of Japan in the 
age of globalization. Echoing the statement of the U.S. Secretary of Education Erne 
Duncan, these efforts are constitutive of Japan’s participation in a world-historical un-
folding of a major political, economic and cultural dynamic: the increasing intercon-
nectedness of the world. The government’s efforts in most recent years （2009, 2012 
and 2014） are nothing less than remarkable, especially given the fiscal constraint the 
government is increasingly subject to.
　　In 2009, in order to improve the competitiveness of Japanese higher education 
and to attract more foreign students to Japanese universities, Japan Society for Pro-
moting Sciences （JSPS）, the fund-distributing organization for the Ministry of Educa-
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tion, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology （MEXT）, announced the Project for 
Establishing University Network for Internationalization （G30） （国際化拠点整備事業）. 
The project set out to sponsor the globalization of 30 selected universities by provid-
ing each of them an annual support of up to 400 million yen for five years （JSPS web-
site）. As such, it is more widely known as the G30 project. Eventually, however, only 
13 universities, both public and private, were selected for implementing this project. 
Then in 2012, JSPS followed up with the Project for Promotion of Global Human Re-
source Development （グローバル人材育成推進事業）. 42 schools were selected to receive 
annual funding of between 120―260 million yen for up to five years. Then most re-
cently in 2014, JSPS invited universities to compete for the Top Global University 
Project （スーパーグローバル大学創成支援）. 37 universities were successful in their bid 
and were each awarded 200―500 million yen each year for up to ten years to imple-
ment structural reforms to increase international compatibility and strengthen global 
competitiveness.
　　Major components of structural reforms demanded by these JSPS projects in-
clude: increasing courses and programs taught in English in particular those on Japan 
to attract international students, hiring foreign faculty to increase diversity as well as 
English-speaking teachers, building up collaborative relationships with overseas uni-
versities, and conduct regularized international research and education activities. 
There is considerable resistance to these efforts as many criticize that the emphasis 
on English is succumbing to “English imperialism” and it is becoming a fad to develop 
globalization programs, which in many cases lack substance. Despite these criticisms, 
Japanese universities, in particular the major private ones, met the government initia-
tive with enthusiasm and created many new programs because private schools, de-
pending to significaut degrees on tuition for existence and growth, see globalization as 
the way to go.
　　As part of these reforms, Japanese universities hire more and more internation-
ally trained, English-speaking faculty. In this sense, Japan is joining other Asian coun-
tries in contributing to the formation of the afore-mentioned transnational academia. 
PhDs in Japanese studies comprise a significant part of this community. They could 
be expected to serve as a connector between English-language Japanese studies in the 
West and other areas of the world and broadly defined studies of Japan within Japan, 
conducted in Japanese language. The role of the connector is facilitated by afore-men-
tioned government-funded globalization projects that develop international confer-
ences, research and education exchanges, and other forms of collaboration.
　　Despite the fact that globalization of higher education in Japan is state-led and is 
meant by the government to strengthen the competitive power of Japan in the age of 
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From June 30 to July 2 of this year ［2015］, the International Research Center for Jap-
anese Studies （NICHIBUNKEN） in Kyoto hosted an international symposium titled 
“The Lost Decades and the Future of Japanese Studies.” The topic of that symposium 
closely correlates with the “lost decades” theme of the present symposium, and both 
themes originated in the thesis presented by Prof. Andrew Gordon. Since September 
2014, I have conducted study sessions with several people participating in the present 
symposium in conjunction with Prof. Gordon’s project to reconsider “lost decades,” of 
which the NICHIBUNKEN symposium was a milestone. Today, I intend to summarize 
for you the outcomes of the Kyoto symposium from my own perspective. 
　　First, I aim to introduce the contents of the NICHIBUNKEN symposium. （Refer 
to attached documents.） 
　　Let me begin by explaining how the symposium came to be. Nihon Kenkyū （Japa-
nese Studies）, an academic journal of NICHIBUNKEN, was in the midst of planning a 
special issue under the direction of that publication’s editor, Hideto Tsuboi. The focus 
of the special issue was going to be the lost decades. The symposium theme and par-
ticipant selection advanced under Professor Tsuboi’s guidance. The subject of deliber-
ation for the symposium was the current status of and future outlook for Japanese 
studies amid changes in Japan’s position in the world within the context of global rela-
tions over the past 20 years. The participation of representative scholars of the con-
temporary philosophy, including Jun’ichi Isomae of NICHIBUNKEN and Naoki Sakai 
of Cornell University, as well as several emerging scholars of Japanese literature was 
another noteworthy feature of the event. 
　　Since the presentations covered many subjects, providing a summary of the sym-
posium was difficult. However, several themes emerged unexpectedly through the 
various symposium presentations and subsequent discussions. From my perspective, 




First, many presenters took issue with the label “lost.” Some had fundamental ques-
tions about what had been lost and by whom. Sakai suggested that the subject “lost” 
rests on the assumption of an inward-looking nation state. Steffi Richter averred that 
the period should be reinterpreted from the perspective of a sudden rise in the active 
cooperation and cultural movement of people living on the outer edges of capitalism, 
called the “precariat.” 
　　In this context, the first instance identified by Prof. Gordon of the use of the word 
“lost” is interesting to note. Prof. Gordon indicated that the word’s first appearances in 
connection to Japan occurred in July 1998. An article by Bill Powell in the July 27, 
1998 issue of Newsweek （dated one week after the first printing） used the word in its 
title, “The Lost Decade,” as did a July 20, 1998 Nikkei Shinbun article titled “National 
Treasure: Lessons of the Lost Decade.” These articles indicated the closed nature of 
Japan’s financial markets, and they reported that overseas investors had begun to use 
the phrase “lost decade” to refer to Japan’s slowness in catching up to the global tide 
of financial reform. These origins suggest that the idea of Japan as a “lost” nation was 
initially advanced by non-Japanese voices and then internalized by Japanese society in 
a self-fulfilling manner. This is similar to Engelbert Kaempfer’s argument in The His-
tory of Japan that Japan’s status as a closed country was reverse imported at the end 
of the Edo period and became a self-fulfilling fact by Japanese. 
　　The above discussion suggests the need for a reassessment of how accurately the 
word “lost” describes Japanese society in the years since 1990. Opinions questioning 
the phrase were abundant at the symposium. Those voicing such opinions argued that 
Japan has achieved significantly from a cultural perspective during this period. The 
success of Japanese culture, particularly pop culture, in attracting worldwide interest 
has been inversely proportional to the economic losses that the country suffered fol-
lowing the collapse of the economic bubble. The global popularity of Japanese cultural 
creations in the areas of manga and anime is widely known. Japanese film, architec-
ture, and culinary culture have also been adopted in various areas of the world; for ex-
ample, sushi and ramen are widely consumed across the globe. Japanese athletes are 
also active in the global sports arena. In Boston, the images of major league baseball 
players like Nomo, Matsuzaka, and Uehara remain fresh in our minds. 
　　This global prevalence of Japanese culture elicited input from several participants 
on the vibrancy of Japanese studies. Interest in the field of Japanese language studies 
is particularly trending upward in China and Europe. The widespread passion for Jap-
anese culture （though not for its traditional culture）, especially contemporary mass 
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culture is certainly encouraging this trend. Curiosity is also a part of the equation. Al-
though Japanese contemporary culture was previously seen as little more than a sub-
culture, it has now assumed a prominent global position as a main culture. 
　　However, it may be a bridge too far to conclude that the “lost decades” somehow 
helped produce the triumphant rise of Japanese culture. Actually, the problem is that 
as Japanese culture flourishes, Japanese society withers. At the same time, as substan-
tial Japanese cultural contents are being accepted overseas, the international image of 
Japanese society tends toward a perception of Japanese otherness, or of Japan as a 
“strange and peculiar country.” It can be said that Japan’s societal image actually has 
worsened. Contributing to that problem are such problems as the political and eco-
nomic elites’ efforts to cling to nuclear power even after the 3/11 Great East Japan 
Earthquake and the subsequent nuclear disaster, international condemnation of the 
Japanese political class’s treatment of the “comfort women” problem and of other is-
sues of historical recognition, and the various barriers to the social advancement of 
women in Japan. 
　　In Japan, it is unclear how deeply Japanese people feel the positive elements of 
the global propagation of Japanese culture. For the past twenty years, the Japanese 
have lived with a sense of collapse and stagnation. The aging society with declining 
birth rate, growing economic inequality, and the worsening of workplace conditions 
have all contributed to a sense of loss within the daily lives of Japanese people. How-
ever, similar problems can be found in many parts of the world. There is no reason 
why Japan should feel that it alone is a victim or live with a sense of defeat. 
Ⅲ
Viewed in this way, Japan can be seen as a cluster of world problems. Participants in 
the NICHIBUNKEN symposium repeatedly underscored the need for a “theory.” Such 
a framework of thought would accurately explore the various problems embodied in 
Japan and consider options to address them. 
　　Symposium participants averred that in order to develop such a theory, scholars 
need to extrapolate a definition of “local” and consider the question from that perspec-
tive. That suggestion rests on criticisms of the nation state concept. Because the na-
tion state is usually the unspoken premise of deliberation, the symposium called for 
recognizing the emergence of various marginal voices to protect their disappearance 
in the context of the nation state. The symposium was challenged to pay heed to 
those voices. An example of such a marginalized group is the comfort women, whose 
plight has been overlooked amidst the tides of nationalism. Other examples include 
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the forgotten people of Fukushima after the Earthquake disaster as well as the pre-
cariat class that is forced into precarious anxiety by capitalism and globalization and 
raises its voice in solidarity. 
　　How can we draw out such voices from the margins of the nation state and put 
them into a theory? The keyword that emerges here is “place.” This awakens us to an 
attention to locality, as they constitute the place where thought and speech emerge. 
Several presentations at the NICHIBUNKEN symposium, which focused on the unfair-
ness in Fukushima and Okinawa, discussed in great detail the efforts to sublimate it in 
literary, religious, and philosophical terms. The symposium underscored the impor-
tance of listening to local “narratives” rooted in the serious experiences of daily life, 
which are not absorbed in the nation state “narratives”. The symposium also revealed 
the importance of putting those voices into theory at a more general level.
　　It is true that many such “discussions” that have survived on the Japanese archi-
pelago have been pushed into the nation state framework amidst modernization since 
the Meiji era. Thus in post-Meiji Japan, history became “national” history （kokushi）, 
Japanese became the “national” language （kokugo）, and Japanese literature became a 
“national” literature （koku-bungaku）. In recent years, however, some of the local fea-
tures that were overshadowed amidst this move toward nation state thinking have 
been revived in scholarship. Although I regret to give such a personal example, the 
research of Wataru Enomoto, a Middle Ages scholar and associate professor at 
NICHIBUNKEN, shows that my hometown, Hakata, was a city of great international 
exchange during the Middle Ages, serving as a hub connecting Japan and the Chinese 
mainland. Many Zen Buddhist priests traveled to China from Hakata and returned 
with Buddhist scriptures, tea, and other cultural products in that land. That achieve-
ment in Hakata’s history has largely gone unnoticed. It has been said that the great 
Japanese religious revolution of the Middle Ages was the creation of Kamakura Bud-
dhism, which inspired interest only in Kamakura and Kyoto, the supposed centers of 
religious history. Meanwhile, the role of Hakata, a marginal community, in interna-
tional exchange was overlooked. I was shocked that I have not known such a fact, al-
though I was born and brought up in Hakata. The people of Hakata also failed to 
recognize the rich seeds that their community had sown in history. It is time to re-
store that recognition.
　　A similar situation can be seen in other places around Japan. The symposium fo-
cused on the subjects of Fukushima and Okinawa, each as a local place representative 
of an element of contemporary or post-war Japan. One topic introduced in this regard 
was the practical activity of literature, religious studies, and contemporary philosophy 
in “translating” the “voiceless voices” （these are Junichi Isomae’s terms） produced and 
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buried in those local places. This kind of practical scholarship should be conducted 
throughout the Japanese archipelago. When such scholarship is conducted, it should 
also remain vigilant to avoid reducing the concept of “local” completely to characteris-
tics specific to a certain region. As illustrated by the example of Hakata, history stud-
ies should not simply extrapolate local history but should place it in the context of a 
locality’s relations with the broader world. I believe that we need scholarship that rec-
ognizes the characteristics unique to a certain local place, while creating local places 
in the regions of Japan that aspire toward universality in terms of how their unique-
ness connects to other regions around the globe. In taking this step, we may also need 
to revisit the very definition of Japan as a nation state.
Ⅳ
Considered from this perspective, “local” can be seen as a place that creates knowl-
edge and disseminates that knowledge outward. Yijian Zhong, another symposium 
participant, proposed placing Japanese studies as a global knowledge-generating mech-
anism. That suggestion directly refers to the transformation of Japanese studies into 
something more closely aligned with the reorganization of knowledge and university 
studies, which is advancing on a global level. I think that the suggestion could be re-
structured by incorporating the “local” concept described above. 
　　I would like to return to the keyword “culture” at this point. That Japanese cul-
ture, especially pop culture, has gained recognition over these past twenty years is 
certain. The Japanese government has sought to capitalize on this trend with a cam-
paign called “Cool Japan,” which aims to direct the popularity of Japanese culture into 
cultural diplomacy. However, I think there might be a pitfall in these types of political 
measures. Takumi Sato, a media history scholar, criticizes Cool Japan as a simplistic 
strategy dependent on existing cultural products. Rather than branding products like 
Doraemon, Pokémon, and the works of author Haruki Murakami as Japanese, Sato 
contends that it would be more productive to direct attention toward the structural 
and societal conditions that facilitated the creation of those products. Culture should 
not be limited to a few complete products but should be understood as the shapes, 
styles, and traditions of society that facilitate such achievement. Only through this 
kind of understanding can Japan obtain recognition as a great bastion of culture that 
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I will now turn to the tentative conclusions of this report. What I intend to propose is 
a “Japan” composed of a collection of “local” places, and within that framework, we en-
vision “Japan” as a knowledge-generating mechanism. Such an approach reconstructs 
the “local” as a place for the creation and dissemination of knowledge, and it boldly re-
positions the nation of Japan as a medium for bridging the gaps between Japan and 
other parts of the world and for organically integrating the “local.” Whether Japan re-
mains “cool” and maintains its title as a cultural exporter depends upon the country’s 
ability to internalize a mechanism for the continuous and perpetual production of new 
culture, without exhausting the stable cultural reserves that already exist. 
　　One descriptive theory to explain the secret of Japanese companies’ strength at 
the peak of the bubble era was advanced by Ikujirō Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi. 
This theory, which described Japanese firms as “knowledge-creating companies,” took 
the world by storm. It described the concept of “tacit knowledge,” or a collective cor-
porate culture, consisting of know-how and customs specific to individual companies, 
acquired over many years through each company’s activities, and that cannot easily 
be put into words. The real value of Japanese companies was seen in their ability to 
generate a process of cyclical knowledge creation by formalizing the tacit knowledge.
　　This example suggests that if Japan wishes to find itself after two lost decades, it 
should seek to become a knowledge-creating nation. Local and national knowledge can 
cooperate and feed into one another in response to Japan’s various problems cumu-
lated, leading to the production of new knowledge. In this way, developing a theory of 
“Japan” can be seen as a challenging but realistic goal.
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Ideologies of State, Market, and Gender from High 
Growth to “Lost Decades”
Andrew GORDON
Introductory
An extraordinary change in the substance and tone of discourse on Japan took place 
both inside and outside the country in the 1990s. Its emblem was the take-off of the 
term “lost decades.” The first published use in English appears to have been a News-
week story in 1998. The first use in Japanese was probably the very same day in a 
Nikkei newspaper column attributing the expression to foreign investors. 1 It hardly 
matters which came first. The idea that Japan was declining or lost was a co-produc-
tion of global and local voices.
　　As the problems associated with the condition of loss persisted, the singular “de-
cade” gave way to the plural “decades,” but the discourse of loss has consistently fo-
cused on two topics: first and foremost, on economic stagnation. But second, and also 
importantly, it has focused on a host of social problems seen as both cause and effect 
of an ailing economy, even though all of these predated the bursting of Japan’s bubble 
economy: an aging society and falling birthrate; rising inequality of income, assets, and 
education; limited change in women’s roles; a perceived decline in energy or ambition 
among youth. Put simply, the consciousness of Japan as “lost” resulted from the punc-
turing not only of an economic bubble, but also of a social myth: that Japan had be-
come and could remain a mass middle class society. The years from the 1990s onward 
have eroded faith in the possibility of the great majority of people to achieve member-
ship in the middle-class, whose hero was the “salaryman” and whose heroine was the 
“professional housewife.” ２
　　The onset of the “lost decades” bisects my own 45 years of connection to Japan, 
and the notion that something profound had changed at the midpoint drew my atten-
1 　Bill Powell, “The Lost Decade,” Newsweek （July ２7, 1998）, p. ２8. Takita Yōichi, “Kokufu: Ushi-
nawareta 10 nen no kyōkun,” Nihon keizai shinbun, July ２0, 1998, evening edition, 3. Because 
magazines date their issues a week after actual publication, the Newsweek story would have 
appeared simultaneously with the Japanese newspaper article.
２ 　I have written on the emergence of the professional housewife as heroine of postwar middle 




tion to this topic. In this paper, with a primary focus on conservative or establishment 
voices, I am interested to examine two aspects of the shifting ideological landscape 
that are particularly relevant to the erosion of confidence in the future of Japan as a 
middle class society: first, thinking about markets and competition as the means to 
sustain a good society; second, attitudes toward change in gender roles. My focus will 
be on policy debates or publically oriented statements by scholars more than works 
written by scholars for each other or for students. But this arena of discourse must be 
examined as we seek to understand trends in the practice of what we typically call 
“Japanese studies.”
　　To assess the widely shared consciousness of loss that took root in the late 1990s 
of course requires that we identify the prior more optimistic state of mind against 
which this shift takes on meaning. It is not hard to find such upbeat views, expressed 
with particular vigor toward the end of the era of high economic growth and a per-
ceived “catch up” with the West, even though some of the key problems associated in 
popular thinking with the time of “lost decades” were already noticeable. We begin, 
then, by examining some of the most notable triumphant declarations that an econom-
ically dynamic and socially stable middle-class Japan had become a global leader and 
even model for others.
Japan as Number One: the Japanese version
My point of departure is an important set of mostly forgotten reports produced at the 
end of the 1970s. These are typically called the “Ōhira reports.” They were prepared 
at the behest of then Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi by a large study group includ-
ing prominent academic figures. 3 They focused mainly on domestic issues ranging 
from management of the economy to family life and issues facing regional Japan, with 
attention as well to international relations. While reflecting some anxiety about the fu-
ture, the reports are most notable for their pride in Japan’s accomplishments. Calls for 
reform were relatively modest, especially when read with the hindsight of several de-
cades.
　　The context for this sort of appraisal was global. 4 The Ōhira study group was 
convened in January 1979. Five months later, the Harvard sociologist Ezra Vogel pub-
3 　大平報告書の正式名称は『大平総理の政策研究会報告書』第 1 ～ 9 巻（大蔵省印刷局、1980
年）。The study group officially began its work in January 1979.
4 　In his paper for this symposium, Naoki Sakai argues for the significance of a global context 
both for the creation of the earlier mode of Japanese studies that produced such positive as-
sessments, and the more recent shift toward more pessimistic appraisals.
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lished Japan as Number One: Lessons for America. A Japanese translation quickly fol-
lowed. The works were not identical, but they shared both optimism and the idea of 
Japan as a model. Although Vogel’s book turned out to have a far greater circulation 
in Japan, he wrote for an American audience; he hoped to encourage Americans to 
look outside their borders for ideas in addressing present-day social and economic is-
sues. Members of the Ōhira group addressed their policy proposals to Japan’s political 
leadership, although they too had an eye on Japan’s potential role as inspiration for 
others.
　　Much like the discourse of Japan as “lost” since the late 1990s, these upbeat ap-
praisals were local/global co-productions. Vogel began working on his project in 1976, 
and he had for some years been a close friend in particular of Satō Seizaburō, who 
along with Kōyama Kenichi and Kumon Shunpei was a key figure in convening the 
Ōhira study group. Vogel and Satō had at various times discussed the issues that 
were addressed in both Vogel’s book and the Ōhira report. 5 Other important scholarly 
works were also published outside Japan in the 1970s that saw the Japanese system 
not as destined to “westernize” but as one to which Western models might converge, 
such as Ronald Dore’s now classic study comparing British and Japanese industrial re-
lations. 6 It was in this context, but also in a context of engagement with more critical 
voices in Japan （and indeed, in reaction to their own prior views）, that the authors of 
the Ōhira report produced their study.
　　Somewhat like Tanaka Kakuei, and in clear contrast to other important postwar 
prime ministers such as Yoshida, Hatoyama, Kishi, Ikeda, Satō, or Miki, Ōhira’s per-
sonal background was socially and economically modest. He entered the Ministry of 
Finance from the forerunner of Hitotsubashi University, not from Tokyo University. 
He rose in the political world thanks to the support of Ikeda Hayato, his superior in 
the Ministry before he himself entered politics. Ōhira was a Christian, and widely 
read; among his intellectual influences were Thomas Aquinas and the British econo-
mist Richard Tawney. He took from them a belief in the importance of intermediary 
groups between individuals and the state, which would safeguard society from the 
harmful effects of either a radically unregulated market economy or anti-capitalist 
class struggle. Ohira advocated “reform capitalism” or social cooperativism. He was 
also impacted by the 「成長の限界」ethos expressed by the Club of Rome; he believed 
that the modernizing growth model had reached a dead end and needed to be tran-
5 　Personal communication, Ezra Vogel （May, ２015）.




scended. Within the Liberal Democratic Party at that time he stood in opposition to 
the Fukuda stream that supported more defense spending and constitutional revision; 
he feared such moves would return Japan to a harmful “premodern” state. He was 
also concerned that the central state held excessive power and wanted to shift the 
balance of political and administrative power to localities. 7
　　The nine volumes produced by the study group all include the same prefatory 
“Proposal for the ２1st Century.” This gives the reports an overarching problem con-
sciousness with clear debt to Ōhira’s world view. The preface begins with a buoyant 







The proposal goes on to lay out the authors’ understanding of the different cultures 








Presenting a vision of East versus West that is itself remarkably binary, the authors 
see Japan as particularly suited to address the difficult problems faced by all modern 
societies, in particular「かつてない自由と経済的豊かさは、これまでの物質文系や近代
7 　本段落の記述は宇野重規の論文に基づく。宇野重規「鈍牛　哲人宰相と知識人たち――大平総
理の政策研究会をめぐって」『アステイオン』81 号（２014 年 11 月）174～177 頁。
8 　大平政策研究会「２1 世紀に向けての提言（総説）」『大平総理の政策研究会報告書』（大蔵省印
刷局、1980 年）1 ～ ２ 頁。
9 　大平政策研究会「２1 世紀に向けての提言（総説）」4 頁。
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合理主義の下で、ともすれば見過ごされがちであった人間の精神的・文化的側面への反
省を促し、より高度な人間的欲求を目覚めさせるに至った」.10 The authors, with Ōhira, 
repeatedly describe Japan and the world as entering「近代を超える時代」. In this new 
world, principles of harmony, balance, as well as mutual solidarity rather than individ-
ualism can be the foundation of Japanese leadership in a new global 「文化の時代」
where there are no longer Western models to chase.11
　　In a notably defensive move, the report follows its first mention of 「近代を超える
時代」 with a firm declaration that「前近代の回帰であってはならない」.1２ The authors 
were well aware that their phrasing echoed discredited wartime discussion of over-
coming modernity. But it seems fair to say that no more than the Ōhira writers did 
those wartime thinkers see themselves as atavistic. They were pursuing a vision of a 
globally relevant Japanese cosmopolitanism, grounded in tradition but transcending 
the modern, albeit a vision that was to be spread to the eight corners of the world by 
military might.
　　Given this echo, as well as the report’s reductive understanding of both Japanese 
and Euro-American culture, it is easy and in some measure fair enough to dismiss the 
Ōhira group’s vision of a new “era of culture” as simplistic and shallow. But I have in-
troduced the report’s underlying premises in some detail for two reasons. It is an ex-
ample of a mode of thinking that not only has deep roots reaching back through the 
war era at least to the late 19th century writings of figures who came together in the 
Society for Political Education （政教社） and its journal, Nihonjin ［The Japanese］. It also 
reflects an enduring stance of those seeking to define “Japan” in a continually changing 
and challenging global environment.
　　Such visions in the past, whether during wartime or in the mid-Meiji era, had 
been marked by a sense of crisis and embattlement, reflecting concern that in the 
rush to ape a modernizing West, Japan was losing its cultural essence. Against this 
background, the relatively confident tone of this manifesto is intriguing, all the more 
because it had not been the tone of some earlier writing by these same men. The ori-
gins of the thinking expressed in the Ōhira report―like the origins of Vogel’s project
―reach back to the mid-1970s. A number of the key figures in the Ōhira brain trust, 
including Kōyama, Satō, and Kumon, had been part of a self-described “Group 1984.” 
Convened by the entrepreneur Ushio Jirō, the founder of a major electronics company 






the February 1975 issue of the monthly magazine 『文藝春秋』.13 It drew much atten-
tion and brought its authors together with Dokō Toshop, at that time president of 
Keidanren.14
　　This manifesto shares with the Ōhira report a concern with the spiritual and cul-
tural character of modern life, and a belief that Japanese culture―or what it calls at 
one point “the Japanese soul （日本の魂）” ―held potential to overcome the economic 
challenges of the energy crisis “so long as Japanese society does not lose its「“self-
discipline（自律性）” and “capacity for autonomic decision（自己決定能力）”.15 But such 
confident claims are remarkably few; as the essay’s title conveys, the overall tone and 
substance of the statement is one of crisis and a fear of imminent disaster. The docu-
ment starts with a vivid account of the decline of the Roman Empire, blamed on elites 
pandering to the masses by providing them “bread and circuses.” It goes on, in a pro-
foundly elitist tone, to condemn present day Japan as a society likewise in moral de-
cline as its leaders, and its economy, pander to mass desire at the expense of social 
discipline and responsibility.
　　More specifically, Japan is said to face three great problems: lack of natural re-
sources, damage to the environment, and an inflationary spiral where excessive pay 
raises chase （and enable） rising consumer prices. But these are less economic prob-
lems than cultural, political and especially psychological afflictions. The root problem is 
the rampant materialism of a mass production society. Homogenized goods destroy 
taste, and standardized work harms laborers both spiritually and physically. Consum-
erism damages the home as well, when women pursue the convenience of instant 
foods and ready-made clothes and forget the joy of knitting or cooking. This modern 
system―essentially capitalist production and consumption although the authors gen-
eral stay away from the “C” word―has created a profound moral crisis of an “infan-
tilized” population, weakened popular judgment, and eroded discipline. To top it off, 
and in one section of this 40 year-old manifesto that hardly feels dated, an overflow of 
information circulated in mass media far too quickly for people to make sense of it on 
their own.16
　　The authors have a clear enemy in mind: the political left, especially the Japan 
Communist Party and the Japan Teachers Union （Nikkyōso） created these problems 
13　「日本の自殺」『文藝春秋』1975 年 ２ 月号、いくつかのコメントをつけて同誌 ２01２ 年 3 月号に
再掲載。
14　宇野前掲「鈍牛　哲人宰相と知識人たち」178 頁。
15　「日本の自殺」再掲載版（２01２ 年）100 頁。Quote marks as in original.
16　「日本の自殺」再掲載版（２01２ 年）100 頁、10２～106 頁、109～110 頁。
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and impedes their resolution. The left is blamed for an excessive or evil egalitarianism 
in an education system that moves students along at the same standard pace without 
recognizing merit, and in a welfare state that erodes self-reliance and discipline. What 
is needed is a turn away―“by consumers, by workers, by politicians, by managers”―
from egoistic self-seeking, a turn to self-reliance, strong leaders not afraid to give un-
happy messages to the people, tough love for the young, and recognition that material 
gain is not the sum of human happiness. The overwrought intensity of this long mani-
festo clearly reflects the conviction of the convert; the authors had themselves been 
student radicals―and Communist Party members―in their youth.
　　Against this background, the Ōhira report must be read as a radically moderated 
presentation of the problems Japan faced, and a dramatically more confident appraisal 
of the potential for Japanese culture not only to thrive but to serve the world outside 
Japan in a new “age of culture.” It is not entirely clear what accounts for this differ-
ence in statements written four years apart by many of the same people. The expla-
nation would appear to rest first in growing confidence; Japan by 1980 had weathered 
the storm of two oil crises in better condition than much of the advanced capitalist 
world, something not anticipated in 1975. Specifically in relation to the earlier article’s 
fear of the left, wage negotiations between cooperative private sector unions and cor-
porations had tamed the inflationary spiral, and the public sector unions had suffered 
major setbacks in a failed “strike for the right to strike”. Second, a report prepared for 
a Prime Minister is politically constrained. It cannot bemoan the present crisis to ex-
cess, especially as the Prime Minister’s party held power during the time the alleged 
crisis emerged, and it must allow the Prime Minister to offer some possible ways for-
ward through his policies.
　　The Ōhira report’s presentation of Japanese economy and culture as a strong 
foundation for a new “age of culture” thus had its origins in an antagonistic, anxi-
ety-ridden dialogue with the left, even if that anxiety was muted in the report and the 
antagonism largely unstated. In later years the report’s essentialist concern to identify 
and preserve something specific to Japan in changing times would persist, and a sense 
of crisis would return. But with the left increasingly marginal, its place as the per-
ceived enemy or source of the problem would diminish （although not disappear, as ev-
idenced in attacks on teachers by politicians such as Hashimoto Tōru as well as Prime 
Minister Abe）. A different axis of opposition would emerge, reflecting the internal 
contradiction at the heart of these manifestos of the 1970s. Even as it was positioned 
as an alternative to the programs of the Japanese left, the Ōhira report’s support for a 
Japanese cultural path placed it in uneasy tension with the incipient neo-liberal spirit 




　　The first important moment in the rise of a Japanese version of neo-liberalism 
came just a few years later under the administration of Nakasone Yasuhiro, more or 
less simultaneously with advent of similar reformism from the right in the United 
States under Reagan and in the United Kingdom under Thatcher. Calling for a “total 
settlement of postwar politics （戦後政治の総決算）”, the centerpieces of Nakasone’s do-
mestic agenda included education reform and the privatization of government monop-
olies, above all the Japan National Railway. Nakasone intended not only to cut the 
huge debt incurred by the railway but above all to destroy the powerful JNR union 
（Kokurō）. There is some dispute among Japanese scholars as to how much direct car-
ryover there was from the Ōhira report authors to Nakasone’s economic programs, 
but the spirit especially of his project for education reform surely carried forward the 
gist of “Japan’s Suicide.”17
　　But for all that Nakasone pursued reforms in education and in public sector mo-
nopolies, through the time of his administration and well beyond, optimistic assess-
ments of Japan’s private sector economic system continued unabated or were put 
forth even more exuberantly. Only after the bubble burst, and even then not immedi-
ately, would a steady stream start to flow calling for reform of the heart of the post-
war economic and social system. Among the most famous early works in the “rescue 
lost Japan” genre were Noguchi Yukio’s Structure of the 1940s （1995） and Richard 
Katz’s Japan: the System that Soured （1998）. Such works were at heart attacks on bu-
reaucratic management of economy and society, and legal restrictions on the operation 
of free markets. After taking a closer look at how the Ōhira report affirmed the value 
of what it defined as a Japanese management system, we will look in more detail at 
the conflicted discourse of market friendly reform that has been the hallmark of eco-
nomic talk in the lost decades.
From Managed to Free Markets?
The Ōhira reports included a particularly interesting volume titled “Busines 
Management in an Age of Culture（文化の時代の経営運営）”.18 It offered a detailed and 
17　There is not space in this paper to examine this issue in depth. For more on the topic, see 大
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positive description of the special characteristics of the Japanese management system. 
In the 1950s and 1960s this system had often been presented as rooted in the 
pre-modern past and fated to converge to a more advanced Western system. Now it 
was seen to be an enduring set of practices that might in fact serve as models for oth-
ers. These included long-term employment and seniority wages, based on a culture 
that stressed solidarity among people （人と人の間柄）, and a modular “rhizome” struc-
ture to organizations, which they contrasted to a top down “tree” structure of Ameri-
can management organization. The “rhizome” model led to more fluid decision making 
involving all relevant parties. These organizations gave security to employees but in 
the view of the authors, they did not lack for effective internal competition; rather 
they possessed “the dynamism of competition for advancement which stood upon a 
foundation of solidarity and peace of mind.”
　　Turning to “competition in the market”, the report gave a ringing endorsement to 






This report’s introduction laid out the above perspective in broad strokes. The rest of 
the document offered further details of practices such as the regular hiring of school 
graduates, the cooperative stance of labor unions, the coordination of financial markets, 
and the practice of administrative guidance. It repeated the point about “fair share” 
over “fair play” and cited Vogel’s Japan as Number One as the source.２0
　　The report did, at the same time, evidence anxiety that echoed the “Japan’s 
Suicide” when it identified signs of erosion of this now effective system, although its 
tone is muted and more optimistic. In an era when a once unimaginable freedom and 
affluence had been achieved, the authors voiced concern at the spiritual state of the 
nation. Echoing concerns found in Europe and North America in these years, they 
feared that across the advanced industrial world, a postwar regime of economic 
growth that promoted popular welfare through access to new technology, cheap en-
19　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 7 巻　文化の時代の経営運営』10 頁。
２0　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 7 巻　文化の時代の経営運営』80～93 頁。
Vogel quote on p. 90.
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ergy, Keynesian demand stimulation, and welfare states had exhausted its potential. 
They worried that except for electronics, no technological innovations were on the 
horizon. Demand management and Japanese-style administrative guidance had a cost 
in inflation, and the emerging welfare state was too costly for taxpayers to sustain. 
Turning to social issues, the emergence of the new middle class with「生産中心主義」
and「会社中心主義」, as the ethos of men, was laudable, but it had brought with it 
some worrying trends. One was called「個別化」, which seems to be not quite individ-
ualism but a partial secession from the group in pursuit of leisure and relaxation （yu-
tori）. Related was an emerging desire for instant gratification and pursuit of pleasure. 
This was related to a perceived self-protective （保身性） or selfish behavior, leading cou-
ples to have fewer children and speeding the aging of society. All of these economic 
and social problems were encapsulated in the notion of “advanced country disease,” a 
toxic mix of declining economic energy, political un-governability and social anomie 
manifest in terrorism, crime, youth delinquency, and suicide. But Japan, they con-
cluded, still possessed a dynamism and cohesion that was the envy of others.２1 Thanks 
in large measure to its ability to manage competition both within organizations and in 
the wider marketplace, it had so far contracted no more than the advanced country 
sniffles, hardly the flu or pneumonia.
　　As Japan’s economy continued to outpace its advanced country rivals and allies 
through the 1980s, an even more exuberant tone came to mark discourse on Japan in 
the academy as well as among policy makers. By the mid-1980s, declarations echoing 
the report’s binary divide of Western and Japanese culture, and elevating a Japanese 
style of labor management to the status of a model to the world, were common both 
among scholars and a wider public. Itami Hiroyuki, a well-known professor of manage-
ment at Hitotsubashi University, proclaimed his belief in the superiority of what he 
called a「人本主義的企業システム」which he understood to be the「日本文明の企業
的側面」. He argued that「日本の長い繁栄を考えるのなら、いささか大げさではずか
しい話だが、文明を輸出することを意識して考えるべき時期にきているのではないか」
―most notably, its corporate system.”２２ The eminent sage of Japanese-style quality 




２1　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 7 巻　文化の時代の経営運営』36～50 頁。
２２　伊丹敬之「文明を輸出するとき」『アステイオン』創刊 ２ 号（1986 年）41～4２ 頁。
２3　唐津一「米国の破綻」『Voice』106 号（1986 年）1２3 頁、1２5 頁。
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　　Of course, with the bursting of the economic bubble in a crash of stock and land 
prices, followed by years of anemic, sometimes negative, economic growth, this happy 
chorus with its hymns of praise gave way to criticism and calls for change in the 
media and among some academics. The British magazine, Economist, was in the fore-
front among foreign press. As early as 1993 it gleefully reported a decision by Pioneer, 
the large audio-equipment maker, to force 35 veteran employees to retire early. “Capi-
talism in Japan is becoming harder to confuse with socialism. ...［The Pioneer deci-
sion］ is seen as a signal that the post-1945 tradition of life-time employment in big 
companies is creaking under pressure from economic slowdown.”２4 As the United 
States economy surged through the late 1990s, American-style corporate governance, 
often described as a “shareholder capitalism” in which the best outcomes for all were 
achieved by giving primary attention to return on the shareholder’s investment, was 
put forward as the new model in a renewed statement of―and support for―the 
America-centered global convergence of labor-management relations. Japanese firms 
were criticized for their adherence to a “stakeholder” capitalism that considered the 
interests of employees and of managers to be comparable to those of investors.２5 
　　But through the 1990s one found both in the wider society and among corporate 
leaders and elite bureaucrats an enduring attraction to the ideas and institutions un-
derstood in the Ōhira report to have provided the foundation for the nation’s postwar 
rise as a global economic power. To be sure, corporate Japan in these years made 
many quite significant changes in the workplace. As they had already been doing at 
least since the 1980s, companies facing global competition from low wage nations dra-
matically cut their numbers of domestic employees. They also increasingly turned to 
the hiring of non-regular workers in various categories: part-time employees, dispatch 
workers, contract workers. Perhaps because these changes were in fact quite exten-
sive, many in Japan spoke of the need for caution in the continued pursuit of reforms.
　　As one example, consider the 1996 proposal of Japan’s major employer federation 
focused on labor issues, Nikkeiren. Called the “Bluebird Plan,” this was in significant 
measure a managerial vision of a deregulated future where companies would be more 
responsive to market forces. The federation called for “structural” reforms, in particu-
lar the end to regulation of utilities, distribution, and transportation, said to drive up 
the cost of the industrial infrastructure. But Nikkeiren ended its call for reform with a 
strong caution. Although「市場経済・資本主義は自由競争原理を通じて産業の興隆、
２4　“To encourage the others,” Economist, January 16 （1993）, p. 66. 
２5　Ross Mouer and Hirosuke Kawanishi, A Sociology of Work in Japan （Cambridge: Cambridge 








る」.２6 The echo of the Ōhira report’s praise of managed competition is clear, as is the 
similarity in Nikkeiren’s explicit presentation of a “third way” that would avoid what it 
saw as the excesses of Anglo-American capitalism as well as the rigidities of social 
democratic systems. Nikkeiren here called on management more than the state to 
curb the excesses of the market, but it also called for a new civilian power of the citi-
zenry at large to play this role, and it mentioned unions as cooperative partners who 
were needed to help enterprises be all the more flexible in hiring and deploying work-
ers and in setting wages in “rational” fashion. The Rengō labor federation had a similar 
view. In 1997 its secretary general was Washio Etsuji, formerly a union leader at New 
Japan Steel. Interviewed for a front-page feature on “Private sector reform: the future 
of the corporation” in April 1997, he noted that「どの企業も大競争時代と声高に叫び、
危機感をあおり、雇用を奪おうとしている。安易な人減らしは生産性まで低める」.２7 
These cautious reformers of the managerial and union elite spoke for many. They 
found support in media commentary suspicious of too single-minded a pursuit of an 
American model.２8
　　In the early ２000s, the tide seemed to turn away from such caution in media dis-
course, party politics, and state policy. In ２003, the Nihon Keizai shinbun ran a high 
profile series on what it called the “Japanese disease” （picking up on much earlier crit-
icisms of “the British disease” of economic stagnation and entrenched labor power）. 
The paper condemned Japanese business leaders for failing to implement much 
needed reforms in how they managed their companies.２9 It was of course reflecting 
and supporting the ambitious free market reform spirit of the administration of Koi-
zumi Jun’ichirō, who came to power in April ２001 and would remain the Prime Minis-
ter for over five years （until September ２006）.
　　Koizumi pursued policies of deregulation and privation with unprecedented vigor. 
His most ambitious reform by far was to further deregulate financial markets by pri-
２6　日本経営者団体連盟「ブルーバードプラン・プロジェクト」（1997 年度～ 1999 年度）報告
（1997 年 1 月）２5 頁。
２7　「米国型競争社会を実現すればいいのか（民革――企業の未来を問う　下）」『朝日新聞』1997
年 4 月 8 日朝刊 1 面。
２8　Edward Lincoln, “Japan Hasn’t Really Failed,” New York Times, Saturday, February ２２, 1997.
２9　Mouer and Kawanishi, p. ２54. And/or find cite to original, January ２003.
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vatizing the massive postal savings and insurance system. He and his allies, most sig-
nificantly the economist and cabinet minister for economic policy, Takenaka Heizō, 
argued that this was the only way to insure that its assets were invested in the most 
productive sectors and enterprises according to a logic of the market rather than at 
the behest of special interests. They trumpeted this reform as the key to Japan’s eco-
nomic recovery and long run prosperity, and with a landslide victory in the Lower 
House election of ２005, in essence a referendum on privatizing the postal savings sys-
tem, Koizumi appeared to have triumphed unequivocally over anti-reform sentiment, 
including significant resistance within his own party.
　　Koizumi also pursued labor market deregulation with considerable energy. In 
２003, his administration won approval of a revised Labor Standards Law, which ex-
panded the scope of fixed-term contract labor.30 And in ２004, after two years of negoti-
ations with labor unions and opposition parties, his government enacted a new 
Dispatch Worker Law, which made it possible for labor brokers, until then limited to 
providing workers in a small number of service industries, to dispatch workers to jobs 
of any sort.
　　Koizumi’s mantra throughout his administration was “stractual reform without 
sanctuary（聖域なき構造改革）”. Takenaka and Koizumi’s other advisors likewise justi-
fied their reforms with a neo-liberal rhetoric that was considerably more forceful than 
anything heard in the postwar past. Takenaka, for example, dismissed concerns about 
growing economic disparities with the claim that while polices were needed to support 
those in poverty, if the rich got richer, so much the better:「がんばってリスクをとっ
て、どんどん稼いで、たくさん納税してくれる人は増えたほうがいい」.31 That the ex-
panded ranks of non-regular workers might lack buying power did not seem to trouble 
him. In a similar spirit, Ushio Jirō, a close Koizumi advisor and one of the charter 
members of the “Group 1984” which wrote “Japan’s Suicide（日本の自殺）” thirty years 
earlier, told a reporter who asked him about the negative side of deregulation such as 
the rise of non-regular work that deregulation had not gone nearly far enough. Only 
about ２0 percent of the needed changes had taken place during Koizumi’s time in of-
fice.3２ And another of Koizumi’s business allies, Miyauchi Yoshihiko, chairman of the 
30　Hiroya Nakakubo, “The ２003 Revisions of the Labor Standards Law: Fixed Term Contracts, 
Dismissals, and Discretionary Work Schemes,” Japan Labor Review （２004）, pp.4 ―２5.
31　「（検証・構造改革　第 4 部・当事者たちの証言：1 ）総務大臣・竹中平蔵氏」『朝日新聞』２006
年 9 月 5 日朝刊 10 面。In the same interview, he also dismissed the possibility that poverty 
was a significant problem in Japan, compared to Europe or America.
3２　「（検証・構造改革　第 4 部・当事者たちの証言：3 ）ウシオ電機会長・牛尾治朗氏」『朝日新聞』
２006 年 9 月 7 日朝刊 10 面。 
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Orix corporation, celebrated the shift from Keynesian polices that supported the econ-
omy with public expenditures to structural reforms aimed to increase the scope of the 
market economy. For Miyauchi, growth had to be the goal, and if one cost was rising 
inequality, so be it.33
　　But for all this rhetoric, even at the high tide of market reform under Koizumi’s 
administration, the enduring attraction of what the Ōhira report called an ethos of fair 
share rather than fair play was evident. The government’s ２001 draft of a proposed 
new Labor Standards Law included an initial declaration that “employers have the 
right to dismiss employees,” followed by the proviso that such dismissals had to be 
“reasonably” grounded. Labor unions, lawyer organizations, and the opposition political 
parties all objected strenuously to this initial statement. They felt it would weaken the 
doctrine of the “abuse of the right to fire,” which had been developed over several de-
cades of case law, although never written into legislation. In the end, the revised 
Labor Standards Law passed in ２003, while moving slightly toward deregulation by 
widening the scope of contract labor, also omitted the first draft’s affirmation of a 
right to fire while inscribing in a statute for the first time ever the requirement that 
dismissals be “reasonable” and not an “abuse of right.” A clause of the new law （Art. 
18― ２ ） stated “In cases where a dismissal is not based upon any objectively reasonable 
grounds, and is not socially acceptable as proper, the dismissal will be null and void as 
an abuse of right34. In addition, amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Law included greater protection for women against dismissals either directly or indi-
rectly based on gender. A new Whistleblowers Protection Law （２004） outlawed dis-
missal on ground of whistle blowing, and a revised （２004） Child Care and Family 
Care Leave Law ruled out the dismissal of employees taking leave for child care or 
family care.35 
　　Of most interest, key business leaders were reluctant to embrace the affirmation 
of a right to dismiss. The head of Nikkeiren, Okuda Hiroshi （later the first chairmen 
of the merged Keidanren/Nikkeiren） put it clearly in ２001 as discussions of a revised 
law were beginning:
私はこれ〔解雇規制の緩和〕を最もやってはいけないことであると思います。それ
33　「（検証・構造改革　第 4 部・当事者たちの証言：7 ）オリックス会長・宮内義彦氏」『朝日新聞』
２006 年 9 月 13 日朝刊 8 面。
34　Takashi Araki, “Corporate Governance Reforms, Labor Law Developments and the Future of 
Japan’s Practice-Dependent Shareholder Model,” in Japan Labor Review （２005）, pp. 40―4２.
35　Woolf, “The Death of Lifelong Employment in Japan,” pp. 76―77.
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は最も警戒すべき便乗解雇を容易にするものであるとともに、何より、経営者のモ
ラルハザードに直結しかねないものであるからであります。36
　　Okuda expanded on his implicit call for corporate managers to act with restraint 
in Keidanren’s New Year statement of ２003, sometimes called the “Okuda vision” 
which called for a 「民主導・自律型の日本独自の成長モデル」. This vision was thin on 
detail, so it is hard to be sure in what sense Okuda and Keidanren felt a need for cor-
porate self-discipline, but the statement appears to echo the moralism of the Ōhira 
study group and the earlier manifesto on “Japan’s suicide”, which also spoke of the im-
portance of corporate and individual self-discipline in a society marked by ever ex-
panding desire for material gain.37
　　Even during the Koizumi administration, then, the attitude toward neo-liberal re-
form remained ambivalent or divided even among business leaders. As Sanford Jacoby 
wrote in ２005, significant numbers not only of labor leaders but corporate executives 
and academics were urging “preservation or incremental reform of current corporate 
practices.” They argued that too dramatic a shift toward American practices would 
“erode Japan’s comparative organizational advantage in customer and supplier rela-
tions, product quality, firm-specific human capital formation, and speed of execution.”38
　　And, as the post-Koizumi era loomed in ２006, a pushback against reform esca-
lated. It focused in particular on the recently expanded scope of dispatch labor, even 
though such workers accounted for a small minority of all non-regular workers. It is 
important to remember that the so-called “lost decades” were not a time of continuous 
economic decline, and certainly not a span of unrelenting losses for Japanese corpora-
tions. By the spring of ２006, the economy had been slowly but steadily growing for 
four years, and businesses were reporting growing profits. But criticism that these 
benefits were not widely shared came to be voiced even within the establishment. 
Shinagawa Masaharu, for example, a former director of the Keizai Dōyūkai, Japan’s 
second most important business association, presciently noted that「小泉改革は資本家
のための改革だったと反発が出かねない状況だ」.39




37　日本経営者団体連合会「活力と魅力溢れる日本をめざして」（２003 年 1 月 1 日）。https://
www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/vision２0２5.html 
38　Sanford Jacoby, The Embedded Corporation: corporate governance and employment relations 
in Japan and the United States （Princeton: Princeton University Press, ２005）, pp. 7―8. 
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within the LDP rejected calls for further deregulation, in particular the proposal to re-
move the three year limit to the duration of any one dispatch worker’s stint. Yanagi-
sawa Hakuo, Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare, told the press “there are people 
among the dispatch workers who want to become regular employees, and a time limit 
is necessary so they are not stuck in that status.” The resistance here likely stemmed 
as much or more from the career bureaucrats with responsibility for labor and wel-
fare issues, as from the politicians who served briefly as cabinet ministers. One un-
named ministry official complained of the free market reformers: 「直接雇用を促すとい
う制度の根幹をひっくり返し、厚みのある正社員層を切り崩そうというのか。２0 代の
フリーターの 85 ％は正社員を望んでいるというのに」.40
　　Yanagisawa’s predecessor as Minister, Kawasaki Jirō, noted in an interview a 
couple weeks later that he and others among the LDP MPs were concerned that the 
benefits of recovery had not reached enough people, especially those in smaller com-
panies or sub-contractors to larger firms. Non-regular workers received no bonuses or 
retirement pay, and the minimum wage was much too low. Japan had become “the 
worst of the low-wage countries（最低の最低賃金国）”. Non-regular workers who held 
such jobs against their wishes needed policies to move them into regular status.41
　　Although he was in favor of some market-friendly reforms, such as the white col-
lar exemption on overtime pay, Minister Yanagisawa stuck to his opposition to further 
deregulation of dispatch labor. From autumn of ２006 through the winter of ２007 
（under the first Abe administration）, a vigorous debate on this issue set the Ministry 
of Health, Labor and Welfare against Keidanren; in the end the Ministry and their al-
lies among the LDP’s reluctant reformers prevailed. One reason was that strong DPJ 
resistance in the upper house, where it held a majority, was in any case expected to 
doom the reform. But the LDP was itself divided. 
　　Against this background, the made-in-America global financial crisis of ２008 fur-
ther discredited the cause of American-style free market reform, and gave a boost to 
those who supported existing practices of long-term employment. In June ２008, with 
the support of the newly-installed Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo, the new Minister of 
Health Welfare and Labor, Masuzoe Yōichi, argued that “regular employment should 
be the norm.” The fact that a recent （and rare） murderous attacker of random shop-
39　「（奥田経団連　変容の 4 年　上）蜜月の実装　「改革」と響きあい」『朝日新聞』２006 年 5 月
18 日朝刊 8 面。
40　「（時時刻刻）派遣待遇、潜む危険　直接雇用義務撤廃を検討」『朝日新聞』２006 年 1２ 月 1 日 ２
面。
41　「「非正社員の代弁したい」　川崎・自民雇用生活調査会長」『朝日新聞』２006 年 1２ 月 14 日朝
刊 1２ 面。
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pers in Tokyo’s Akihabara district had been a dispatch worker provided part of the 
motivation for this stance.4２ But concern over the insecurity of employment and future 
prospects for non-regular workers was widespread, and it came together in the out-
pouring of popular support for the thousands of dispatch workers who lost their jobs 
during the immediate aftermath of the Lehman shock.43 
　　This conflict among conservative elites over the desirability of neo-liberal reforms 
can also be seen in the dissonance between “White Papers” issued by two government 
ministries just before and then after the global financial crisis. The Cabinet Bureau’s 
Economy and Finance White Paper of ２008 （written before the crisis of that year） 
continued to beat the drums of reform. It lamented the rigidity of「伝統的日本型企業」
compared to what it called「市場型企業」. The former―defined as companies that re-
lied on a single main bank and followed the “traditional” commitment to long-term em-
ployment―were unwilling to take necessary risks. The report acknowledged that the 
security of a long term position can lead to willingness to take risks by employees 
who will not be afraid to fail, but it argued that this potential benefit is outweighed by 
the fact that employees concerned to insure the long-run survival of their company so 
they can get pensions and future wage gains will not take risks that might upset the 
status quo. Further, the slow adoption in “traditionalistic” companies of incentive or 
results-based pay schemes failed to encourage risk taking.44
　　In sharp contrast, Ministry of Health Welfare and Labor strongly defended the 
core institutions that had come to be celebrated in the high growth era. The ２008 
Labor Economy White Paper likewise written and released before the Lehman shock, 
worried that employment in high value added positions was not growing, while inse-
cure non-regular jobs were on the rise. Further, an increased use of performance in-
centives for middle aged and older regular workers lowered morale by expanding 
disparities among employees. A rethinking of wage practice was needed. The report 
concluded that Japan’s notable practice of long term employment, marked by regular 
school grad hiring, learning on the job through experience, and attention to building 
career paths, was making a comeback. After having come under attack in the 1990s 
and early ２000s, regard for「日本型雇用慣行」had risen along with the improved econ-
omy of the past several years. The goal of policy was said to be support for such prac-
4２　「日雇い派遣禁止、範囲は　厚労相、法形成の意向　各党の主張に隔たり」『朝日新聞』6 月 14
日朝刊 7 面。
43　Toru Shinoda, “Which Side are You On? Hakenmura and the Working Poor as a Tipping 
Point in Japanese Labor Politics” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 7 , Issue 14, No. 3 , April 4 , 
２009.
44　内閣府『経済財政白書』（２008 年）135～14２ 頁。特に 140～141 頁。
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tices, highly valued by workers and by many employers.45
　　The following year’s Labor Economy White Paper―issued just after the financial 






This clarion call to defend Japanese employment practice, issued in the name of Minis-
ter Masuzoe （later the governor of Tokyo）, does not make clear what would consti-
tute the “new form” to be added, though one assumes it would involve some degree of 
increased flexibility. Nonetheless, the overall tone here is hardly reformist. At a mo-
ment of intense economic crisis, the focus of this Ministry, at least, was on shoring up 
existing institutions rather than transforming them.
　　Under the second Abe administration, economic thinking and policy has continued 
to play out as a negotiation between defense of and desire for the status quo, and call 
for free market reform. On the one hand, the government has revised the dispatch 
worker law by eliminating the requirement that companies convert a dispatch work-
er’s position to regular employment after three years, and it continues to press to ex-
empt companies from the need to offer overtime pay to white-collar workers with 
relatively high incomes. On the other hand, in the parliamentary election of December 
２014, one key measure of success put forward by the Abe administration was the ris-
ing percent of college seniors who were winning promises of regular employment be-
fore graduation （内定率）. Also, in spring of ２015 as in the previous year, the Prime 
Minister pushed corporate managers with unusual force to offer wage increases 
during the annual springtime round of bargaining with unions, in a sign of the contin-
ued or indeed increased salience of a corporatist model of economic management in-
volving the state in consultation with management and labor.
　Another striking sign that a style of economic management associated with the 
heyday of administrative guidance remained alive and well in Tokyo was the role of 
the Prime Minister and METI in revising “guidelines for transactions” between large 
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and small firms in 14 industries in spring of ２015. The revision was informed by “con-
centrated on-site inspections” of approximately 500 major firms. The goal of the new 
guidelines was to press large companies to share the burden with smaller subcontrac-
tors of the increased costs of imported raw materials and energy due to the sharp fall 
in the value of the yen rather than pass on those costs to the weaker partners. This in 
turn was intended to allow the smaller firms to offer pay increases to their employees, 
thus reinforcing a virtuous cycle of rising wages and rising consumption feeding back 
into stronger production and productivity, a cycle at the heart of the political economy 
of Japan as a mass middle class society.47
Beyond a Society of Male Breadwinners, and Good Wives, Wise Mothers?
Although its discussion of the issue was relatively limited, the Ōhira reports gave 
some attention to the social and economic roles women were playing and would play
―or ought to play―in the future. These were discussed in passing in the volume on 
economic management in an “age of culture” and more directly in the report on “en-
riching the foundation of family.”48 The authors remained very much in the grip of a 
traditional modernity defined by breadwinning men and home-managing women, even 
as they indicated their awareness of challenges to these roles and the world view that 
sustained them and some need to widen the range of life choices available to women.
　　In its report on families, the Ōhira group in 1980 already identified what remain 
35 years later as two of the most urgent related issues understood to be facing Japa-
nese society: an aging population and a declining birth rate. But the focus was less on 
the need for elder care, an issue that would emerge to prominence later, and more on 
offering women paths to fulfillment in their middle and older ages, as they were living 
longer and now had many decades post childrearing, which needed to be filled with ei-
ther hobbies or work （there is no discussion of providing fulfillment to men post-re-
tirement）. The report also identified a need for policies to support women who did 
choose careers in the working world from a younger age, such as better childcare, but 
the framing assumption was that for the most part, men would earn a living and 
women would manage the home.
　　The report envisioned a rich cultural life for such women in the years after the 
47　首相官邸「経済の好循環実現に向けた政労使会議」２015 年 4 月 ２ 日（http://www.kantei.





heaviest burden of childrearing had passed. While mentioning that about half of all 
women were working outside the home, it noted that women must be enabled to pur-





ア活動」. At a later point, in a section on「婦人の生きがいと生活設計」the report 
listed four possible life paths for women, one of which was to work outside the home, 
whether part time or full time. The authors did mention the importance of giving 
women the ability to make use of their education, ability, and experience in the work-
place.49 But the strong force of a male breadwinner ideology was evident throughout, 
as was awareness there were exceptions or challenges to such a vision. A bit later in 
the report, the authors noted that an established division of labor in which women 
work in subsidiary roles while men are the “breadwinners” was the guiding principle 
of the gendered division of labor in the families of industrial societies. But however 
much this was generally appropriate, there were exceptional cases, whether stemming 
from economic need or from women’s own ambitions. Society should offer chance and 
room for such women to work on equal footing if they wish. This meant offering not 
only part time work but equal treatment for those who did want to work on equal 
basis.50 
　　Toward the end of this volume, a brief section addressed in some detail （although 
only for women） the related matter of what has come to be called “work-life balance.” 
Titled「有職夫人の仕事と家庭生活への支援」it noted an「家庭のほかに専門的な仕事
と職業をもつ有職夫人が増大している」. A marked shift had taken place as fewer and 
fewer women worked as “family labor” in agriculture, small commercial operations, or 
home-based production, and more worked outside the home for wages. In this context, 
and gently anticipating the more recent strategic emphasis on women as a resource 
for the national economy, the report asserted the importance of opening pathways for 
women to make use of their high abilities in various realms of economic life so as to 
increase the quality of Japanese 「人的資源」. Specific measures put on the agenda of 
state or corporate policy were longer maternity leaves, childbirth leaves, child care fa-
cilities, shorter working hours, two day weekends, more annual and summer vacations, 





49　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 3 巻　家庭基盤の充実』9２ 頁、18２ 頁。
50　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 3 巻　家庭基盤の充実』133～134 頁。
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　　The volume on economic management touched only lightly on the question of 
women in economic life, but where it did, it echoed this tentative emphasis on giving 
women a somewhat greater role outside the home or family business in a way that 
pointed directly to the later emergence of a varied “portfolio” of non-regular jobs for 
both men and especially for women. In the future, this volume asserted, it will be nec-
essary to both retain a core of long term employees and gain greater flexibility in ad-
justing employment to a changing business climate. To this end, it will be necessary 
for companies to systematically offer specialized jobs for medium and short term as-
signments. Such an approach would enhance corporate flexibility, reduce competition 
for top posts （by limiting the number of long term employees）, and offer opportunities 
for good jobs for women. Similarly, an expansion of part-time work was welcomed as 
a way to offer positions to women and older workers. This would offer women and the 
elderly time to pursue a “cultural” life, and these jobs would not threaten the posts of 
the core of long term employees, and offering them opportunities for cultural life5２. 
　　The configuration of family life that runs throughout the various volumes of the 
study group is one where some women might find fulfilment some of the time by 
working outside the home, but where their basic commitment lay within the home. 
This vision was clearly connected to the study group’s underlying assumption of a 
Japanese cultural particularity suited to face common problems of the advanced indus-





This passage discussed “family” with no specific reference to women or men, but the 
only way to read it is in gendered terms. It echoes the gauzy nostalgia for a lost 
world where housewives poured their souls into knitting and sewing for the family, so 
vividly articulated in the passage from “Japan’s Suicide” cited above. For the men who 
wrote these documents, it was the special role of women to anchor the families that 
gave Japan its stability in the face of rapid social change. The Ōhira report went on to 
note that Japan was blessed with a high proportion of families where grandparents 
lived together with children and grandchildren, and more generally a warm network 
51　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 3 巻　家庭基盤の充実』184～186 頁。 
5２　大平政策研究会編『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 7 巻　文化の時代の経営運営』1２8～130 頁。
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of human relations grounded in family life. The goal of policy should be to support the 
foundation of such families. Even as they noted that “today, with the rise in married 
women who pursue careers （職業）, a desire for husbands and wives to share ［family］ 
roles is evident,” the authors introduced a 1979 survey that showed the majority of 
people in Japan expected husbands to be primary breadwinners and wives to raise 
children, monitor their education, and shoulder the burden of elder care.53
　　I have introduced the Ōhira study group’s discussion of women and the family at 
some length because over the following thirty-five years, in Japan more than in many 
countries, the tension embedded in the report remains deeply entrenched; it sets the 
traditionally gendered modern family as the “guiding principle” of industrial society 
against a newer vision of women as social actors on a par with men in their opportu-
nities and accomplishments. To be sure, in 1985 the government adopted an Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law, revised and strengthened in 1997, and in 1999, it pro-
mulgated a Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society. This set forth the ambitious goal of 
realizing a “gender equal society in which men and women respect each other's 
human rights and share responsibilities, and every citizen is able to fully display their 
individuality and ability regardless of gender.”54 Today, the Abe administration pro-
claims the goal of building a “society where women can shine（女性が輝く社会）” and it 
promotes in rhetoric―including numerical targets―the goal of a sharp increase in the 
numbers of women taking on leadership roles in economic and political life.
　　But the legal reforms have been contested and tentative at every step. Echoing 
the spirit of the Ōhira report and a longer heritage of gender ideology, support for a 
more “traditional” gendering of society remains powerful. One finds evidence of this in 
the response to various efforts to enable women to participate more fully and on their 
own terms in social and economic life. Among the most notable examples is the re-
fusal of successive LDP （or DPJ） administrations to pursue legal reforms that would 
allow women to keep their original family name upon marriage, even after the Justice 
Ministry’s Legal System Advisory Council （Hōsei Shingikai） went on record in favor 
of this reform in 1996. This reform would not only carry practical and symbolic 
weight by allowing women to build careers with a continuous identity from before 
marriage and giving recognition to women’s identity independent of a husband’s fam-
ily. It also would have important practical implications for couples who do not formally 
marry in order to maintain separate names, and whose children are therefore consid-
53　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 3 巻　家庭基盤の充実』34～35 頁、84 頁。
54　From preamble to the law, official translation, accessed at http://www.gender.go.jp/english_
contents/about_danjo/lbp/index.html. 
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ered illegitimate. 
　　Resistance to this reform is grounded in the continuing ideological power of the 
view found in the Ōhira report that the “family and its foundation”―implicitly a foun-
dation sustained by women in domestic roles―was a source of social stability and cul-
tural identity. Thus, when the Legal Advisory Council issued its report called for 
legalization of separate names in 1996, one of the leading politicians in the LDP, 
Murakami Masakuni （dubbed the “don of the House of Councillors） warned “this will 
weaken family ties （kizuna） and sow seeds of family dissolution.”55 Over the years, 
such sentiments have remained deeply rooted in the LDP, whose Prime Ministers 
have repeatedly invoked the divide in public opinion on the merits of the reform as 
reason to move cautiously or not at all. Indeed, public opinion polls on this issue have 
generally shown at most an even split on the issue, or else a minority in favor.56
　　In other realms of policy, one finds a more mixed picture, although one that ulti-
mately reveals the enduring power of the expectation that women anchor the home 
front. Osawa Mari’s important work on Japanese social security programs makes this 
complexity clear.57 She shows that on the one hand, the government has in its rhetoric 
moved away from the concept of a “Japanese style welfare society” that was the rul-
ing ideal through the 1980s. Prime Minister Miyazawa in the 1990s put forth a goal of 
social fairness alongside efficiency in speaking of social programs, and he lamented the 
absence of fathers as a distorting factor in family life. Prime Minister Hashimoto af-
firmed a commitment to「男女共同参画社会の実現」in the late 1990s. The LDP-Social-
ist coalition government in 1994 also called for a shift in welfare policies from support 
of male-headed families toward support of individuals, although few such policies were 
implemented immediately. But the pioneering long-term care insurance program, writ-
ten into law in 1997 and implemented from ２000, did take an important step away 
from elder-care as the private work of women in the family when it provided state-
funded services to those who qualified for care. One can read the significance of this 
step against the grain of comments such as that of the LDP politician, Kamei Shizuka, 
who complained that this system would destroy「子が親を介護するという美風」.
　　Moving from policies for elders to those for youths, one sees with astonishing 
55　Statement on floor of House of Councillors, January ２5, 1996. Accessed via kokkai.ndl.go.jp.
56　For Ministry of Justice list of polls generally running against the reform （though with in-
creasing acceptance over time）, see www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/minji36-05.html.  
　　法務省 HP「選択的夫婦別氏制度に関する世論調査結果（総数比較）」（www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/





clarity the persistence of the assumption that women’s primary role was in the home 
in the way the government has defined the category of young workers known as 
furītā. This term is not a legal status, and has only recently and inconsistently been 
treated by the state as a category of employment. It began as a colloquial term that 
came into common use in the mid-1980s, originally with a positive connotation of care-
free youth pursuing non-mainstream careers. The famous and notorious Recruit Cor-
poration gave the term a boost as the centerpiece of a marketing campaign in 1987. 
But in the 1990s and after, it took on the relatively negative connotation of young peo-
ple unable to get a footing on a strong career track, both in state policy and to some 
large extent in the wider culture. 
　　In 1991 the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare offered what appears to be the 
first official definition of the term in its annual White Paper on labor：「「アルバイト」
か「パート」と呼ばれている雇用者で、男子では継続就業年数 5 年未満、女子では未婚
の者」58 The Ministry of Internal Affairs in ２003 for the first time began to count the 
number of furītā in its「労働力調査」. It adopted a slightly revised definition of「15～
34 歳の男性又は未婚の女性（学生を除く）で、パート・アルバイトして働く者又はこ
れを希望する者」59. In this bureaucratic mind’s eye, when a woman married she was 
no longer a furītā even if she continued on the same job. Rather, insofar as she now 
had a husband expected to be the breadwinner, her official identity shifted from that 
of an individual in a non-regular category of employment to that of a dependent 
woman.
　　In practice the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare has been more flexible than 
this definition implies. In a ２011 report, the Ministry described furītā as “divided into 
three categories: the「モラトリアム型」biding their time until the find an occupation 
they want to pursue; the「やむを得ず型」who while aiming for regular employment 
cannot get such work; and the「夢追求型」who have a clear future goal but are now 
working just to get by60.” In ２01２ the Ministry established a network of over ２00 “em-
ployment assistance” centers （就労支援センター） at public employment agencies through-
out Japan. Their mission was to help young working people in non-regular jobs, in 
particular those considered furītā, to find regular jobs with long-term stability61. The 
goal was to cut the number of furītā from its ２01２ level of almost 1．8 million to 1．２ 
58　労働省政策調査部『図説 労働白書　平成 3 年度版』至誠堂、1991 年、88 頁。
59　厚生労働省「若者雇用関連データ」２011 年（http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/２010/01/tp01２7-
２/1２.html）。２015 年 6 月 ２4 日アクセス。「15～34 歳の男性又は未婚の女性（学生を除く）で、
パート・アルバイトして働く者又はこれを希望する者」。
60　厚生労働省「若者雇用関連データ」２011 年（http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/２010/01/tp01２7-
２/1２.html）。２015 年 6 月 ２4 日アクセス。
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million by ２0２0. The Ministry defines those eligible for the program as “furītā and 
such （フリーター等）”, thus not strictly following the official definition. It makes not only 
those strictly defined as furītā, but also married women, and all men and women in 
non-regular jobs up to the age of 45, eligible for assistance.6２ But the great majority of 
those who use the program are indeed men.
　　Apart from the matter of gender bias in the official definition, this initiative is 
problematic for imposing a normative understanding of proper adulthood that stigma-
tizes the pursuit of a furītā lifestyle; for some significant portion of the population 
furītā was a positive choice rather than a sign of failure to find a proper place in soci-
ety. Still, given that many younger adults unable to find stable employment do indicate 
a desire to do so, launching this program made sense. Despite the formal opening of 
this job assistance program to married women, the overall context of the history of 
the notion of furītā reveals the enduring power of a vision of women as guardians of 
the family whose default mode was of employment as a supplementary activity.
　　The discussion thus far has focused mainly on the ideology and policies of politi-
cians and bureaucrats, with a glance at divided sentiment among the wider public in 
polls on the question of women maintaining their family names at marriage. Govern-
ment polling conducted at three year intervals by the cabinet’s Gender Equality Bu-
reau from 199２ through ２01２ suggests that the notably halting moves of bureaucratic 
and political elites toward gender equality over these decades have not been greatly 
out of step with popular wishes, even among women. To be sure, the proportion of all 
men and women （among roughly 3000 to 4000 respondents in each poll） who believe 
women should continue their careers through marriage and childrearing years and be-
yond has risen steadily from only ２3 percent in 199２ to 48 percent in ２01２, with hardly 
less than a two percent difference in views of men and women in ２01２. But when 
asked whether they supported the belief that “men should work outside the home and 
women should protect the family,” the 3033 respondents in ２01２ reversed a 17 year 
trend moving against that position. Those who supported this venerable vision of 
women as good wives and wise mothers had fallen from 60 percent of all in 199２ to 41 
percent in ２009. Three years later the traditionalists had jumped back to a majority of 
5２ percent. The proportion of women who upheld this view （48 percent） was not 
much smaller than the proportion of men （55 percent）.63 It is hard to know what to 
make of these contradictory recent trends （and a survey in ２014 revealed a swing 
61　厚生労働省「フリーターへの就職支援拠点を全国約 ２00 カ所に設置します」２01２ 年 4 月 9 日
（http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/２r985２00000２7f6u.html）。２015 年 6 月 ２4 日アクセス。
6２　Personal communication from Iokibe Chinami, Ministry of Health, Labor, Welfare, July 10, ２015.
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back toward support for women’s work outside the home, albeit still less than in 
２009）.64 The long term picture appears to be one of a slow and inconsistent increase 
in those affirming wider social and economic roles for women, an increase that has not 
reached a tipping point that might be considered a clear mandate for change.
　　It is also, finally, noteworthy that the recent push for women’s empowerment put 
forth by the Abe administration is in important ways a step backward from the logic 
of the Ōhira report. The members of the Ōhira study group were clearly proud of Ja-
pan’s cultural heritage understood to have enabled or framed the nation’s modernizing 
achievements. But they envisioned the future as an era of “culture” in which self-culti-
vation and fulfilling individual lives were affirmed more as ends in themselves than as 
means to an end of national power. The goal of promoting「社会に新たな活力を与え
る婦人の進出」was justified not mainly as a means to strengthen the nation’s economy 
but as a way to offer “fulfilling lives for women （婦人の生きがい）”.65
　　Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, in contrast, has explicitly boasted that he promotes 
women’s advancement as an economic strategy for the nation, rather than a socially 
desirable step for women themselves, or a goal grounded in ideals of equity and justice. 




かった女性の皆さんは、言ってみれば “ 宝の山 ” です。……能力ある女性の皆さん
に、どんどん日本を引っ張っていってもらいたいと思います。66
It is not hard to hear echoes of prewar and wartime calls for people to “serve the na-
tion”（お国のために）, in this call for women to be fully exploited as human resources 
to build a strong national economy.
Conclusion
One thing “lost” in the past ２0 years has been a mainstream conservative consensus 
63　「男女共同参画社会に関する世論調査」２01２ 年（http://www.gender.go.jp/research/yoron）。
２015 年 6 月 ２4 日アクセス。
64　「女性の活躍推進に関する世論調査」２014 年 8 月（http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h２6/h２6-jo-
seikatsuyaku/index.html）。２015 年 7 月 1２ 日アクセス。
65　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 3 巻　家庭基盤の充実』14～15 頁。
66　安倍晋三「アベノミクス第二章起動宣言」『文藝春秋』２014 年 9 月号、104 頁。
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as to what constitutes a good society and how it is to be sustained or achieved. As en-
capsulated in the Ōhira report, and with an explicit global framing, after several de-
cades of strong economic growth that consensus focused on the virtues of Japan’s 
mode of “managed competition.” It also rested on a gendered structure of society 
where women maintained the family, with exceptions allowed for ambitious women to 
advance into the man’s world of professional achievement. These views were never 
unanimous of course, but the main counter-narratives in public and policy discourse as 
well as in the academic world, both in Japan and in the Anglophone community of 
Japanese studies, came from the left or “progressive” camp. In the case of gender, the 
challenge came from feminists who sought gender equality in principle as a social 
value and human right, not as a means to national economic power. In studies of labor 
history or industrial relations this counter-narrative took the form of critiques of the 
Japanese model which stressed its costs. But through the 1980s and into the early 
1990s, those who put forth such critiques found themselves on the defensive in the 
face of the widespread evidence of its success, and they to some extent modified their 
views.67
　　Work in Japanese studies today, which focuses on the present moment or on con-
temporary and modern history, is situated in a more complicated intellectual environ-
ment than in the past. Over the past two decades, the main axis of opposition in public 
debate on the question of sustaining or restoring a good society has come to set de-
fenders of a “traditional” modernity against neo-liberal reformers, but a secondary axis 
of critique has continued, albeit with lower profile than before. It draws on the dis-
course of a global precariat and rising inequality. In studies of Japan it has focused on 
and lamented the exclusions inherent in the traditional modern system, arguing they 
have only been made worse in recent years.68 
　　The global attention given Thomas Picketty’s work on inequality has opened new 
space for such debate. At the same time, insofar as Picketty describes Japan―like 
most of Europe, the US and the UK―as having indeed experienced a heyday of rela-
tive equality over the forty of so years after World War II, he offers grounds to see 
67　Gordon, Wages of Affluence discussed the changes in the perspectives of scholars in Japan 
writing from a left or critical perspective as they sought to address the apparent success of 
the Japanese model.  It was written in the early years after the economic bubble burst, with 
awareness that the ground was shifting, but it did not successfully reorient its own argument 
to take account of the emerging critique from the neo-liberal camp.
68　Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class （London: Bloomsbury, ２011）, Anne 
Allison, Precarious Japan （Durham: Duke University Press, ２013）, Tachibanaki Toshiaki, 
Nihon no keizai kakusa （Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1998）, and other works.
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the Ōhira report as the logical product of a moment when optimism seemed justified. 
With hindsight it is easy to dismiss its authors as shortsighted in their view of the fu-
ture, and dismiss their essentialist and static understanding of Japan’s own culture as 
reductive in the extreme. But these reports remain worthy of attention for the way 







1990 年代の日本は 1970 年代の欧米諸国
　欧米諸国と日本の社会状況を比較すると、一言で言えば、日本の 1990 年代は欧米諸
国の 1970 年代にあたる、とわたしは考えている。65 歳以上の高齢者が全人口に占める
割合が 14 ％を超えて「高齢社会（aged society）」と呼ばれる段階に進んだのが、欧米
































図 1　高齢化率の長期的推移（65 歳以上人口の割合　％） 出所　各国政府統計
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された。ベルギー、フランスでも保育サービスが発達した（Esping-Andersen ２009, 80 ＝
２011, 8２）。国家による社会サービスの供給、市場化の促進と方向は異なるが、多くの欧







































































































































んどの欧米諸国よりも高かった（落合 ２004：２6）。男性稼ぎ主 ― 女性主婦型の家族が日

















































































































































お わ り に
　何が日本の「失われた ２0 年」をもたらしたのかという問いに対しては、第一に、男
性稼ぎ主型の世帯を前提とした労働レジームと税・社会保障レジームを再強化して固定
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No More Playing ‘Catch-up’ with the West: 
Educational Policy during the “Lost Two Decades”
KARIYA Takehiko
In the early 1980s, Japanese society and Japanese people experienced “a revolution” in 
terms of their mindset as they recognized that Japan’s “catching up with the West” 
had ended. In official documents, the clearest declaration of this was probably the 
Ōhira Masayoshi Policy Research Group’s report, which marked the beginning of this 
recognition.  Drawn to the field of education, the Ad Hoc Council on Education Re-
forms of the Nakasone Cabinet era took over this recognition and constructed policies 
using it as a framework of reference.  How did this mindset of “the end of catching up 
with the West” influence Japanese society? This chapter will analyze the “Lost Two 
Decades” of Japanese society, using the socially constructed mindset of “the end of 
catching up with the West” as a clue and focusing particularly on discourses in educa-
tion policies.
　　In examining education policies, I will also explore how such societal recognition 
deepened Japan’s confusion in a so-called “model-less” era with a） its identification of 
the prior era as a “catch-up” model following system, b） its emphasis on the impor-
tance of a new nationalism in the “post-catch-up era,” and c） the impact of recent 
catching up with globalization and other internationalization. Particularly in this chap-
ter I will discuss the recent problems in Japanese education wherein the lost decades 
have not ended by elucidating the historical background of those problems, known as 
the “delay in a global response” in today’s education reforms.
Japanese Popular Mindset in the 1980s
Before analyzing policy discourses, I will introduce some results of several interesting 
surveys, which will help clarify the characteristics of the Japanese mindset in the 
1980s. Figure 1 shows the changes in participants’ responses to the question “Are Jap-
anese people superior to Westerners?” in the Survey on Japanese National Character 
conducted by Institute of Mathematical Statistics.  In 1953, only ２0 percent, and even 
in 1963, only slightly over 30 percent responded that they were “superior.” However, 
in 1983, the number of responses rose up to over 50 percent. Conversely, in 1953, 
nearly 30 percent responded that Japanese people were “inferior,” whereas in 1983, 
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（Annual Survey of Japanese National Character, Institute of Mathematical Statistics）
From the left side, responses are: “superior”, “inferior”, “equal”, “hard to say”, “other”, and D.K.
　　The results of another survey reveal similar changes in the Japanese mindset. 
Figure ２ depicts part of the results from the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research In-
stitute’s Mindset Survey （Takahashi and Aramaki ２014）. As the graph demonstrates, 
the mindsets that “Japanese people have outstanding qualities” and “Japan is a first-
rate nation” both increased in 1973 and peaked in 1983. These survey results indicate 
that in the early 1980s, Japan dispelled its sense of inferiority to Western developed 
countries and reached what could be called a sense of superiority. This was the Japa-
nese people’s mindset just before the Japanese economy moved toward the bubble, 
and four years after 1979, when Harvard University professor Ezra Vogel’s Japan as 
Number One was published in Japan and the United States simultaneously, becoming 
a bestseller in Japan, with over 700，000 copies sold.
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Figure 2 .Japanesepopularmindset（“ConfidenceinJapan”）
・　J　apanese people have outstanding qualities.
⃝　Japan is a first-rate nation. 






Ōhira Policy Research Group’s Report and the End of the Catch-up Mindset
In line with this general mindset of the Japanese people, discourses publicly declaring 
the end of the catching up to Western advanced countries appeared in official docu-
ments looking toward Japan’s long-term policies. One example, published in 1980, is a 
series of reports of the Policy Research Group, which was organized by Prime Minis-
ter Masayoshi Ōhira （Age of Culture Research Group 1980）. The group was divided 
into nine subcommittees, each of which made a report.  Report No. 1 presented a sec-
tion titled “The Age of Culture” states:
　　In the past, there have been periods that strongly demanded countries to 
westernize, modernize, industrialize, and pursue economic growth. Then, the con-
tent of the needs of the times were clear, and there existed models we needed to 
aim toward. Since the Meiji period, such needs have denied, or even ignored, our 
own traditions, placed our nation as backward and low-level, and constituted a 
way to pursue alien aims.
［…］ In order to “catch up” as speedily as possible with the advanced nations of 
the West, Japan has proactively pushed forward with modernization, industrializa-
tion and westernization since the Meiji Restoration. As a result, Japan succeeded 
in reaching the stage of a mature, highly industrial society, and everyone has 
come to enjoy freedom and equality, progress and prosperity, economic wealth 
186
KARIYA Takehiko
and the convenience of modern life, high education and high welfare standards, as 
well as advanced scientific technology. These are all qualities we can be proud of 
in the world. Moreover, with the backdrop of enormous structural socio-economic 
changes, which were induced by industrialization and modernization, the nation’s 
consciousness and its behavior have been undergoing major changes.
As these quotes show, in the early 1980s, Japan loudly and proudly declared that its 
time of catching up to Western developed countries was over. With this “Zeit-Geist” as 
a framework of reference, the report clarifies what is necessary for future generations. 
Report No. 7 , titled “Economic Administration in an Age of Culture,” added:
　　Japan’s modernization （industrialization and westernization） and the matura-
tion of it into a highly industrial society imply the end of any models involving the 
need to align to, or to “catch up with.” From now on, we need to find our own 
path to follow.
This quote presented the notion that with the catch-up model at its end, it was time 
to “find our own path to follow.”
　　As a result of this end-of-the-catch-up mindset, the loss of the catch-up model was 
taken over in 1984 by the Ad Hoc Council on Education Reforms （AHCER） organized 
by Prime Minister Nakasone. The council found that education until then had been of 
the “catch-up model.” To catch up with developed Western nations, introducing ad-
vanced knowledge and skills had been essential, and the efficacy of this had been em-
phasized. It was indicated that the resulting problem of catch-up-type education was 
knowledge-cramming type of teaching and learning as well as a uniform and highly 
centralized education system which sought for efficiency in education. The identifica-
tion of these educational problems coincided with the recognition that the catch-up 
model had ended. This led to the construction of educational issues that are related to 
today’s issues, such as the importance of cultivating individuality and creativity in fu-
ture education （Kariya ２015a）. The Ad Hoc Council on Education Report expresses 
this in the following passage （Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau 1988）.
　　However, it is undeniable that Japan’s traditional education has mostly rested 
upon the tendency of cramming knowledge by rote memorization. The society of 
the future will require us not merely to acquire knowledge and information, but 
to further develop the ability to express, create, think with our heads, and to 
make an appropriate use of that knowledge and information. Creativity is closely 
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connected to individuality, and only when individuality is fostered can creativity 
be nourished.
Catch-up-type education was found to be an outdated educational model that did not 
meet the changes of the era or societal demands, and a departure from this model 
was sought.
　　This policy discourse clarifies the following three points. First, the mindset of 
competition with Western developed nations and the hierarchical mindset （advanced 
and backward） were the basis of this era’s “Zeit-Geist” as a framework of reference. 
Furthermore, this mindset leaning toward international competition was particularly 
emphasized in terms of industrialization and economic development and their connec-
tion to science and technology.  Second, an aspect of postwar Japanese nationalism ap-
pears in these competition and hierarchy mindsets. The defeat in World War II left an 
impression among citizens of the failure of the first catch up trial that began in the 
Meiji era （“national wealth and military strength”） and ended with the defeat of the 
WW２. The era from the postwar rapid economic growth period to the 1980s was, in a 
sense, marked by the second catch-up challenge, and the recovery of the Japanese na-
tional identity was attained once again catching up to western advanced nations in 
terms of economy, science, and technology, with excluding military power in this sec-
ond challenge. 
　　Third, and most important to the following discussion, the recognition that the 
catch up had ended produced the “loss of the catch-up model” mindset. This mindset 
renounced education until then as outdated. Additionally, since the catch-up model 
was completed, education from then onward was required to develop human re-
sources equipped with problem-solving skills and the idea of “think on your own, learn 
on your own,” which would lead to technological innovations and economic growth by 
fostering creativity and individuality, even though they obviously reflected values of 
the West. This education was based on the framework of a mindset that the Japanese 
needed to discover problems and resolve them on their own. A search for the ideal 
type of education began, which did not take into account its feasibility, that is, how it 
could be accomplished by specific methods as well as lacking enough resources 
（Kariya ２00２）.
The Problem of the Lost Two Decades and Globalization
As we have seen, the zeitgeist of the end of catching up was already established be-
fore the start of the lost two decades. After this zeitgeist was established, Japan 
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moved toward the bubble economy, and after the bubble’s collapse, Japan experienced 
the lost two decades. For education policy, the problem of the “delay in response to 
globalization” arose during the economic stagnation and has continued to date. This 
has been particularly directed toward higher education. The “Super Global Universi-
ties Initiative” currently in progress is one of the easiest of these policies to under-
stand.
　　A recommendation from the Cabinet Office’s Education Rebuilding Conference 
presented the following recognition of the current situation in regards to the policy 
section of the Super Global Universities Initiative. 
　　The delay in the globalization of Japanese universities is reaching a critical 
state. With the accumulation of knowledge as their foundation, universities are ex-
pected to be the nucleus for creating new knowledge by exploring uncharted ter-
ritories and for transforming society. Rebuilding Japan’s universities to a position 
where they can persistently pursue new challenges and create new knowledge is 
an important pillar for re-enhancing Japan’s international competitiveness and “re-
vitalizing Japan” so that it can regain its former brightness （Cabinet Office, Edu-
cation Rebuilding Conference, ２013）.
To rectify this delay in response to globalization, deemed a “critical state,” a specific 
aim is to provide focused support to universities actively carrying out internationaliza-
tion （‘Super Global Universities （tentative name）’）, such as by actively hiring foreign 
professors, collaborating with overseas universities, and expanding degree programs 
that can be completed entirely in English. It has also been proposed that Japan aims 
to enhance its international collaborative research and, in the next ten years, raise its 
international presence by having at least ten universities in the top 100 universities in 
the world universities ranking. To improve scores on the Internationalization Index, 
which is deemed a weak point of Japanese universities, universities must recruit more 
foreign professors and introduce more classes taught in English. Aiming for a top 100 
ranking through such measures was cited as a numerical policy target.
　　Thirty-seven universities were chosen in the Super Global Universities Initiative. 
Further analysis of the plan’s breakdown reveals that the method of global response is 
in fact superficial. Although this has already been analyzed in detail elsewhere, there 
is, for example, the goal of increasing the number of foreign professors in order to in-
crease the number of classes in English; however, in many Super Global Universities, 
this function is being fulfilled by Japanese professors who have one to three years’ ex-
perience of research and education in a foreign country （Kariya ２015b）. In reality, 
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years, meaning that they lack enough teaching experiences in English.
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tween these have visible and measurable scales such as the straightforward university 
world ranking permeated and led Japan to play the “catch-up game” again. While 
there is no escaping the mindset of techno-economic nationalism that was born after 
the war and seeks economic, scientific, and technological development, the numerical 
policy targets have been incorporated without bearing in mind the relevance and va-
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During “The Lost Two Decades”
KUSUNOKI Ayako
Introduction
Since the 1990s, Japan has expanded its participation in areas facing regional and 
global security issues, with the strengthening of its security alliance with the United 
States. At the same time, the Self Defense Forces’ participation in UN-sponsored 
peacekeeping and disaster relief operations, and its proactive involvement in global se-
curity issues, such as post conflict peace building, disarmament, and arms control is a 
remarkable phenomenon in terms of Japan’s post-Cold War foreign and security policy. 
In contrast to these actual changes in policy itself, it seems as if the argument around 
Japan’s foreign and security policies has hardly changed at all since the Cold War. 
During 2014―15, the Abe cabinet’s approval of bills to drop the ban on exercising the 
right of collective self-defense and changes in security-related legislation designed to 
allow Japan’s military to mobilize overseas in cooperation with the United States and 
Japan’s quasi-allies as Australia caused a firestorm of debate on how to interpret the 
Constitution of Japan in the summer of 2015. Economic and military cooperation be-
tween Japan and the United States has often been viewed as Japanese’ subordination 
to America―the U.S. military presence in Okinawa and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
（TPP） are, for some people, symbols of American domination. Whether the govern-
ment’s decisions on security issues are constitutional or if Japan should align itself to 
the United States or break away have been major preoccupations within political and 
journalistic circles from the Cold War era up until today.
　　In this paper I will summarize the debates on Japan’s foreign and security policy 
since the 1990s 1 , and explore the major areas within the political forces that have 
been agreed on, or not agreed on as the case may be, regarding Japanese foreign pol-
1 　On literatures dealing with Japan’s post-Cold War foreign and diplomatic policy, for example 
see Miyagi Taizo, Gendai Nihon Gaikō shi: Reisen no mosaku, shushō tachi no ketsudan. 
［Contemporary Diplomatic History of Japan: Search for Post-Cold War Japanʼs Foreign Policy 
and Prime Ministerʼs Decisions］（Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2016）, Richard J. Samuels, Securing 
Japan: Tokyoʼs Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia （Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007）; Glenn 
D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson, eds., Japanʼs International 
Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, 2 nd ed. （London: Routledge, 2001）.
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icy during the “lost two decades.” I will focus in particular on the arguments of major 
political leaders over the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and Japan’s role within it, and the 
so-called “Yoshida Doctrine,” the guiding principle for Japanese foreign and security 
policy in the post-World War II period, in the hopes of clarifying the changes in Japa-
nese thought on this issue over the years.
Japan as a “Normal Country” or “Global Civilian Power”?
Two international events around 1990, the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of 
the Gulf Crisis and War, swiftly outmoded the security policy debates in the previous 
decades between conservatives and socialists, particularly over the constitutionality of 
Japan’s armed forces and the security relationship with the United States. The former 
generated a vague sense of anticipation among some political leaders that the dimin-
ishing military threat from Communist powers might no longer necessitate sizable 
American forces in Japan, stationed under the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. It can-
not be ignored that this expectation was more fundamentally the representation of a 
simple but deep-rooted antagonism against foreign troops within the Japanese sover-
eignty as well as anti-war and peace sentiments. On the other hand, the U.S.-Japan co-
operative relationship based on the Security Treaty has been widely accepted as an 
indispensable and invaluable device in Japan’s foreign policy strategy.
　　The latter, Japan’s experience of the Gulf Crisis and War of 1990―91 left a sense 
of “defeat” in many people. Japanese officials failed not only to predict the situation, 
but also to promptly respond to requests from the United States to support multilat-
eral forces, which provoked fierce criticism from the international community. Despite 
Japan paying a total of around $13 billion as a financial contribution, its unwillingness 
to send personnel to the Persian Gulf during the war and its bit-by-bit financial assis-
tance was dismissed as mere “check-book” diplomacy. Under intense international 
pressure the Japanese government finally decided to dispatch vessels of the Japan 
Maritime Self Defense Force to the Gulf for minesweeping operations after the war 
ended. Its operational success won international praise and motivated Japan to send 
the SDF overseas to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations through a 
new bill, the International Peace Cooperation Law in June 1992. 2 Both international 
2 　Makoto Iokibe, ed., The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan （New York: Routledge, 2013）, 
chap. 6 ; Makoto Iokibe, ed., Okamoto Yukio: Genba shugi o tsuranuita gaikōkan ［Okamoto 
Yukio Oral History: Diplomats who has Kept Hands-On-Approach］ （Asahi Shimbun Shuppan, 
2008）, chap. 5 .
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events undermined the premise of Japan’s postwar security policy in which Article 9 
as an anti-military norm and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to satisfy security re-
quirements implicitly coexisted. 3
　　Ozawa Ichiro’s idea of Japan as a “normal nation,” perhaps mainly led by a kind of 
Gulf War trauma, emerged as a bold challenge to the conventional framework of 
thinking that had fitted into the Cold War. It seemed that Ozawa tried to create a 
more internationally standardized framework of foreign and security policy. In his 
Blueprint for a New Japan, he argued that Japan must satisfy “two conditions if it is to 
go beyond simply creating and distributing domestic wealth and become what the 
world community recognize as a ‘normal nation’ ”: first, Japan should be a “nation that 
willingly shoulders those responsibilities regarded as natural in the international com-
munity.” Secondly, Japan was required to “cooperate fully with other nations in their 
efforts to build prosperous and stable lives for their people.” Clearly denying Japan as 
a “normal nation” seeking for military superpower status on the one hand, he on the 
other advocated that Japan’s contribution to world peace “should be carried out in in-
timate cooperation with the United States” and the SDF should be developed as forces 
“centered on the United Nations,” by making the leap from Japan’s passive “exclusive 
defense strategy” to a “peace-building strategy.” 4
　　Although sharing the view with Ozawa that Japan needed to actively contribute 
to international peace and prosperity, Hosokawa Morihiro and Takemura Masayoshi 
had a more pacifist viewpoint on Japan’s course of action. Hosokawa envisioned Japan 
playing a leading role in nuclear disarmament or building a lasting security system in 
Asia, as well as participating in the activities of UN forces. Yet he thought it desirable 
that Japan’s exclusive defense strategy was maintained based on the ideal of Article 9 
of the Constitution, and the military-oriented U.S.-Japan relationship was transformed 
into a more comprehensive one. 5 Takemura, calling for “A Small but Shining Country,” 
was not completely positive to Ozawa’s argument, since he believed that international 
3 　Tetsuya Sakai, “‘ 9 Jō=Anpo Taisei’ no shūen: Sengo Nihon gaikō to seitō seiji ［The End of 
‘Article 9 and the Security Treaty’ System: Postwar Japan’s Foreign Policy and the Party 
Politics］,” Kokusai Mondai, March 1991, pp. 32―45.
4 　Ichiro Ozawa, Louisa Rubinfien （translation）, Eric Gower （ed.）, Blueprint for a New Japan 
（Tokyo: Kodahsha International, 1994）, pp. 94―107. Among conservatives, Watanabe Michio’s 
group in the Liberal Democratic Party （LDP） developed similar arguments to Ozawa’s. See 
Michio Watanabe, Kōji Kakizawa and Bunmei Ibuki, Shin hoshu kakumei ［Revolution of New 
Conservatives］ （Nesco, 1994）, pp. 72―82.
5 　Morihiro Hosokawa, “’Kaikaku’ no hata no motoni ［Under the Flag of Reform］,” Bungei 
Shunjū, January 1993, pp. 160―161.
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peace would never be achieved if all nations became “normal nations.” 6 The Socialist 
Party totally opposed the support for multilateral forces during the Gulf Crisis and 
War as well as the Diet sessions on International Peace Cooperation Law. 7 Neverthe-
less, the Socialists began to change their stance around 1991, searching for a new 
course to be taken in the post-Cold War period. Murayama Tomiichi revealed the fact 
that there had been an argument inside the Socialist Party that its long-standing 
stance on the anti-U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which had exactly meant that Japan 
should abrogate the Treaty and the U.S. forces should withdraw from Japan, would be 
neither accepted by many Japanese nor was realistic. While overtly criticizing the Se-
curity Treaty as the obstacle to peace between the East and the West, the Socialist 
Party during the Cold War in fact appreciated the Treaty as the so-called “cap-in-the-
bottle.” 8 The Socialist Party announced that it would virtually relinquish its identity, 
based upon the policy for unarmed neutrality of Japan, by admitting Japan’s own 
armed forces at the minimum required level for its self-defense and the U.S.-Japan Se-
curity Treaty, both as transitional measures until a universal security system was es-
tablished. 9
　　Many political leaders, including some socialists, developed a more positive atti-
tude toward SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s―not 
full-fledged, but conditionally under principles strictly limiting the use of weapons by 
the SDF. Importantly there were few that tried to pursue a military superpower sta-
tus for Japan in the post-Cold War period, no matter how opposing their views on Ar-
ticle 9 were. But there were significant differences between Ozawa’s “normal nation” 
and Hosokawa or Takemura’s minimalist vision on Japan’s international posture over 
the role that Japan could play in maintaining international peace and security under 
the United Nations and the purpose of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Ozawa assumed Japan’s 
non-military as well as military role to some extent under the United Nations, and he 
did not rule out cooperation with the United States as far as the U.S. government 
made an effort to enhance the capabilities of the United Nations.
6 　Takashi Mikuriya and Izuru Makihara, eds., Kikigaki Takemura Masayoshi kaikoroku 
［Takemura Masayoshi Oral History］ （Iwanami Shoten, 2011）, pp. 98―100. Also see, Michael 
J. Green, Japanʼs Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power 
（New York: Palgrave, 2003）, pp. 18―19.
7 　Hiroki Mori, Nihon shakaitō no Kenkyū: Rosen tenkan no seiji katei ［The Japan Socialist 
Party: the process of Its Policy Change］ （Bokutakusha, 2001）, pp. 164―166.
8 　Yakushiji Katsuyuki, ed., Murayama Tomiichi kaikoroku ［Memoirs of Murayama Tomiichi］ 
（Iwanami Shoten, 2012）, p. 104.
9 　Mainichi Shinbun, May 14, 1993.
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U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security
It is interesting that many visions on Japan’s future courses of action were presented 
by the political leaders who left the LDP in the early 1990s. After a series of political 
scandals, the failure to introduce political reform, and the party split, the LDP lost its 
majority in the Diet in the 1993 general election, which invited an eight-party coalition
―that is, every party other than the LDP and the Communists―under Prime Minis-
ter Hosokawa in July 1993. However the end of the LDP’s 38 year in power and the 
coalition government that followed did not necessarily bring about a fundamental shift 
in Japan’s security policy: the Japanese government simply maintained its U.S.-cen-
tered defense strategy.
　　The “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, Alliance for the 21st Century” 
signed by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro and President Bill Clinton in April 1996, 
followed by the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation concluded in 1997, 
confirmed that both countries would reinforce their security ties after the Cold War. 
In the Joint Declaration both governments indicated that the Japan-U.S. security rela-
tionship, based on the 1960 Security Treaty, “remains the cornerstone for achieving 
common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment 
for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century.” It concluded that 
both governments “reaffirmed their strong determination, on the eve of the twen-
ty-first century, to build on the successful history of security cooperation and to work 
hand-in-hand to secure peace and prosperity for future generations.”10 Along with the 
“National Defense Program Outline” adopted in November 1995, which underscored 
that Japanese defense capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security envi-
ronment after the Cold War, and the new Guidelines stipulating that both govern-
ments would effectively coordinate their activities in situations in areas surrounding 
Japan,11 the Joint Declaration sent a clear signal from both countries to the interna-
tional community that the U.S.-Japan Security relationship would continue to play a 
role in maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.
　　There emerged no arguments worth mentioning in Japanese political circles on 
this joint decision to maintain U.S.-Japan Security framework by redefining its primary 
objective to deal with post-Cold War international environments, mainly through 
10　“Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, Alliance for the 21st Century,” April 17, 1996, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/97/1st/234-240.html#n2.




working-level consultations between the two governments.12 Again, international 
events had an impact on Japanese mindsets: the nuclear crisis on the Korean Penin-
sula in 1994, and the China-Taiwan Crisis in 1996. Amidst the tension caused by North 
Korea’s development of its nuclear capability and brinkmanship diplomacy, Japanese 
political leaders were appalled by the fact that Japan’s crisis management was less 
than poor, and no concrete contingency plans were in place with the U.S. govern-
ment.13 The Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in January 1995 and Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin 
gas subway attack in Tokyo in March also exposed Japan’s vulnerability to internal 
threats.
　　In addition, the most focalized and thus contentious issues in Japanese domestic 
politics in the late 1990s were not the foreign and security policies, but political, ad-
ministrative and financial reforms for one thing, and economic and financial policies to 
tackle the burst of the bubble economy and lingering recession for another. After re-
peated party realignments partly caused by these issues, the Democratic Party of 
Japan （DPJ） was established finally in 1998. In the meantime, the coalition govern-
ment of the LDP, the Socialist Party and the Sakigake, led by Takemura Masayoshi, 
undertook a streamlining of the SDF for post-Cold War missions and promoted a re-
definition of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Socialist Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi re-
called that he had not been willing to sign the Joint Declaration, but he did not show 
his reluctance to the Foreign Ministry or in the Defense Agency’s explanation since 
he had made up his mind to resign shortly.14 
　　It seems impossible to ignore that under the coalition government the Socialist 
Party was relatively flexible to the redefinition process, while the LDP refrained from 
going far beyond the realm of the official interpretation of the Peace Constitution. 
Sakigake functioned as an in-between. The Japanese government denied any intention 
to use the right of collective self-defense at that moment, consequently displaying the 
reinforcement of the U.S.-Japan Alliance under which the SDF, through developing ca-
pabilities more suited to post-Cold War international security, strengthened military 
cooperation with U.S. forces as a moderate change in Japan’s security policy within 
the constitutional framework. 
　　The Joint Declaration and the 1997 Guidelines were accepted as premises in the 
12　On the entire process of redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance, see Yōichi Funabashi, Alliance 
Adrift （New York: Council on Foreign Relations press, 1999）.
13　Takashi Mikuriya and Watanabe Akio, eds., Shushō kantei no ketsudan: Naikaku kanbō 
fukuchōkan Ishihara Nobuo no 2600 nichi ［Decisions by the Office of the Prime Minister: 
2600 Days of Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishihara Nobuo］ （Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2002）.
14　Yakushiji, ed., Murayama Tomiichi kaikoroku, pp. 195―196.
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DPJ’s foreign and security policy. Its “1998 Policy Outline” and the “Basic Policy on Se-
curity Issues” adopted the following year stated that Japan should place the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty at the center of its security policy, while making an effort to enhance 
the effectiveness of this alliance for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. One 
thing that made the DPJ’s argument distinct from the government’s was the DPJ’s 
stress that Japan’s independence should be preserved as much as possible in the alli-
ance’s management through bilateral dialogue or consultations on an equal basis. It is 
also notable that the DPJ indicated a regional multilateral security system, such as the 
ASEAN Regional Forum （ARF）, as the goal for Japan to pursue.15 Among many of 
the political leaders both in the ruling parties and the DPJ a kind of security consen-
sus was built at the end of the 1990s: placing the U.S.-Japan Alliance at the center of 
Japan’s security policy, thereby enhancing its role in the regional order; promoting Ja-
pan’s participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations; and developing Japan’s own de-
fense capabilities in order to cope with new international environments while 
maintaining the exclusive defense strategy or Senshu bōei. It could be said that the 
idea of Japan as a “Normal Nation” was absorbed in the U.S.-Japan Alliance-centered 
strategy led by the Joint Declaration and the 1997 Guidelines.
U.S.-Japan Alliance for Global Security
The principles of postwar Japan’s mercantile foreign policy, the so-called “Yoshida 
Doctrine,” came under critical review in the 1990s in academic as well as political cir-
cles, along with other security policy debates. Among political leaders some conserva-
tives had negative views on the Yoshida Doctrine, criticizing it for depriving the 
Japanese people of the will of self-defense. Koizumi Junichiro for instance, argued that 
Japan’s dependence on the United States for its security for 50 years produced the il-
lusion among the Japanese that they were able to protect the country without arma-
ments.16 Abe Shinzō expressed his belief that the Japanese might have lost something 
important in their spirits as a result of pursuing economic prosperity without enough 
being spent on defense.17 Asō Tarō, Yoshida’s grandson, stood in the same line with 
them when he suggested that Japanese identity had been torn apart by self-distrust 
15　Democratic Party of Japan,“1998 nen kihon seisaku ［the 1998 Policy Outline］,” April 27, 1998, 
https://www.dpj.or.jp/about/dpj/policy; “Minshutō anzen hoshō kihon seisaku ［the Basic Pol-
icy on Security Issues］,” June 24, 1999, http://www1.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=10838&mm=print.
16　Jun’ichiro Koizumi, Koizumi Junʼichiro no bōron, seiron ［Koizumiʼs Wild and Immature 
Arguments］ （Shūeisha, 1997）, pp. 142―146.
17　Shinzō Abe, Utsukushii kuni e ［To the Beautiful Country］ （Bungei Shunjū, 2006）, pp. 126―128.
200
KUSUNOKI Ayako
for more than 50 years.18 Nevertheless, these critiques neither tried to deny Japan’s 
cooperation with the United States, nor pursued a military superpower status for 
Japan. Regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance as indispensable for Japan’s survival and as 
the best strategic choice for Japan in considering U.S. military and economic power as 
well as universal values of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and rule of 
law, all of which were shared with Japan, they demonstrated that Japan needed to 
further strengthen security ties with the United States and to enhance its role in the 
alliance.19
　　The prompt decision by the Koizumi Cabinet to support America’s war on terror 
and to dispatch the SDF to Iraq after major combat operations were over for humani-
tarian and reconstruction assistance undoubtedly came from the traumatic experience 
of the Gulf War in 1990―91, on the one hand. Yet at the same time, the later coalition 
government of the Liberal Democrats and Kōmeitō determined to reinforce U.S.-Japan 
security relationships in the post-9/11 world, seeing the rise of China and North 
Korea’s nuclear threat. The end result was the joint statement by President George W. 
Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi in 2006, in which the two leaders “reviewed with 
great satisfaction the broadened and enhanced cooperation achieved in the alliance 
under their joint stewardship, and together heralded a new U.S.-Japan Alliance of 
Global Cooperation for the 21st Century.” Both governments reached an agreement to 
manage the alliance in terms of regional as well as global security.20 
　　It seems that the Democratic Party of Japan reacted against such developments. 
Hatoyama Yukio, one of the founders of the DPJ, interestingly shared the view with 
Abe that Japan’s dependence on the United States for its security for decades in the 
postwar period had eroded Japanese spirit of independence. However, unlike Abe or 
Koizumi, he therefore considered it desirable for Japan to weaken the security relation-
ship with the United States and pursue a more autonomous foreign policy, building 
more cooperative relationships with other Asian countries. In this context he advo-
cated the “East Asian Community” for peace and security in Asia, while also remodel-
ing the shape of the Security Treaty with the United States to achieve the withdrawal 
of U.S. forces stationed in Japan. Allowing foreign troops within the territory of a 
sovereign state to maintain the nation’s defense, in his point of view, had been unprec-
18　Tarō Asō, Jiyū to hanʼei no ko ［Arc of Freedom and Prosperity］ （Gentōsha, 2008）, pp. 11―12.
19　See Koizumi, Koizumi Junʼichiro no bōron, seiron; Abe, Utsukushii kuni e; Asō, Jiyū to hanʼei 
no ko.
20　“The Japan-U.S. Alliance for the New Century,” June 29, 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/
n-america/us/summit0606.html.
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edented in world history.21 Hatoyama’s view was another anti-thesis to the “Yoshida 
Doctrine,” and had something attractive for the people aspiring to define defense and 
diplomatic measures that could be an alternative to the U.S.-Japan alliance and with a 
more peaceable perspective. 
　　Throughout the 2000s the DPJ became increasingly oriented toward more auton-
omy or independence, and UN-centered foreign and security policy, setting a goal of 
creating a “Northeast Asian Forum” and later an “East Asian Community,” within 
which member countries and areas cooperated with each other in a variety of fields 
such as finance and trade, environment and energy issues, as well as disaster relief. 
While accepting the necessity of the U.S.-Japan alliance for regional security, DPJ lead-
ers strongly denounced the stance of the LDP-Komeito coalition government as too 
dependent on the United States, exemplified by its prompt support for America’s war 
on Iraq and the dispatch of the SDF to the Middle East. Many of them advocated that 
Japan should transform the present bilateral relationship into a more equal one based 
on mutual trust. Hence, the DPJ continuously and publicly stated its commitment at 
national elections in the 2000s to reviewing the Agreement under the Security Treaty 
regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of U.S. Armed Forces in Japan （SOFA）, 
and to easing the burden of U.S. military bases exclusively carried by Okinawa.22 
　　Some young DPJ members, Maehara Seiji or Nagashima Akihisa for instance, 
held views closer to the LDP on Japan’s regional and global roles through the U.S.- 
Japan Alliance. However, the younger generation of the DPJ generally failed to show 
their leadership within the party, which often suffered from an apparent lack of integ-
rity due to the ideological differences among intra-party groups. Consequently, 
Hatoyama and Kan Naoto, the founding fathers, Okada Katsuya, and Ozawa Ichirō―
relatively the older generation and more or less reform fundamentalists who cast 
deeply skeptical eyes on the political, social, economic, and security systems that the 
LDP had developed throughout the postwar period―dominated the power positions 
within the DPJ.23 It seems that Ozawa’s participation in the DPJ in 2003 had a particu-
larly significant impact on the party: under his leadership the DPJ became more fo-
cused on socially and economically vulnerable groups with the aim of ousting the 
21　Jirō Yamaguchi and Kōji Nakakita, eds., Minshutō seiken towa nandattanoka: Kī pāson tachi 
no shōgen ［Reviewing the DPJ Government: Interviews with Leaders］ （Iwanami Shoten, 
2014）, pp. 96―107.
22　DPJ Manifestos in 2003―2009, published in Kaieda Banri ed., Minshutō kōshiki handbook 
［Official Handbook of the Democratic Party of Japan］ 2014 （Bensei Shuppan, 2014）, pp. 181―
264.
23　Yamaguchi and Nakakita, eds., Minshutō seiken towa nandattanoka.
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LDP-led government, namely adopting dole-out policies. In the meantime its defense 
and security policies were perhaps left unexamined and remained somewhat abstract. 
The only clear position of the Democrats was their objections to the LDP-Kōmeitō co-
alition government’s decision to support America’s war on Iraq. In the end there was 
still a security consensus between the LDP and DPJ on the necessity of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance for regional peace and stability or Japan’ participation in non-combat activities 
overseas, but the distance between them widened in the 2000s over Japan’s role in the 
alliance with the United States.
Conclusion
The most serious problem with the foreign and security policies of the Democratic 
Party of Japan was that it was difficult for the DPJ to present a comprehensive and 
realistic picture of regional peace and security. Accordingly, the DPJ government ad-
vocated the necessity of revising SOFA, or the withdrawal of a part of U.S. forces in 
Okinawa, namely the relocation of the Futenma Air Station to outside Okinawa, which 
only complicated relationships with the United States. The DPJ’s vague aspiration for 
an autonomous or independent foreign policy, motivated by simple but strong senti-
ments that U.S. forces stationed in Japan should be reduced and removed in the near 
future, that Japan should maintain an exclusive defense strategy based on Article 9, 
and that building a framework for regional cooperation―including China―would 
achieve lasting peace and stability in East Asia, did not create real alternatives, but 
merely functioned as protests against the reality of the present situation.
　　It seems, however, that this was not the case only for the DPJ. Twenty years of 
security debates in the post-Cold War period has produced a consensus among many 
political leaders: maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance; and SDF participation in non-combat 
activities overseas, such as UN Peacekeeping Operations, disaster relief, sea patrols, 
and minesweeping. Yet there have still been disagreements among such leaders over 
Japan’s role in the U.S.-Japan alliance for regional and global peace and security. Many 
political leaders within the LDP pursue Japan’s more active role, including limited mil-
itary activities; in contrast, others do not necessarily believe that Japan’s close cooper-
ation with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty will contribute to international peace and 
security. The former believe that Japan will be able to maintain its independence 
through enhancing its role in the bilateral alliance, while the latter fears that Japanese 
sovereignty might be infringed by strengthening of U.S.-Japan security relations. No 
common ground has truly been found between these conflicting visions since the days 
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たかを考える上で、1970 年代末から 80 年代初めの大平政権における政策研究会に言及
したことも重要である。というのもこの研究会は 70 年代を通じて日本が到達した政治
経済、社会文化の地平を、欧米モデルとは異なるものとして位置づけ、その文明史的意


















































































































































































Intellectual Origins of Post-1990 Political  Reforms in Japan




Japan has experienced comprehensive political reforms since the early 1990s. These 
reforms have been conducted in most public domains, including the electoral system, 
public administration and bureaucracy, the prime ministership, the judicial system, 
and intergovernmental relationships. Note that the relationship between the govern-
ment and the private sectors has been also transformed due to reforms in areas such 
as corporate governance and consumer protections. In terms of my argument here, 
these transformations should be regarded as parts of comprehensive institutional re-
forms. The phrase “constitutional reform” might be even more suitable. 
　　Because these political reforms occurred simultaneously with long-lasting eco-
nomic stagnation, they were often considered a major source of the “lost decades” of 
Japan. This view is certainly understandable because political instability can have neg-
ative effects on the economy and society. 1 In this way, it would possible to argue that 
political reforms since the 1990s were worse than meaningless, that is, the reforms de-
stroyed the great harmonies in Japan that were previously enjoyed. For example, 
some believe the political stability that accompanied the predominance of the Liberal 
Democratic Party （LDP） could be recovered by reverting to an electoral system of 
single, nontransferable voting （SNTV） with multimember districts （MMD）. 2
　　Although no one can describe how Japanese politics, economy, and society would 
appear without the political reforms that currently exist, it is worth considering 
whether these reforms were necessary in the context of the early 1990s. The focus 
will be on the intellectual context of the pre-reform era of the 1980s. The author will 
also address how these reasons and contexts affected the contents and effects of politi-
cal reforms. 3
1 　A typical case is the shaky relationship between the government and the Bank of Japan with 
regard to monetary policy.
2 　Interestingly, some scholars note that these reforms, political reforms in particular, have 
made Japanese politics move to the right, although their causal arguments are weak. See, for 
example, Nakano （2015）.
3 　This point is argued in my other article. See Machidori （2015）.
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Two Intellectual Tides in the 1980s
In the 1980s, Japan was enjoying its heyday in many respects. Its economy was seen 
as the most competitive among the developed nations, and it was the only large 
player in Asia. Its society was safe, and it had a large number of young citizens and a 
very low unemployment rate. A consumer-driven culture flourished in urban areas 
such as Tokyo, while rural areas still had large enough work forces to maintain their 
agricultural bases. These elements were products of the stable political conditions be-
ginning in the late 1950s, when the LDP continued to have governing power and coop-
erated with bureaucrats. As is well known, LDP governments focused largely on 
economic development within the context of an alliance between the United States 
and Japan.
　　Intellectuals, however, did not value the LDP predominance, at least until the 
middle of the 1970s for two reasons. First, the LDP was regarded as an old, premod-
ern political party. The LDP members of the Diet （parliament） often came from the 
ruling classes of the prewar era, and they embodied an older type of common sense, 
which often sounded out of date. Because the intellectuals were products of modern 
institutions, such as universities, their negative feelings against the LDP may have 
been the result of divisions between the premodern and the modern in Japanese soci-
ety. In addition, the LDP overrepresented the socioeconomic interests of rural areas. 
After the high economic growth in the 1960s and early 1970s, approximately half of 
the Japanese population lived in urban and suburban areas around Tokyo, Osaka, and 
Nagoya. However, urban policy was poor, and many urban problems remained un-
solved.
　　This situation began to change in the late 1970s, when some intellectuals shed 
light on the LDP’s positive role in postwar socioeconomic prosperity. 4 Although it is 
possible to give various explanations, I believe there were at least two waves of this 
revaluation.
　　The first wave was that of “Japanese-style pluralism.” As Kōji Nakakita’s excellent 
work shows, some scholars, such as Ken’ichi Kōyama, Shunpei Kumon, and Seizaburō 
Satō, advocated this view （Nakakita 2014）. They pointed out that organizations in 
Japan had unique structures that emphasized long-term, mutual relationships among 
members in general. Although these structures were criticized for being undemo-
4 　While Masataka Kōsaka offered this kind of view on the roles of Shigeru Yoshida for the 
choice of foreign policy in the mid-1960s, it was a persuasive but still not dominant, 
particularly in the intellectual community.
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cratic, they were active, democratic organizations in which every member had the 
right to participate in significant decisions and held veto power. According to the first 
wave of scholars, the LDP also shared these pluralistic organizational features. As a 
result, the LDP could involve various stakeholders in the rapid socioeconomic changes 
of the postwar period.
　　Well-known advocates of Japanese-style pluralism often had personal histories in-
cluding confrontations with Marxism. This would appear to be a significant fact for at 
least two reasons. First, proponents believed that the Japanese style of pluralism was 
a conservative, rather than a liberal, ideology. It was meaningful for them that the 
LDP was not a party of liberal democracy but of conservatism. Second, advocates did 
not sympathize with modernism. In Japanese intellectual history, Marxism was at the 
center of modernism, which emphasizes reason, logic, and theoretical approaches. Tak-
ing anti-Marxist positions, they supported the traditional and irrational aspects of con-
servatism as pluralism.
　　Another often-forgotten wave was that of “liberal modernism.” As mentioned 
above, modernism was largely associated with Marxism among modern Japanese 
intellectuals. However, the realm of modernism is much larger, and it includes many 
types of thoughts. In the case of Japan, it was possible to be supportive of the LDP 
and its policies because the LDP was the only party committed to Western liberal de-
mocracy. Members of the so-called “conservative mainstream （hoshu-honryū）,” such 
as Hayato Ikeda, Eisaku Satō, and Kiichi Miyazawa, had a positive attitude towards 
maintaining good relationships with Western democracies, founded on the alliance be-
tween the United States and Japan. They were modernists rather than conservatives. 5
　　The intellectuals of this stream, including Masakazu Yamazaki and Masakata Kō-
saka, took the position that the LDP was reliable because it was committed to achiev-
ing an alliance with Western countries and the fundamental values of modernism. 
These liberal modernists often had American experiences during the formative parts 
of their careers. For example, Yamazaki was at Yale in 1964―65 and Kōsaka was at 
5 　There are many arguments regarding how the “conservative mainstream” and “conservative 
substream （hoshu-bōryū）” should be differentiated. Although it is often noted that foreign 
policy, such as an attitude to U.S.-Japan alliance, was the key （see, for example, Kitaoka 
2008）, the author believes that more fundamental values mattered. The mainstream gave the 
priority to modernism, while the substream prioritized conservatism. The emphasis on the 
significance of the alliance was a concrete expression of the mainstream’s commitment to 
modernism. Support for a U.S.-Japan alliance was possible and logical for conservatives such 
as Nobusuke Kishi and Yasuhiro Nakasone because the national glory of Japan would be 
achieved by the alliance.
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Harvard in 1960―62. These American experiences led them to non-Marxism modernist 
thought. 6
Ideas for Political Reforms
The two intellectual waves described above gave equally positive evaluations of post-
war Japanese politics, in which the LDP was predominant and provided socioeconomic 
stability together with cooperation with bureaucrats. At the same time, however, in-
tellectuals involved in these waves understood that the political and socioeconomic 
fundamentals of Japan had gradually transformed and that Japan must face a new era.
　　As other scholars of this NBK-Harvard project, Andrew Gordon and Shigeki Uno, 
have recently pointed out, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ōhira believed in the necessity 
of transformation, establishing a study group in 1979 （see, for example, Uno 2014）. Al-
though the Ōhira study group （policy research council） included over 100 scholars 
and senior bureaucrats, significant figures from the two intellectual waves, such as 
Kōsaka, Kōyama, Kumon, and Yamazaki, also participated. In other words, the reports 
of the Ōhira study group were co-products of two intellectual waves: Japanese-style 
pluralism and non-Marxist liberal modernism.
　　These two waves, however, separated after Ōhira’s death. When the Ōhira study 
group submitted its final report in the summer of 1980, the Prime Minister had al-
ready died from a sudden heart attack during the general election of 1980. Ōhira’s 
death caused the report to remain in the archives. However, the work of the study 
group returned to political discourse a few years later, when Yasuhiro Nakasone took 
over the prime minister. Since Nakasone continued in this role for five years （1982―
87）, the Nakasone government set the tone for political discourse in the 1980s.
　　Nakasone had a clearly conservative political ideology. He began his political ca-
reer just after the end of World War II, advocating that a “real” independence of the 
Japanese state should be recovered by comprehensive constitutional reform. Because 
he was also a foreign-policy realist, as was Nobusuke Kishi, two-time prime minister 
during the postwar period, Nakasone’s foreign policy largely kept within the tradi-
tional lines the LDP government worked within for years: maintaining the U.S.-Japan 
alliance and remaining committed to the fundamental values of Western liberal de-
mocracy. At the same time, however, he also emphasized the significance of national 
6 　With regard to Kōsaka, it has been often pointed out that his father, philosopher Masaaki 
Kōsaka, had greatly affected. In my view, however, his American experience was as 
significant as his father’s effects. 
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pride, even officially visiting the Yasukuni Shrine publicly as the prime minister. His 
style was a mixture of realism and nationalism, both of which were rooted in conser-
vatism. He was generally accepted by the majority of Japanese voters, who became 
more confident in the postwar development of their country （Hattori 2015）.
　　In this context, it is quite natural and understandable that Nakasone was mainly 
committed to the Japanese style of pluralism from the viewpoint of the LDP predomi-
nance. Koyama, Kumon, and Satō continued to be major advisors of the Nakasone gov-
ernment. Although Nakasone believed the power of the prime minister should be 
strengthened in order to take care of national emergencies, this did not mean that the 
power of the LDP president became stronger. The fundamental features of the deci-
sion-making process remained untouched. Instead, he enacted tough policies against 
leftists both domestically and diplomatically as symbols of the strong prime minister-
ship. 
　　After the Nakasone era, the political and socioeconomic situations began to 
change drastically. As I argued in another article （Machidori 2015）, these changes oc-
curred due to several reasons. 
　　First, the LDP politicians and high-level bureaucrats repeatedly suffered financial 
scandals in the late 1980s. They were clearly side effects of closed decision making 
systems to which advocates of the Japanese style of pluralism preferred. Gathering 
the negative psychological effects of the bubble economy, many voters raised ques-
tions concerning the systems related to LDP predominance. 
　　Second, and more importantly, the end of the Cold War and the experience of the 
Gulf War （1990―91） had a significant effect on Japanese politics. During the Cold War, 
the LDP was the only party positively and clearly committed to the U.S.-Japan alliance 
and the Western world. This allowed Japanese voters and allied governments （e.g., 
the U.S. government） to forgive the LDP some policy miscues and scandals. After the 
end of Cold War, however, these actors began to be dissatisfied with the decision-mak-
ing style of the LDP government, which wasted time and money. Because the Japa-
nese style of pluralism gave veto power to many actors, decisions took a long time to 
make involved extensive expenditures to influence vetoing players. Although this ten-
dency irritated the U.S. government in some negotiations related to economic frictions, 
the Gulf War experience clearly showed it as a significant weak point of the Japanese 
polity.
　　As Japanese-style pluralism was held to be the source of these shortcomings, the 
necessity of a change to a more logical decision-making system that wasted less time 
and money and that had a smaller number of veto players was felt. This meant a 
comeback of liberal modernism. Because the Japanese style of pluralism formed com-
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plex networks of mutual interdependences among major insiders, including LDP mem-
bers of parliament, bureaucrats, interest groups, rural supporters, and local 
governments, reforming the Japanese polity also meant dismantling these mutual 
interdependences and giving excluded outsiders, such as opposition groups, civic orga-
nizations, and urban voters, a chance to participate in decisions.
Call for Political Reforms: Tendency to Majoritarianism
As mentioned in the previous section, political reforms since the 1990s can be under-
stood as a substitute of non-Marxist liberal modernism for Japanese-style pluralism as 
a leading intellectual tide. 7 Although the bearers of liberal modernism changed due to 
the succession of generations among political leaders, the fundamental ideas were 
inherited from intellectuals in the 1970s. 8
　　In a more concrete, institutional context, Japanese-style pluralists positively evalu-
ated the LDP predominance based on SNTV/MMD. Under the SNTV/MMD system, 
between two and six representatives are elected from one electoral district. A candi-
date generally needs only 15 to 20 percent of the total votes to be elected, thereby al-
lowing socioeconomic minorities to be more easily represented and to gain substantial 
veto power in decision-making processes. At the same time, the SNTV/MMD system 
resembles a proportional representation （PR） system because shifts in the electoral 
strength of parties are relatively small over elections. In general, proportional electoral 
systems generate coalition parties. Japan’s system after the war, however, took the 
shape of a permanent two-party coalition government in 1955 when two major parties, 
the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, established a unified party, the LDP, in a 
merger. This practically gave the LDP a one-party government rule; however, there 
were many veto players and plural competition （and stagnation） within the party or-
ganization.
　　The political stability generated by the LDP’s predominance provided a firm bed-
rock for rapid economic growth, but it also produced a number of downsides, including 
7 　The argument in this section is largely based on my other article, in which I conduct a more 
comprehensive analysis of the process and results of Japanese political reforms. See 
Machidori （2015）.
8 　The relationship between the liberal modernism and the conservative mainstream of the 
LDP should not be ignored. Until the 1970s, both were firmly interconnected. In the 1990s, 
however, newly rising intellectuals in liberal modernism were close to LDP members such as 
Ichirō Ozawa, who were not necessarily regarded as members of the conservative 
mainstream. This point should be studied more in detail in future work.
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the entrenchment of relationships between the ruling and opposition parties; the for-
mation of factions within the LDP; a clientelistic and particularistic allocation of bene-
fits; and the diminishment of the opposition party’s ambition to come to power and 
hone its policy-making skills. The particular allocation of benefits based on clientelism 
resulted in the formation of relationships that exchanged political support for the polit-
ical redistribution of goods between the LDP and its member politicians within various 
industries and interest groups. Transaction channels between patrons and clients sta-
bilized due to frequent bureaucratic regulatory involvement. Over time, however, 
these exchanges led to excessively intimate, collusive relationships between politicians, 
bureaucrats, and interest groups. 
　　Although non-Marxist liberal modernists believed LDP predominance had been a 
necessary condition for Japan to have socioeconomic stability and a secure interna-
tional environment based on an alliance with the United States, it was not a foregone 
conclusion that LDP predominance was the only way to achieve these goals. Rather, if 
necessary, changes in power structure could have major positive effects on Japanese 
politics, economy, and society. Relatively, many modernists began to believe that the 
negative effects of LDP predominance exceeded the positive ones after the end of the 
Cold War. 
　　Accordingly, the transformation of these intellectual tides naturally led to a dis-
mantling of LDP predominance along with reforms to the electoral system. Liberal 
modernists argued for a party system that would allow alternations in power. They 
believed parties should compete not internally through factional infighting but against 
each other through proposals for differentiated policy programs. From the viewpoint 
of the electorate, votes could then be cast for parties based on their proposals for na-
tional policy rather than for the qualities of a particular candidate or the kind of ser-
vices the candidate had provided to individual districts or specific industries. Britain’s 
two-party system was considered as a model. As a response to the problems of Japa-
nese politics in the post-war period, the introduction of a single-member district elec-
toral system （SMDs） appeared to be a rational choice that went beyond a simple 
utopian view of British politics or two-party systems.
　　The decision to reform the Lower House’s electoral system to one centered on 
SMDs was made to determine whether Japan would have a two-party or multiparty 
system, interparty competition or intraparty competition, and votes cast based on can-
didate quality or party programs. As comparative political scientist Arend Lijphart 
（1999） noted, the shift to SMDs was of crucial significance because this particular 
electoral system played a central role in “majoritarian democracies.” 
　　Majoritarian democracies in Lijphart’s model are characterized by the concentra-
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tion of power in the central government, and they tend to weaken the independence 
of institutions such as the Central Bank, the judiciary, and local governments. Over 
the course of Japan’s political reforms after the 1990s, however, reformers believed 
the independence of these external institutions had to be strengthened because of the 
shift to majoritarianism. For that reason, decentralization reforms, judiciary reforms, 
and the revision of the Bank of Japan Law reinforced the autonomy of these institu-
tions in tandem with the shift to majoritarianism. The reduction of government inter-
ference in society was also pursued through measures such as private sector 
deregulation and regulatory relaxation. Freedom of choice in education was expanded 
through the abolition of educational districts and the introduction of a public school 
choice system. 
Was the Japanese Experience Exceptional?
Because of the political reforms taking place since the 1990s, the Japanese polity has 
become a hybrid, featuring a concentration of power around the chief executive in the 
central government and a diffusion of powers among decision-making domains such as 
local governments, the judicial branch, and the central bank. Because this is not a typi-
cal mixture if reforms are aimed at establishing a majoritarian polity, one might re-
gard this as something exceptional or unique to Japan.
　　Interestingly, however, a similar kind of combination has been found in the British 
Constitutional Reform since the 1990s. Britain, the mother nation of majoritarian de-
mocracy, has experienced many institutional reforms, including the devolution of 
power to Scotland and Wales, the increased independence of the judicial branch, the 
partial recovery of some power by the upper house （the House of Lords）, and the 
introduction of the PR electoral system to the EU parliament and subnational legisla-
tures. Some argue that these reforms should be seen as “Madisonian”; they certainly 
led to the separation of powers by increasing the number of veto players in deci-
sion-making processes. Current British politics feature a hybrid of the traditional con-
centration of power and the diffusion of powers. Remembering that the Madisonian 
polity is pluralistic, we might regard the new polity as British-style pluralism.
　　British Constitutional Reform was conducted with the recognition that traditional 
majoritarianism worked poorly as socioeconomic diversity increased in British society 
and cooperation with EU became indispensable for British prosperity. Two-party com-
petition and the concentration of power excluded the proper representations of mi-
norities' interests. Because the European Union emphasized minority rights and its 
social diversity was significant, it requested that all the member nations adopt the PR 
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system for European Parliament elections. In sum, its political reforms were motivated 
by the recognition and evaluation of the current situations in Britain. The same was 
true in Japan. In this context, Japanese political reforms were quite typical.
　　What made Japanese political reforms unique was the intellectual starting point I 
argue for in this paper. Japanese-style pluralism described pluralistic decision-making 
processes in which many actors could participate and be satisfied. At the same time, 
however, these processes excluded other actors out of reach of LDP predominance 
and bureaucratic protections, including supporters of opposition parties, civic activists, 
and consumer activists. The most problematic aspect of this system was its lack of 
turnover of political power. Even without referring to Madison’s original view, political 
turnover seems to be a necessary condition of a plural system. In this sense, we 
should say that Japanese-style pluralism had fundamental contradictions.
　　As a result, political reforms were necessary to reduce these contradictions, se-
curing the possibility of turnover in party politics and separating overly interconnect-
ing decision-making domains. These involved combining the centralization of power 
while also eliminating ties between the central government and external domains 
（economic, social, or local institutions）. I label this package of reforms Japanese-style 
majoritarianism. Although Japanese-style majoritarianism is similar to the orthodox 
model of majoritarianism in terms of concentrating power in the central government’s 
hands, Japanese-style majoritarianism is different in that it reduces the links between 
the central government and external institutions.
　　The deeply felt urge to cut through these collusive relationships is understand-
able. However, insufficient intellectual consideration was given to the consequences of 
reducing central government intervention in institutions such as local governments 
and the central bank. The reformers were also not fully aware that they were includ-
ing elements that differed from standard majoritarianism. These two problems, lay-
ered upon each other, have resulted in what can be called “plural immobility.” Plural 
immobility refers to a situation in which multiple actors with decision-making powers 
undertake diverging policy decisions independently, resulting in a loss of policy direc-
tion as a whole. The source of this immobility stems from the links between the cen-
tral government and external institutions and groups being reduced, permitting each 
of these groups to pursue autonomous actions. In conjunction with certain areas that 
were left untouched by reform, a deepening pluralization within the political system 
rendered decision-making difficult. This outcome was not desired, but it could arguably 




In this paper, I deal with the intellectual origins of Japanese political reforms since the 
1990s. It has often been noted that comprehensive political reforms stemmed from the 
recognition that the Japanese polity did not prepare for the new international environ-
ments existing following the end of the Cold War. The Gulf Crisis and War clearly 
showed weak points in the Japanese system. The reforms should be regarded as re-
sponses to this traumatic experience. In addition, the U.S.-Japan relationship qualita-
tively transformed after the mid-1980s. Until that time, it was a stable partnership 
between a senior entity and a junior one. Because of the American economic down-
turn and the Japanese upturn, the United States came to see Japan as a major com-
petitor and to request structural reforms as a precondition to entering the Japanese 
market. These requests could not be fulfilled using the traditional Japanese deci-
sion-making style.
　　While this paper also emphasizes the latter aspect as a reason for political re-
forms, I argue that what the United States criticized during the economic frictions 
and the Structural Impediments Initiative （SII） talks in the 1980s was a significant 
factor in what LDP predominance depended on. This was called “Japanese-style plu-
ralism” after Nakakita’s prominent work （2014）; it had two main features. First, it 
gave opportunities for equal participation and veto powers to many political actors 
connected with the LDP. Rank-and-file members of the LDP, bureaucrats, and interest 
groups handled bottom-up decision-making processes. Second, it excluded actors who 
did not have a positive relationship with the LDP. Although the LDP’s “insider” policy 
communities allowed relatively frank discussions on policies and gave access to 
younger members, without political turnover for long years, they gradually became 
iron triangles, which maintain a status quo.
　　In this sense, the political reforms during the 1990s can be understood as roll-
backs of the other intellectual wave that evaluated the LDP and postwar Japanese 
politics positively: non-Marxist modernism. Because this wave emphasized the signifi-
cance of committing to liberal democratic values and alliances with the United States 
and other Western nations, the LDP wanted to maintain these commitments. Modern-
ists did not believe, however, in LDP predominance and its distinctions between “in-
siders” and “outsiders” in decision-making processes. Instead, if these distinctions 
prevented Japan from employing the necessary policies to continue its commitments, 
9 　For more detailed information on the results of political reforms, please see Machidori 
（2015）. This section is partially extracted from that article.
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LDP predominance and its decision-making processes should have been dismantled. 
For this reason, non-Marxist modernists advocated and initiated comprehensive politi-
cal reforms intellectually despite their long-lasting support of the LDP government.
　　Modernists certainly had a clear understanding of the problems Japan faced and 
of the direction in which Japan should go. However, their prescriptions led to other 
kinds of problems in decision-making processes. Because they strongly believed that 
interconnections among insiders mattered, it was necessary for them to dismantle 
these interconnections by separating the decision-making domains and abandoning in-
sider-only pluralities. As a result, each decision-making domain became autonomous 
and made decisions without considering the effects on other domains. Newly autono-
mous domains do not necessarily accept decisions from other domains. Such situations 
led to a pluralistic immobility of the Japanese polity, which is currently the largest 
challenge to Japanese government.
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1979-80 as a Pivotal Moment in Japanese Postwar 
Conservatism
UNO Shigeki
1 .  Did Everything Begin in 1979?
The years 1979 and 1980 were a pivotal moment for the world and for Japanese con-
servatism alike. This paper focuses on the policy-making group of Masayoshi Ōhira, 
who was the prime minister of Japan during this transition.
　　1979 saw the birth of the Thatcher administration in Britain, along with the full-
fledged implementation of liberalization measures by Deng Xiaoping in China; these 
formed an important transition leading toward the subsequent trend of an increasingly 
rapid spread of market values. The Iranian revolution occurred in Iran at the same 
time, while the Afghan resistance movement against the Soviet invasion gathered 
pace. Hence, this was also the year that marked the start of the current Islamic re-
vival. Looking back, one can say that 1979 was the year that gave us advance notice 
of the dawn of the age of market values and religion.
　　In addition to these four events, journalist Christian Caryl, in his book Strange 
Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century, covers the visit of Pope John Paul II to 
his native Poland in the same year （Caryl 2013）. In the sense that this event was the 
first step toward the dissolution of the socialist system in Poland, 1979 should also be 
remembered as the “beginning of the end” for the socialist system as a whole.
　　If one considers the twentieth century as beginning with the Russian Revolution 
of 1917 and ending with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, this was definitely a cen-
tury spent in the company of “socialism as an alternative.” In this sense, looking back 
to 1979, a point ten years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, one can say that “socialism 
as an alternative” was already in the process of being lost. The events of 1979 demon-
strate that people were instead looking to the market―or, alternatively, to religion―
as driving forces for the advancement of society.
　　Against this background of world events, where, one might ask, does Japan fit in? 
In retrospect, it seems truly ironic, but 1979 is also memorable as the year that saw 
the publication of Ezra Vogel’s Japan as Number One. It was precisely in this year, 
when the world was searching for a new direction, that this “Japan-worshipping” book 
appeared. 
　　In fact, it is certain that Vogel did not write the book with the intention of being 
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a Japan worshipper. The question was how America should handle the economic 
progress of Japan. The book, which was written as a re-examination of American soci-
ety, was received in Japan as an unadulterated piece of Japan worship. While it may 
not be the case that Japan as Number One instigated the trend, a distinctive tendency 
toward self-affirmation became highly apparent in Japanese political and social dis-
course thereafter.
　　It may well be that 1979 was the fateful year in which Japanese society, rather 
than opting for either market values or religion, chose for itself to continue with the 
status quo. Bearing this awareness in mind, this paper traces the fate of a policy-mak-
ing group founded in 1979. Looking back at the legacy of this policy-making group, 
positive and negative, this paper examines the choices Japanese society made at the 
time. 
2 .  Prime Minister Ōhira’s Policy-making Group
In Japan in 1979, the administration of Masayoshi Ōhira had been in power since the 
end of the previous year. As a politician, Ōhira continued in the mainstream of Japa-
nese conservatism as it had been since the time of Shigeru Yoshida; simultaneously, 
however, he was mentally searching for an image of the future of Japan after the pe-
riod of high economic growth. In his opening address on January 25, he stressed the 
transition from the modern to the postmodern, along with a shift in emphasis from the 
economic to the cultural, as critical issues for Japanese society.
　　Ōhira meant what he said. He immediately formed a policy-making group （known 
in Japan as a “study group”）, the “Ōhira Policy Study Group,” composed of nine sub-
groups. Under Ōhira’s own initiative, the group investigated research topics such as 
garden cities, the Pacific Rim Solidarity, and the shift of emphasis from economics to 
culture. The chairmen of the sub-groups, such as Tadao Umesao, Tadao Uchida, and 
Saburō Ōkita, were appointed by Ōhira （Nagatomi 2000）. Ōhira himself was appar-
ently extremely keen on the group’s work and enthusiastically participated in its re-
search, paying close attention to the opinions of junior and middle-ranking academics 
and bureaucrats in attendance.
　　The study group failed to produce almost any results in political terms because of 
Ōhira’s sudden demise in 1980. Ōhira received merely three policy papers from them 
during his lifetime; other papers were hurriedly compiled after his death. Although 
some of the group’s themes were later taken up by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Naka-
sone, important differences in approach emerged in the meantime, as will be discussed 
later. Ōhira’s initiatives, it must be concluded, ultimately misfired.
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　　However, the work of this policy-making group was certainly not meaningless. 
First, the group was established with an awareness of the radical changes that faced 
postwar Japanese society, which had in a sense achieved completion and which had 
weathered the oil crisis of the 1970s. It cannot be said that the majority of the issues 
that the policy-making group tackled were adequately dealt with subsequently. The 
debates undertaken by the policy-making group were to have a major influence on 
subsequent political and social discourse in Japan over numerous issues, including the 
reform of the centralization of administrative power, the development of regional com-
munities, the pursuit of a less materialist lifestyle and less materialist values, the de-
velopment of a new middle class, the approach to be taken toward the advent of an 
information-based society, and international policy with regard to the Pacific Rim.
　　In particular, while academics and critics such as Ken’ichi Kōyama, Seizaburō 
Satō, Shunpei Kumon, and Masakazu Yamazaki, as well as Yasusuke Murakami who 
had strong personal connections, although he was not directly involved with the 
group, were actively involved in popularizing the debate on these issues in mass-circu-
lation magazines such as Chūō Kōron. As an example of the concerns of the time, one 
could indicate Murakami, Satō, and Kumon’s “Bunmei toshite no ie shakai ［The society 
of ‘household’ as a civilization］,” Murakami’s “Shin chūkan taishū no jidai ［The age of 
the new middle mass］,” and Yamazaki’s “Yawarakai kojinshugi no tanjō ［The birth of 
a soft individualism］.”
　　If hitherto the debate in Japan had been led by “Iwanami intellectuals” such as 
Masao Maruyama, who understood the state of Japanese society as the remaining ves-
tiges of a feudal society, the stage was now set for the age of the “Chūō Kōronists.”
3 .  The Background to the Policy-making Group
So, let us ask, why did Ōhira decide to organize such a large-scale policy-making 
group, composed of 130 academics and intellectuals and 89 members of the bureau-
cracy? One reason that could be given is the heightening sense of crisis that was felt 
within Japanese conservatism at the time.
　　One salient point here is the essay “Japan’s Suicide,” published in the literary 
magazine Bungei Shunjū in 1974. The essay was published under the Orwellian 
pseudonym “Group 84,” but it is now clear that “Group 84” consisted of Ken’ichi 
Kōyama, Seizaburō Satō, and Shunpei Kumon. At the time, these three were young 
academics in their thirties and early forties. They had met Ōhira through Jirō Ushio, 
the president of the electronics firm Ushio, Inc. These three, while inducted into the 
policy-making group by Ōhira, were to play a central role in its proceedings.
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　　The salient feature of the essay “Japan’s Suicide” is its sense of crisis. The essay, 
picturing contemporary Japanese society in terms of the downfall of the Roman Em-
pire, warned that the collapse of the Roman Empire was not due to attacks by barbar-
ian tribes from beyond the frontier but due to a “forfeit of the ability for 
self-determination” brought about by “spiritual disassociation” and “social collapse.” 
The essay warned that the same phenomena were apparent in contemporary Japa-
nese society. Their diagnosis was that Japanese society, enervated by the exigencies 
of the period of high economic growth, faced the prospect of psychological and spiri-
tual dissolution.
　　Another background factor behind this diagnosis was the structural changes tak-
ing place in Japanese society. In 1963, Hirohide Ishida, the Liberal Democratic Party 
（LDP） politician and advisor to Tanzan Ishibashi, published the essay “Hoshu seitō no 
bijon ［The vision of a conservative political party］.” In this essay, Ishida predicted 
that the population drift from rural villages to the city would adversely impact the po-
litical fortunes of the LDP, which had a rural support base. The evident message was 
that the LDP, as a conservative party, faced extinction under the prevailing circum-
stances. The essay helped spark an internal revolution within the LDP aimed at the 
modernization of the party. 
　　How did Ōhira handle this state of affairs? While several policies such as the ra-
tionalization of party organization, the eradication of internal party factions, and the 
introduction of a single-seat constituency system were seriously argued, his thinking 
was not entirely in tune with the reformist movement within the LDP （Nakakita 
2014）. His overriding concerns were the limits of modernization and the catch-up 
model of economic development as the central axis. Timely enough, the publication of 
the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth came in 1972. Stressing the limits to the planet’s 
resources, this paper’s warnings of a tragic future of overpopulation and environmen-
tal collapse had a major impact. Since the late 1960s, Ōhira had already been claiming 
that the accepted model of modernization through economic development in imitation 
of the advanced economies had reached its limits; he now began in earnest to think 
through the “next stage” of modernization with economic growth at its core. The oil 
shock of 1973 did all the more to demonstrate the legitimacy of his concerns. 
　　Ōhira increasingly formulated his own position as “proceeding beyond moderniza-
tion into an age with its emphasis on culture.” It is certain that what lay behind this 
approach was Ōhira’s feeling of opposition to Takeo Fukuda, his rival for the post of 
prime minister. In Ōhira’s eyes, Fukuda’s noted hawkishness in foreign policy and en-
thusiasm for military preparedness and amending the Constitution seemed to point to-
ward a route “back to the pre-modern era.” （It is certain that Fukuda’s approach 
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takes its contemporary form in the cabinet of Shinzō Abe.） Standing against this pol-
icy, Ōhira argued for the continuation of the lightly-armed/economics-driven model in-
herited from Shigeru Yoshida. Indeed, he aimed to shift the emphasis of this model 
from economic to cultural concerns and, in doing so, to seize the commanding heights 
of Japanese conservatism. Rather than an opposition of cities and farming villages, 
Ōhira sought a blending of the two; he was zealous about the devolution of powers to 
the regions. This approach would later factor into his thinking on garden cities; at the 
same time, he was conscious of the distinction between his own thinking and that of 
his rival Fukuda, who placed more emphasis on the role of central government. 
4 .  The Double Character of the Ōhira Policy-making Group
These policy papers had a double character. On the one hand, there was the recogni-
tion that Japan’s modernization had reached a certain turning point, a reappraisal of 
the Japanese lifestyle in favor of a new approach to society and organizations that 
transcended the concerns of economic development. 
　　Looking back from today, one might well say that Ōhira’s grasp of the issues at 
stake was indeed valid. This is because 1979/80 was undoubtedly the turning point 
where Japan changed into a mature society and began facing a future of declining 
birthrates and an aging population.  
　　For example, in 1980, Yasuo Tanaka―then a student―published his novel Nan︲
tonaku, Crystal Feeling and became an instant celebrity. This work gained wide atten-
tion for its coverage of youth culture and lifestyles; it is also famous for its vast 
amount of author’s notes. The majority of them explain and critique brand names that 
appear in the text; however, it is deeply interesting that the very final note in the 
book is a prediction hinting at the advent of declining birthrates and an aging popula-
tion. The note quotes a special report on trends in birthrates prepared by a govern-
mental committee on the population problem, along with a 1979 report （released as a 
white paper in 1980） by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. 
　　In this sense, we can say that the trend toward declining birthrates and an aging 
population, which has continued until today, was already forecast in 1980 （even in a 
best-seller novel!）. Additionally, as the subject matter of this novel spells out quite 
clearly, the cause of declining birthrates and an aging population centers on how the 
genders relate to each other. Also apparent in the novel is a clear awareness of the 
impact of changing value systems and lifestyles. However, given that the work was 
read, at least at the time, as a novel of manners, it is also clear that awareness of 
these problems had by no means become general or mainstream.
228
UNO Shigeki
　　In this context, it merits our attention that, among the policy-making sub-groups 
established by Ōhira, one was devoted to strengthening the family unit. In fact, the 
participants in this sub-group included gender scholars, such as Hiroko Hara, and de-
bated topics such as new approaches to work for men and women. In the work of this 
meeting, it is not impossible to discern the beginnings of one of the currents leading to 
changes like the employment gender equality legislation of 1986. 
　　However, that said, the main problem also lies here. As clarified by a glance at 
the material produced by this sub-group, the family model depicted at the center of 
the deliberations is basically that of a husband working in an industry and a wife who 
stays home as a full-time homemaker. It must be said that the model is completely 
that of the male breadwinner. The other sub-groups displayed a strikingly positive 
view of the Japanese-style management model and Japanese-model system of industry, 
also discoursing eloquently, it should be clear, on the traditional family model, which 
even today exerts a powerful sway, and on the traditional model of working life. 
　　On this basis, one may clearly observe the differences between two papers pro-
duced with the same group of intellectuals at the core of the discussions: “Japan’s Sui-
cide” （1974） and the 1980 policy papers of the Ōhira Prime Ministerial policy-making 
group. While “Japan’s Suicide” is brimming with a sense of crisis toward Japanese so-
ciety, what stands out about the 1980 policy papers is their air of self-satisfaction and 
commitment to the status quo. It is certain that what lies between these two dates is 
the performance of the Japanese economy, which recovered from the oil crisis at a 
relatively early stage.  
　　Regarding what came to be known as “Japanese-style management,” the 1982 
OECD Report on Labor in Japan had already touched on the themes of “lifetime em-
ployment,” “seniority by length of service,” and “in-house unions,” which constitute so-
called “Three Sacred Treasures” of the system overall. It is not impossible that this 
kind of overseas reassessment of Japan―as we have already mentioned, Ezra Vogel’s 
Japan as Number One was published in 1979―working in conjunction with the typi-
cally Japanese way it was received in-country, gave birth to the Ōhira policy papers, 
as the “ideology of 1980.” Therefore, having weathered the oil crisis and now facing 
the birth of the bubble economy, Japanese society confirmed its self-affirmation and 
commitment to the status quo. Additionally, we see here the reason Japan’s socio- 
industrial way of life, along with its concomitant apportioning of gender roles to men 
and women, became “mythologized.” 
　　In that sense, although Ōhira’s policy-makers set out on their deliberations with 
an exceptionally keen and accurate awareness of the structural changes taking place 
in Japanese society and the issues stemming from such, one might characterize their 
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end as a mechanism for the creation of a powerful ideology arguing in favor of con-
tinuing the status quo. In selecting these policy-makers, Ōhira had urged his cohorts 
to “choose a crowd of people who are going to have a big impact in the twenty-first 
century.” This indeed proved the case. The group as it was put together included 
many of the bureaucrats and intellectuals who were to dominate Japan thereafter. 
（Indeed, the group included Haruhiko Kuroda, currently the president of the Bank of 
Japan.） In terms of individuals involved in the group as well, the paradigm of this 
group continues to have a decisive impact on subsequent Japanese society.
5 .  The Legacy of the Ōhira Policy-making Group
Finally, let us examine the legacy of this policy-making group. As we have already 
seen, the policy-making group came to a close with the sudden demise of Ōhira. Zenkō 
Suzuki, who succeeded Ōhira as prime minister, showed no interest in the group, and 
in this sense, the group’s recommendations failed to achieve any political impact. 
　　The only exception is Yasuhiro Nakasone, who became prime minister after that. 
Nakasone did pay attention to the group’s recommendations; Kōyama, Satō, and 
Kumon in particular became his advisors, thus becoming the driving force behind the 
Second Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform and the proposal of admin-
istrative reforms. However, some commentators indicate the existence of clear differ-
ences between Ōhira’s and Nakasone’s terms of office. For example, the political 
scholar Hideo Ōtake argues that the administrative reforms undertaken by the Naka-
sone administration were driven by economists and industrialists such as Hiroshi Katō 
and Yōichi Sando and that these reforms were predicated on an ideology of economic 
liberalism. However, Ōhira’s advisors included more intellectuals involved with cul-
tural affairs; Ōtake argues that this was a group different in tone, with its own distinc-
tive set of values not based on the principle of market competition （Ōtake 1994）. 
Others, however, like Kōji Nakakita emphasize rather the similarities between the two 
groups, with emphasis on rejecting big government and on individual responsibility, 
along with cooperation in families, workplaces and the community （Nakakita 2014）.
　　Regarding this issue, this paper adopts the stance that while both groups rejected 
big government, the logic behind doing so was very different for the Ōhira and Naka-
sone groups. The point is that while Ōhira opposed nationalism and emphasized the 
importance of medium-sized groups such as the local community and the smaller busi-
ness firms, the Nakasone group intended to forward a neoliberal reform program 
through means of privatization. Ideologically, the two groups were completely differ-
ent. In this sense, it is difficult to claim that the legacy of Ōhira’s policy-making group 
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had any direct connection with the Nakasone reform program.
　　Rather, if one were to posit a legacy bequeathed by Ōhira to Nakasone, one might 
search along the lines of conservatism of a new age. As stated previously, Japanese 
conservatism had trod a difficult path since the 1960s because of the structural 
changes taking place in Japanese society; this being the case, we see that the LDP has 
rapidly restored its strength since Ōhira’s death in 1980. The LDP won a crushing vic-
tory in the Diet elections of 1980, which we could term “Ōhira’s condolence.” They 
went on to do the same in the Diet elections of 1986 under Nakasone. This was the 
juncture at which Nakasone stressed, “We’ve won the left wing over.” With everyday 
life for the majority of people now more stable, Japanese conservatism won and main-
tained the support of a city-dwelling population that had been conservatized, propel-
ling it into a new era. In this sense, one perhaps could say that Nakasone harvested 
where Ōhira had sown. 
　　In this way, through Nakasone, the Ōhira policy-makers’ legacy lived on, in a dou-
ble character. Hence, a more optimistic sense of self-affirmation that policy papers rep-
resent kept inflating, partially due to the development of the bubble economy. This is 
one aspect of affairs. However, it is not as though a more positive aspect has failed to 
leave behind any impact on Japanese politics through the 1990s and beyond.
　　In 1992, Morihiro Hosokawa, who had just resigned as the governor of Kumamoto 
Prefecture, declared his formation of the Liberal Social Alliance （Jiyū shakai rengō） in 
the literary magazine Bungei Shunjū. Hosokawa’s idea eventually found expression as 
the Japan New Party, which went on from 1993 to press administrative reforms and 
to form a coalition administration under Hosokawa. The person who drafted Hosoka-
wa’s declaration was Ken’ichi Kōyama （Nakakita 2014）. The text of the declaration in-
cludes the following passage, in which the sense of crisis evident in “Japan’s Suicide” is 
somewhat evident: “The greatest danger that Japan directly faces is that Japanese 
politics has failed to carry out the obligations which it has imposed on itself. Even if 
Japanese politics grasps the fundamental nature of this historic time of transition and 
produces a basic policy line to deal with this time of transition, the turmoil will con-
tinue unless we can forge a new national consensus aiming to change the policies of 
Japan” （Hosokawa 1992: 95）. Additionally, the declaration’s emphasis on decentraliza-
tion of power continues Ōhira’s line of thinking on the issue. 
　　Furthermore, after the fall of the Hosokawa coalition, the LDP coalition with 
Tomiichi Murayama’s Japanese Socialist Party （JSP） came under the influence of Kōi-
chi Katō, a political successor to Ōhira. Opinions are divided on the Murayama admin-
istration, but at least the war apology Murayama gave, conscious of Japan’s wars of 
aggression and colonialism, could only have been achieved through this coalition of 
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LDP and JSP. Certainly, within these limits, the mid-1990s were a kind of “conserva-
tive-liberal age.” One might call this the time when the final spark of Ōhira and his 
policy-making group’s legacy was visible. 
　　If this is indeed the case, Ōhira’s policy-making group’s efforts were definitely 
meaningful, in that they drew a line between Japanese conservatism and its tendency 
toward nationalism, instead formulating another kind of conservatism that looked 
rather at the continual development of Japanese civil society. This trend showed a 
splendor of its own during the 1990s, before being completely silenced in the new mil-
lennium. However, the trend is not one that should be discarded completely, including 
the possibility of a “conservative liberalism” in Japan. 
　　In this age of a trend toward market values and religion, it is clear that Japanese 
conservatism has made its own special choice. When we examine the issues through 
present-day eyes, it becomes clear that the choice has been for the continuation of Ja-
pan’s own social status quo. Yet even so, the intellectual tendencies evident in the age 
of Ōhira also firmly grasped the seeds of dissent toward such a status quo. On this 
basis, the assessments of Japanese society offered by the Ōhira group of policy-makers 
may in a sense constitute a critical evaluation of the subsequent “two lost decades.” 
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Abstract
The 19th Century Rokumeikan and the former World Trade Center of the 20th 
Century transcend time and space to resonate with one another. Both use elements of 
Islamic designs. I aim to explore whether there is an architectural meaning by digging 
deeper into this topic.
Rokumeikan
Many are familiar with the Rokumeikan, which was built in 1883. It is described in 
high school and middle school history classes as a place for social exchange that 
symbolizes the Westernization policies of the Meiji government. It is well known that 
balls were held there for men in tailcoats and women in dresses.
　　The presence of Indo-Islamic elements in the Rokumeikan’s design, however, is 
not very well known. Many researchers largely overlook this aspect.
　　The Rokumeikan was designed by Josiah Conder, who was invited by the 
Japanese government to contribute to architectural planning. He was a so-called oyatoi 
gaikokujin （a “foreign advisor” hired by the government to assist in Westernization）. 
He taught at the Imperial College of Engineering, the precursor to the Department of 
Engineering at the University of Tokyo.
　　He trained in architecture in the 1870s in Great Britain. He was a student at a 
time when there was still enthusiasm for the Gothic Revival style. 
　　It was also a time when there was great interest in the Orient in Western 
thought; Middle Eastern and Indian architecture drew much attention. Architects 
mainly experimented with Oriental styles when designing leisure facilities. This was 
the kind of era in which Conder lived.
　　Furthermore, Conder studied at the South Kensington Royal College of Art. His 
aspirations in architecture grew at this school, which was the foundation of the Gothic 
Revival movement. There were also many people there interested in the Orient.
　　Conder arrived in Japan in 1877 and began working in architectural planning. His 
works often displayed Gothic and Islamic influence.
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　　The building features Islamic styling. One can see this, for example, in the pillars 
on the second story veranda, reminiscent of the neck of a bottle. Here, there is 
reference to the pillars frequently seen in the palaces of Maharajas. The decorations 
of the railing are also clearly done in arabesque.
　　It is unlikely that Conder’s Japanese counterparts requested an Indo-Islamic style. 
They wanted to show Western diplomats that Japan was Westernized; therefore, it is 
difficult to imagine that they had any other expectations. 
　　The inclusion of an Indo-Islamic style must have been Conder’s personal choice. I 
believe this reflects the fervent interest in the Orient that was slowly gaining ground 
in Great Britain. Additionally, as a bridge between the West and Japan, it may have 
made sense to him to use Indo-Islamic style.
　　These types of designs were frequently seen in leisure facilities in Europe, such 
as amusement parks, gambling houses, and other entertainment centers. An exotic, 
Oriental style put people in a good mood in these places of amusement.
　　This must be the reason that Pierre Loti from France wrote, “It looks like a 
public bath in our country.”
　　The Japanese government had likely wanted a more formal and sophisticated 
architectural style. Conder was perhaps too playful, or, to put it bluntly, he may have 
gone too far with the leisure theme.
　　However, the Japanese authorities would not have noticed his light, non-serious 
touch. Instead, they would have accepted it as a European-style site for social 
exchange. Even today, many historians are unaware of this aspect when discussing 
the Rokumeikan. History books have generally taken it as a representative example of 
Westernization, and only a handful of architectural historians appreciate the Islamic 
touches in the building’s style.
World Trade Center
The World Trade Center in New York City was destroyed on September 11, 2001 by 
an act of terrorism.
　　The sight of the two skyscrapers was once a symbol of late 20th-century America. 
I saw it as a sign of American capitalism, whose power was spreading around the 
world. It is also generally thought that this is why it was targeted by Islamic 
fundamentalists.
　　As many architects know, the World Trade Center had Islamic-style arches. The 
lower portion of the arches forked into two and extended upward as vertical lines 
along the window frames. The way they were divided closely resembled arches often 
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seen in the Middle East.
　　The World Trade Center was built in 1973, designed by Minoru Yamasaki, a 
Nikkei （second generation） Japanese-American. Behind the beautiful appearance of 
the buildings was an unusually detail-oriented architect. This is why it has often been 
looked on lightly, with some saying, “Yamasaki only dressed it up to look pretty.”
　　The design borrows heavily from Gothic and Islamic forms. It stands out in its 
ability to incorporate these styles into modern design.
　　Yamasaki was also hired to work in Saudi Arabia. There, the drawings he made 
of the Dharan Airport were used on the country’s paper currency. The king seems to 
have been pleased with the arabesque design of the walls.
　　Yamasaki was Japanese, born in the U.S. He must have often thought his family 
coming to America from Japan. He seems to have sought to express the connection of 
East and West in his work. This may be one reason his mind was drawn to Islamic 
forms. 
　　Yamasaki had little in common with Conder. Yet, their interest in Islamic-style 
designs came from a similar inner attitude; they both wanted to project the story of 
“East meets West” into architecture.
　　Architect Laurie Kahn wrote an opinion piece for an online magazine soon after 
9 ―11. In it, she gave a startling reason for the attack on the World Trade Center.
　　She argued that Yamasaki had dressed up the stronghold of capitalism in Islamic 
style and that Islamic fundamentalists saw this as blasphemy to Islam. That is why 
the World Trade Center was attacked.
　　Her point is known in Japan as well. It was presented in a positive light by 
Makiko Iizuka to her readers （ 9 ―11 no mokuteki o tsukutta otoko ［The man who 
created the target for 9 ―11］, 2010）.
　　I am not convinced by her argument. I think it is highly unlikely that this was the 
case. 
　　The terrorist leader Mohamed Atta had taken lessons in architecture at Cairo 
University. Thus, he may have recognized the Islamic elements of the World Trade 
Center. However, the other terrorists did not have such an eye for architecture, and I 
cannot imagine they would have understood something like this. I disagree with Kahn 
and Iizuka’s interpretation.
　　Yamasaki also gave an Islamic touch to the North Shore Congregation Israel 
synagogue. In terms of being an affront to Islam, this would be a more accurate target 
than the World Trade Center. In this case, I could understand the reasoning that it is 
disrespectful to Islam. However, the terrorists did not target the synagogue, instead 
they attacked the enormous square building in New York. The way it stood out 
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should be understood as a reason it was targeted.
　　In the cases of both Rokumeikan and the World Trade Center, the architect’s 
addition of Islamic stylistic elements has been ignored. I would like to say that, 
including this point, the two buildings resonate with each other.
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Abstract
After the era of the “Lost 20 Years,” a qualitative change occurred in Japanese popu-
lar culture. That change was the arrival of User-Generated Content （UGC, meaning 
works created by general users who are not professionals and provided for free via 
the Internet） as amusement for young people. Among UGC, however, there are many 
works that have been created and distributed without any regard for copyright, and 
the gap has widened between the state of popular culture and the legal system.
　　After the 1990s, the Japanese Copyright Act became stricter as the number of 
cases that were violations under the law increased; amendments were introduced 
year after year that primarily served the intentions of copyright holders. This paper 
reviews what kind of power the content industry and the US government exerted on 
the amendment of the Japanese Copyright Act and discusses the possible effects on 
Japanese popular culture as a result of potential future legal amendments that are 
possibly realized with the Trans-Pacific Partnership （TPP）.
1 .  Introduction
Copyright laws 1  are deeply related to the state of cultural activity in a country. While 
they contribute to the development of culture by protecting the rights of works, when 
those protections are too restrictive, the convenience of the utilization of works is lost. 
In keeping with the changes of the times, searching for a balance has become a criti-
cal legal viewpoint.
　　If we think about the phenomenon after 1991, when the bubble economy ended, 
marking the end of the Lost 20 Years, we can see that period wherein a qualitative 
1 　The Japanese Copyright Act is a civil law modeled on German law, and it differs from the 
system of common law. A major difference between the U.S. Copyright Act and the Japanese 
Copyright Act is that in the latter, the content of individual rights and restrictions are pre-
cisely stipulated in provisions, there is no legal principle of fair use, and there is the concept 
of an offense subject to prosecution only on complaint that cannot be brought before the 
court without a complaint from the copyright holder.
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change occurred in Japanese popular culture. That change was, namely the emer-
gence of a large number of “prosumers” who, while receiving digital content, pro-
duced/transmitted that content, with high performance/networked personal 
computers and software of all types, marked by the groundbreaking release of Win-
dows 95 in 1995. The works that they created have been called User-Generated Con-
tent （UGC）. UGC, being provided for free via the Internet, became mainstream, and 
enjoying such free content was established as amusement for young people. The 
emergence of an income disparity that brought about a hesitation with regard to ex-
penditures for paid amusements formed the background of such enjoyment. However, 
since an analysis of the socioeconomics of the Lost 20 Years deviates from the purpose 
of the present study, this paper does not touch upon it here.
　　Some examples of UGC can be reproductions or derivative works of manga or 
anime released on video-sharing sites such as pixiv, “kusokora” meaning a parody col-
lage work; “MAD videos” of remixed existing videos/musical works; “tried to sing/
tried to dance,” where people sing popular songs themselves or make dance videos to 
fit the songs; works that use the vocaloid social phenomenon Hatsune Miku, and oth-
ers. Since these are some areas where problems with rights have been resolved, there 
is no reason to think that they all have problems with copyright. However, many 
users who create UGC produce and release works without regard for copyrights, and 
there is a strong reaction among them with respect to things that make laws stricter 
and limit users.
　　On the other hand, based on a sense of legal compliance that is at times excessive, 
people who find products that are suspected to be an infringement of rights and de-
nounce them in depth on the Internet have also appeared. It can be said that one of 
the main causes that psychologically supports such people is the trend of the 
strengthening of copyright protections.
　　This paper examines the changes to the Japanese Copyright Act, assesses the de-
mands from the U.S. and the lobbying of the cultural industry that worked toward 
those changes, as well as the responses to those activities primarily from Internet 
users, and discusses the area of the TPP copyright that is presumed to have an effect 
on the directionality of Japanese culture hereafter.
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2 .  Complication/Toughening of the Copyright Act
Fig. 1  Changes in the total character count of the Copyright Act （round num-
bers）
First, let us obtain an overview of the changes to the Japanese Copyright Act. Fig. 1  
is a graph of the total character count of the current Copyright Act in round numbers, 
from the enactment of the law in 1971 till date. The total character count increased 
about 2．3 times over this 44-year period, and about 1．9 times when compared with 
1991, when the Lost 20 Years began. Above all, the increase after 1992 has been steep, 
and the amendment of the Copyright Act has largely been performed like an “annual 
event.” Among the principle Japanese laws, there are no other examples of amend-
ments being frequently repeated to this degree.
　　In most cases, the content of the amendments consider the side of the copyright 
holder, such as the addition of matters that are illegal and the strengthening of penal-
ties. Amendments for the sake of the convenience of users of literary works have thus 
been extremely limited to things such as provisions for the sake of information access 
for physically disabled persons or deregulation limited to the National Diet Library.
　　Concerning the law becoming stricter, in 1971, when the current Copyright Act 
was enacted, the penalty for an individual violator was “imprisonment up to three 
years, or a fine up to 300，000 JPY,” and for a corporation, it was “a fine up to 300，000 
JPY.” In 1985, the fine for both individuals and corporations was up to 1，000，000 JPY, 
and in 1997, it rose to 3，000，000 JPY. In 2001, the fine for a corporation changed to 
100，000，000 JPY, and in 2005, the penalty for an individual became “subject to impris-
onment up to five years, or a fine up to 5，000，000 JPY, or both.” In the same year, the 
fine for a corporation was raised to 150，000，000 JPY. Then, in 2007, the law acquired 
the current provisions of “subject to imprisonment for a term of up to ten years, a fine 
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of up to ten million yen, or both” for an individual, and “a fine of up to three hundred 
million yen” for a corporation. 2
　　The provision of the Copyright Act that has become the most complicated can be 
identified in the provision of Article 30 that established Reproduction for Private Use. 
In the initial Copyright Act of 1971, the provision of Article 30 was very simple, as fol-
lows:
Article 30　A user may reproduce a work that is subject to copyright （hereinaf-
ter in this Subsection referred to as a “work”） if the reproduction is for personal 
or family use or for any other use of a similarly limited scope.
This provision of Article 30 restricts copyright in order to ensure the convenience of 
users for the utilization of works, and it is exceedingly important text from the view-
point of attempting to balance the protection and utilization of works. However, in 
1985, 1993, 1999, 2010, and 2012, Article 30 was amended in a form where text was 
added, and the convenience of the user got largely narrowed gradually. As shown 
below, the current Article 30 has become so exceedingly complex that it can hardly 
be grasped in summary if one is not a specialist in copyright.
Article 30　（ 1 ） Except in the following cases, a user may reproduce a work that 
is subject to copyright （hereinafter in this Subsection referred to as a “work”） if 
the reproduction is for personal or family use or for any other use of a similarly 
limited scope （hereinafter referred to as “private use”）:
　　（i） a user reproduces a work by means of an automated duplicator （meaning 
a device with a function for making reproductions, of which all or most of the in-
struments for making the reproductions are automated） that has been set up for 
use by the public;
　　（ii） the reproduction of the work has become possible due to the circumven-
tion of technological protection measures （meaning that the removal or alteration 
（excluding removal or alteration due to technological constraints accompanying 
the conversion of recording or transmission systems） of the signals that the tech-
nological protection measures use, makes it possible to take an action that the 
technological protection measures prevent or makes it so that a barrier no longer 
arises as a result of an action that the technological protection measures deter; 
2 　For details, please refer to chapter 1 of Yamada Shōji, Nihon no chosakuken wa naze konnani 
kibishiinoka （Kyoto: Jimbun Shoin, 2011）.
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the same applies in Article 120― 2, items （i） and （ii）） or a barrier to reproduction 
of the work no longer arises as a result of that circumvention, and the user repro-
duces the work in the knowledge of this fact;
　　（iii） the work is received via an automatic public transmission that infringes 
a copyright （including an automatic public transmission that is transmitted 
abroad and that would constitute a copyright infringement if it were transmitted 
in Japan）, and the user records the sounds or visuals of the work in digital for-
mat, in the knowledge of this fact.
（ 2 ） A person who, for private use, records the sound or visuals of a work in a 
digital format, on a digital sound or visual recording medium that is provided for 
by Cabinet Order, by means of a machine with digital sound or visual recording 
functions （excluding a machine with special performance capabilities for use in 
the broadcasting business or other special performance capabilities that are gen-
erally not offered for private use, and also excluding a telephone with a sound re-
cording function or any other machine with sound or visual recording functions 
incidental to its primary function） which is provided for by Cabinet Order shall 
pay a reasonable amount of compensation to the copyright owner.
3 .  The Legal Amendment Procedure and the ARR
As expressed symbolically in the provisions becoming stricter or the changes to Arti-
cle 30, the amendments to the Copyright Act have been conducted in a form that 
largely satisfies the demands of the cultural industry. However, along with the inten-
tions of the domestic cultural industry, there is a sequence of events that has affected 
amendments to the law in a form where it cannot be said that they are unrelated to 
the intentions expressed by the US government. The intention of the US government 
mentioned here is the “Annual Reform Recommendations from the Government of the 
United States to the Government of Japan under the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform 
and Competition Policy Initiative” （hereafter, ARR）.
　　The ARR was decided in talks between then Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa 
and President Bill Clinton in 1993. With the demands of both the Japanese and U.S. 
governments having been communicated to the other party, the demanding papers 
were exchanged yearly around October, and reports of the results of the investigation 
into those demanding papers were sent to the heads of both countries around June of 
the following year. 
　　Several events were demanded by the ARR that were symbolic for Japanese soci-
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ety in the era of the Lost 20 Years, such as the privatization of Japan Post or the lib-
eralization of temporary staffing. There is also the viewpoint that the future of Japan 
was written in the ARR. The exchange of demanding papers began in 1994 and con-
tinued until 2008 when the Hatoyama Administration abolished it. In 2011, however, 
the same type of dialog was revived under the name of the United States-Japan Eco-
nomic Harmonization Initiative （EHI）.
　　Regarding the directionality of the Japanese Copyright Act, there are several 
points that are referenced in the ARR, and there are even parts that are seen to be 
amendments of the law that satisfy U.S. demands. This paper investigates several sep-
arate issues with regard to what the actual circumstances were in concrete terms. 
　　However, before that, let us first clarify the typical procedure for the amendment 
of the Japanese Copyright Act. It is the Copyright Division of the Agency for Cultural 
Affairs that has jurisdiction over the Copyright Act. The Copyright Subcommittee of 
the Culture Council, which has been established in the Agency for Cultural Affairs, 
conducts investigations directed at the revision of the law. Every year, the Copyright 
Subcommittee sets the items that must be intensively deliberated, and between one 
and two years are taken in the subcommission to investigate those items and summa-
rize the findings in a written report. The written report is approved by the subcom-
mittee, summarized in a concrete bill in the Agency for Cultural Affairs, and placed 
on the Diet’s agenda after a decision in a Cabinet meeting. Thus, once it is passed by 
both houses of the Diet, the amendment of the law is implemented. A bill placed on 
the agenda of the Diet through the decision of a Cabinet meeting just like this exam-
ple is called a “Cabinet Law.” Being placed on the agenda of the Diet as Cabinet Law 
is a typical method, but an agreement may not be reached if there is an inquiry com-
mission that stands in opposition to any interests. Additionally, since several years are 
required for the series of processes, rushed revisions to the law cannot be handled.
　　Other than becoming a Cabinet Law after discussion by an inquiry commission, 
an amendment proposal may be placed on the Diet’s agenda with a private member’s 
bill from a Diet member. Contrary to rapid revisions to the law being possible, the 
part of this law that has not been carefully deliberated by specialists poses the danger 
of becoming a problematic amendment. Additionally, through industry groups’ lobby-
ing of politicians, there is a problem that amendments to the law or the enactments of 
new laws that take away users’ convenience may end up being placed with a private 
member’s bill.
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4 .  Individual Issues Concerning Copyright
4. 1 The Problem of Extending the Copyright Protection Period
Hereafter, we will examine concrete examples in the movements of the domestic con-
tent industry, the ARR, the discussion by the inquiry commission, and the responses 
of users with respect to these. First is the problem of extending the copyright protec-
tion period.
　　In Japan, until 2002, in the case of a general work, copyright protection was given 
for 50 years from the death of the author, while in the case of anonymous/aliased/cor-
porate works, copyright protection was given for 50 years from the official release. 
According to the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act enacted in 1998 in the 
U.S., the period of protection for the corporate copyright of works released up to 1977 
was extended from 75 years to 95 years after publication, and with regard to works 
announced in 1978 and thereafter, with general works, the copyright protection is 70 
years from the death of the author, while in the case of corporate works, the copyright 
protection is the shorter of either 95 years from publication or 120 years from produc-
tion. The U.S. intended to make such a long protection period, seen globally as a long 
protection period, a global standard, and the U.S. has continued to apply pressure on 
all countries to that end. 
　　Also in Japan, copyright holders have principally advocated that a long protection 
period will further stimulate cultural activities. The 1999 Agency for Cultural Affairs 
copyright inquiry commission discussed the possibility of extending the protection pe-
riod but did not conclude that it should be immediately extended. In 2002, in the Cul-
ture Council, the Motion Picture Producers Association of Japan advocated making 
the protection period after release 70 years for movies only.
　　Beginning with the ARR of that year, a demand was described where the copy-
right protection period for general works must be extended to 70 years after the 
death of the author, while the copyright protection period for corporate works must 
be extended to 95 years after the official release. The movements of the ARR and the 
Motion Picture Producers Association of Japan are almost concurrent, and some kind 
of connection between the two parties had been presumed. The encouragement by 
the Motion Picture Producers Association of Japan was successful, and an amendment 
to the law was passed in 2003 that made the protection period 70 years after release. 
The following description was seen in the ARR written report exchanged in 2003. It 
has a style of writing that seems to promise the U.S. an extension of the protection 
period even with regard to works other than movies.
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The Government of Japan submitted a bill amending the Copyright Law to the 
Diet on May 13, 2003 in order to extend the term of protection for cine-
matographic works from 50 years to 70 years from their first publication. The 
Government of Japan will continue its deliberations on extending the terms of 
protection for other subject matter protected under the Copyright Law, in consid-
eration of several factors including global trends.
In the 2003 Culture Council Copyright Subcommittee, a group of copyright holders ad-
vocated for making the protection period 70 years even with regard to general works. 
In the 2004 version of the “Intellectual Property Promotion Program” announced 
every year by the Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters that has been estab-
lished in the office of the Prime Minister, a revision to the law where necessary would 
be included with regard to the protection period of general works, and an extension 
has effectively entered a predetermined track. Even in the ARR, the extension of the 
protection period was continuously described until 2007.
　　In 2006, the Japan Writers’ Association and 16 other groups called for an exten-
sion of the protection period. On the other hand, extending the protection period 
would not only discourage new creativity but also make it remarkably difficult to uti-
lize past works, and this concern about stagnating culture spread among users. People 
who were aware of the problem gathered together, and in 2006, the National Council 
to think about the problem of extending the copyright protection period was launched, 
an open forum has been held repeatedly, and the discussion has deepened.
　　In 2007, a sub-commission to consider the problem was established in the Culture 
Council. The documents, which the Agency for Cultural Affairs prepared at Assembly 
No. 1  of this sub-commission, specified demand from the U.S. in the ARR as one of 
the underlying reasons for the necessity of extending the protection period. On the 
other hand, considering that concern for the extension of the protection period was 
spreading among the public, the Agency for Cultural Affairs altered the sub-commis-
sion configuration that was biased toward copyright holders and incorporated numer-
ous opinions in the discussion. The written report compiled in 2009 stated, “It is 
appropriate to continue the deliberation so that a conclusion can be obtained that har-
monizes the balance of protection and utilization,” and the extension of the protection 
period that was effectively on a predetermined track was overturned by the power of 
the public. This was an extremely rare conclusion made in the history of copyright in 
Japan.
　　The ARR demanded that the extension of the protection period continue until 
2007; however, it accepted the trend as described above, and the 2008 demanding 
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paper did not include this. The ARR itself was abolished soon thereafter, and the EHI, 
which was a revived ARR in 2011 in the U.S. once again, demanded an extension of 
the protection period. The inheritance of that policy by the TPP will be discussed 
later.
4．2 Law for the Prevention of Surreptitious Videoing
In the middle of the discussion on the extension of the copyright protection period in 
2006, in the Intellectual Property Strategy Investigating Committee of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, the chairperson of the Japan Video Software Association, Tsu-
guhiko Kadokawa sought legislation to prohibit the “surreptitious videotaping” of mov-
ies in a theater. The act of recording movies for the purpose of private use in the 
movie theater had been legal under the Copyright Act. Movies “surreptitiously shot” 
appear on the market as pirated editions. The association had the intention of de-
manding some kind of restriction on that act. Suddenly, a demand for measures to 
counter movie piracy appeared in the 2006 version of the ARR document that was of-
ficially released three months after that: “Enacting effective anti-camcording legislation 
against the use of recording devices in movie theatres, aimed at cutting off the major 
source for masters used to make pirate DVDs.” Technically, the movements of the do-
mestic industry were in a manner that somewhat preceded the AAR, but it can be in-
ferred that the two parties were moving in coordination.
　　In order to implement this legislation, upon agreement by the inquiry commission, 
the proposal for the amendment of the Reproduction for Private Use provision of Arti-
cle 30 of the Copyright Act was supposed to be brought before the Diet as a Cabinet 
Law by the normal method. However, at this time, the Law Relating to the Prevention 
of Surreptitious Videotaping （Surreptitious Movie Videotaping Prevention Act） that 
overwrote the Copyright Act was drafted separately, and the industry and the Liberal 
Democratic Party adopted a way to place it on the agenda of the Diet as a private 
member’s bill without submitting it to the inquiry commission. It took three weeks 
from being placed on the agenda of the Diet to be executed, and during that time, 
there were only a few people who noticed these movements. In the ARR’s written re-
port issued the following year, the results of the U.S. demands were described as fol-
lows: “A bill which makes it possible to punish those who make sound or visual 
recordings of movies in movie theaters, even if the recordings are for the purpose of 
private use, by applying the penalty provision of the Copyright Law, passed the Diet 
on May 23, 2007.” The Law Relating to the Prevention of Surreptitious Videotaping 
was enacted on August 30, 2007, and since that day, a PR short movie calling for the 
prohibition of surreptitious videotaping has been distributed in Japanese movie the-
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aters. In the movie, a man with a video camera for a head performs a pantomime.
　　In the content of the Surreptitious Movie Videotaping Prevention Law, it is 
thought that there are not many problems on a serious level. However, copyright law 
amendments should have been originally desired through discussions in which special-
ists are involved. Separate from a law that overwrites the Copyright Act with a pri-
vate member’s bill through the lobbying of an industry group, there should be room 
for discussion of whether the method that executes that law rapidly is appropriate. 
This is because the success model for the private member’s bill at this time was once 
again tested at the time of the “Illegal Download Penalization” discussed below.
4．3 Illegal Download Penalization
The demand to revise the scope of Reproduction for Private Use in Article 30 of the 
Copyright Act can be seen in the ARR report of 2000. The relevant description was 
unseen from 2001 to 2003, but it was revived in 2004. Thereafter, in the Culture Coun-
cil Copyright Subcommittee that was formed in 2006, the music/film industry made a 
strong demand that the act of knowingly downloading music and movies that had 
been illegally uploaded be excluded from the definition of “reproduction for private uti-
lization.” In concert with those trends, the relevant parts of the 2007 ARR were as fol-
lows. 
Ensure the transparency of relevant rules and regulations so that right holders 
are not adversely affected and competition law, and protection of trade secrets 
are considered, including by limiting the private copy exception to copies made 
from a legal source and not extending this exception to activities with implica-
tions outside the home （such as downloading copies from peer-to-peer services）.
In the sub-commission, at the end of an intense discussion with members representing 
users, the Copyright Act was amended on the premise of not applying criminal pun-
ishments, and it was agreed to criminalize illegal downloads in 2008. 3  The ARR docu-
ment of October 2008 that preceded the final agreement included a description 
“clarifying that the private use exceptions in Japan’s Copyright Law does not apply to 
the downloading of content from unlawful sources.” It is understood that the U.S. pres-
surized Japan so that the criminalization of illegal downloads was surely implemented.
　　The amended Copyright Act that criminalized illegal downloads was enacted in 
3 　A detailed description of the progress of this subcommission is given in chapter 4  of Ya-
mada Shōji, Nihon no chosakuken wa naze konnani kibishiinoka （Kyoto: Jimbun Shoin, 2011）.
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January 2010. As stated previously, the object of this amendment was limited to music 
and movies, and copyright holders did not advocate for the necessity of applying crim-
inal punishment. However, in the EHI of 2011, the U.S. demanded that the scope of ap-
plication of illegal downloads be widened, stating the aim to “targeting all works, 
clarify that the exceptional provision relating to private use in the Japanese Copyright 
Act is not applicable to downloads from illegal information sources.”
　　In the summer of 2011, the Recording Industry Association of Japan began lobby-
ing Diet members using a popular actor and began activities for the penalization of il-
legal downloads. A private member’s bill, such as the Surreptitious Movie Videotaping 
Prevention Law, had been planned once. However, it fell through and was finally sub-
ject to revisions through a Diet member proposal for the 2012 Copyright Act amend-
ment that had been originally planned as a Cabinet Law. The industry succeeded in 
causing the criminal punishment of illegal downloads to pass in the Diet. At this time, 
a fierce opposition movement occurred, centered around Internet users, but in the 
end, it was unable to move the Diet.
　　With this, for the act of downloading works that have been illegally uploaded, an 
act that any Internet user can perform, a criminal punishment may be imposed of “up 
to two （ 2 ） years imprisonment or up to 2，000，000 JPY fine, or both.” The amend-
ment destroyed the balance between the protection and utilization of a work, and 
even influential legal experts who had approved of the criminalization of illegal down-
loads declared their opposition to it. However, the fact that these kinds of techniques 
went unchallenged is assumed to create a large breeding ground for future troubles, 
including the outcome of the TPP hereafter.
5 .  Concern for the TPP
The current topics that have critically impacted amendments to the Japanese Copy-
right Act hereafter are those related to the TPP negotiations. The negotiations them-
selves were conducted in strict secrecy, and in Japan, even Diet members could not 
see the text of the negotiations. 4  Even in the U.S. there have been voices critical of 
the fact that the negotiation techniques are not democratic. According to the agreed 
text, for Japan, the extension of the copyright protection period, the removal of the of-
fense subject to prosecution only on complaint for copyright infringement offenses, 
and the introduction of pre-established and additional damages have been largely 
agreed.
4 　The present situation of the TPP at the time of the writing of this paper in January 2016.
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　　The truth is that while these items have all continued to be demanded by the U.S. 
in the ARR as well as in the EHI, it is not necessary to immediately revise the law as 
a result of the deliberation by a domestic inquiry commission, or the introduction of 
those systems have already been concluded to be negatives. As this kind of “policy 
laundering” is a non-democratic technique and attempts were being made to conduct 
it conspicuously, it was a major problem for handling copyright with the TPP.
　　In Japan, which does not have a legal principle of fair use like in the U.S. it is in-
evitable that either the extension of the copyright protection period, the removal of of-
fenses subject to prosecution only on complaint, or pre-established/additional damages 
will largely impact the reuse of classical works from the past, archiving, and the exis-
tence of secondary uses with UGC. In particular, with the Japanese UGC culture such 
as the comic market that supports the world of manga/anime that is highly popular 
worldwide, there is the possibility of inviting a critical situation through the TPP. 
Thus, legislation to avert such a situation is needed.
　　As described above, it can be forecast that the confrontation between U.S. or in-
dustry interest and user demand that began with the Lost 20 Years will continue, and 
when the design of a system is mistaken, it may be linked to the withering of Japa-
nese popular culture.
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After the collapse of the bubble economy, the “production committee model” of film 
production, which involved joint investment by multiple companies, became dominant 
in Japanese commercial films. In this model, television networks, which led the com-
mittee, came together with publishers and film software companies, in addition to film 
companies that are in charge of distributing films, in order to disperse risk and plan 
secondary sales of television programs, DVDs, and books. As with their American 
counterparts, Japan film studios had previously used their own staff and cast to pro-
duce films independently and then distribute them to theaters for profit. However, this 
practice has completely disappeared, and now film companies work together with out-
side companies to create films. The studios also functioned as educational institutions 
to train the next generation of filmmakers, a role now performed by universities. I 
myself was involved in such a project, participating as a director’s assistant in the pro-
duction of a dramatic film called Miroku, with both professional filmmakers and col-
lege students. The actor Masatoshi Nagase, who had played the Japanese protagonist 
in Jim Jarmusch’s Mystery Train （1989）, starred in the film. Some college students go 
from working with first-rate filmmakers in situations like this to later working in the 
film industry themselves. In any case, the decline of the studio system changed the 
education system for those working in filmmaking as well as film production practices 
themselves. A major part of the change came in the 1980s, during the economic bub-
ble period. As the studio system declined, it was supplanted by a system of participa-
tion by various external companies in the film production business. In this 
presentation, I consider the collapse of the studio system as it propelled other busi-
nesses to participate in movie production and led to the present state of the movie in-
dustry. Below, after discussing the studio system at the height of its prosperity, I will 
cover the chain of events that led to its downfall.
　　First, I will examine the Japanese film industry of the 1950s, when studios func-
tioned most successfully. In keeping with Japan’s postwar recovery, the number of 
moviegoers rapidly increased each year. At the peak, each person in Japan went to 
the movies at least once a month, theoretically speaking, and movies became deeply 
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entrenched in people’s lives. 1 Starting with the Venice Film Festival’s Grand Prix’s 
being awarded to Akira Kurosawa’s Rashomon in 1951, Japanese films began to draw 
international attention, with Kenji Mizoguchi’s The Life of Oharu, Ugetsu, and Sansho 
the Bailiff also winning awards consecutively from 1952 to 1954 at the festival. Taking 
advantage of this trend, the six major studios, Nikkatsu, Tōhō, Tōei, Shōchiku, Daiei, 
and Shintōhō, released new films every week. Each had its own directors and actors 
who were bound by contract and could not work for other studios. With these pre-es-
tablished teams, studios could thus produce a high volume of similar films. It is rela-
tively easy to break down the studios into a list according to genre: Nikkatsu was 
known for action films; Tōhō for films using special effects, particularly monster films 
like Godzilla, as well as comedies; Tōei for historical dramas and matatabi （ruffian and 
Yakuza） films; Shōchiku for melodrama films and family dramas; and Daiei for popu-
larizing haha-mono （films about the lives and suffering of mothers） soon after the war 
and also for historical dramas in the 1960s. Even Shintōhō, which went bankrupt in 
1961, managed to make a name for itself in erotic and grotesque films. Having a fixed 
staff and cast functioned very efficiently in terms of mass producing the films of each 
studio’s type and led to each studio’s having one specialty genre. In this era, quantity 
was increasingly valued over quality.
　　Tōei, founded in 1951 and an emerging company at the time, tried using its own 
films in double feature programs and began distributing new double feature films in 
1954. For theaters as well, making a contract with a single studio was cheaper and 
more convenient than contracting with multiple studios and putting together double 
features on their own. Therefore, by the end of December 1953, there were 42 
Toei-exclusive theaters, and a little more than half a year after, they had begun pro-
ducing double features, that is, by the end of August 1954, there were 155 such the-
aters, a nearly four-fold expansion. 2 The other major studios certainly did not simply 
observe Tōei’s strategy. With the exception of Shintōhō, which was no longer able to 
produce films, beginning in January 1956, Shōchiku, Daiei, Tōhō, and Nikkatsu also 
began to increase production. 3 Although at some instances only one new film a week 
1 　If the number of movie visitors published in “Statistics of Film Industry in Japan” on the Mo-
tion Picture Producers Association of Japan website （http://www.eiren.org/toukei/data.
html） was divided by 90 million, which was the total population of Japan at the time, people 
would have gone to the movies 12 or more times per year on average between 1957 and 
1959. 
2 　‘Nihondate kyōsō to nihon eiga no sinyō,’ Kinema junpō, November 1, 1958, p. 65.
3 　Since it was difficult to maintain the production of double features, all the studios eventually 
reduced production. However, they resumed the production of new double features in 1958.
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or the same film was shown for two weeks straight, each studio basically released two 
new films per week in order to obtain more theaters with exclusive contracts.
　　Thus, we can see that behind this substantive competition in new double feature 
films was each studio’s plans to improve its own distribution and standing at the box 
office. The major Hollywood studios from the 1930s and 1940s glorified their status as 
an oligopoly; distribution strength in major cities and industry-wide networks led to 
monopolistic control （major studios in 1945 controlled more than 70% of premiere the-
aters）. 4 However, the Supreme Court ruled in 1948 to end the practice known as 
“block booking” in which production and distribution companies made contracts to sell 
groups of films as one block （United States v. Paramount Pictures）. This dealt a major 
blow to studios and was a major reason for the decline of the studio system, along 
with people’s moving to the suburbs and the spread of television. 5 In Japan as well, in 
the post-war period, there were efforts to prohibit major film studios’ control of the in-
dustry. By 1955, the Japan Fair Trade Commission had found violations under the 
“Antimonopoly Act” ［Dokusen kinshihō］ and Excessive Economic Power Deconcentra-
tion Law ［Kado keizairyoku shūchū haijo hō］ four times including re-examinations, 
and film studios promised to make improvements. However, they ultimately did not 
follow through, and without any legal action to deal with the situation, the studios’ 
control through block booking grew even stronger. 6 In other words, the studio sys-
tem’s safe functioning depended on control through block booking, which guaranteed 
that the films they produced would have a stable distribution into the market.
　　Next, I will move on to the discussion of the 1960s, when Japan’s studio system 
fell into a state of crisis. In this period, there were obstructions to film studios’ control 
through block booking. In 1958, the number of movie spectators was 1．12 billion, but 
this turned out to be the last year of growth, and five years later, in 1963, the number 
had sharply dropped to less than half, at 510 million. The television, which began 
broadcasting programs in 1953 and rapidly permeated society, was seen as a problem, 
and indeed, the spread of television and the contrastive decline in movie theater atten-
dance began to be noticeable.
　　Studios were faced with a grim situation as people stopped going to the movies, 
4 　Douglas Gomery, The Hollywood Studio System （New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986）, pp. 8―
13.
5 　Douglas Gomery and Clara Pafort-Overduin, Movie History: A Survey, 2 nd ed （New York: 
Routledge, 2011）, pp. 162.
6 　Katō Atusko, ‘Eiga kaisha no shijō ninshiki to kankyaku: 1930-1960 nendai o chūshin ni,’ in 
Fujiki Hideaki （ed.） Kankyaku eno apurōchi （Tokyo: Shinwasha, 2011）, p. 102.
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and each drastically reduced the number of films it produced. For example, Tōei had 
distributed more than 100 films per year in the 1950s, but this dropped below 100 in 
1961 and declined drastically to 40 in 1965. Other studios had similar decreases, each 
ending up with around 50 distributed in 1965 （only Nikkatsu distributed more, at 65 
films）. The practice of releasing new double features every week completely disap-
peared. 7 As they produced fewer films, it was inevitable that these studios would 
have to scale down.
　　Japanese film studios stopped signing exclusive contracts with staff and cast 
members and tried reducing personnel. Shōchiku closed its Kyoto studio in 1965, thus 
putting excess personnel on standby at their homes, while Daiei took similar measures 
out of necessity to reduce its workforce. Nikkatsu decided to create its own films for 
television in order to employ those who no longer had any work, having previously 
dispatched directors and actors to subcontracted companies for this purpose. Now 
they devoted one stage of their studio to films for television and switched to producing 
their own. 8 These types of measures occurred at each studio in the name of rational-
ization, but one could also see it as their paying the debt for the blind mass production 
of movies in the more prosperous 1950s.
　　These changes to major film studios also gave more space to independent produc-
tions, which had previously been hidden in their shadow. Without a distribution net-
work like the major studios, these independent studios had, until then, rarely been 
able to reach a national market. However, reduced production by major studios meant 
that independent work could receive more attention. Film studios began to purchase 
independently-made films and distribute them through their own channels. Shōchiku, 
in particular, having mainly produced melodramas and family drama films, lost much 
ground to television dramas and began to reconsider their production of movies. In a 
sense freeing themselves from the conventions of their own genre, they began to ac-
tively distribute externally produced films dealing with erotic or other themes outside 
of family drama. In 1967, one-third of the films they distributed were not produced in-
house. 9 This applied not only to Shochiku; making space for the distribution of inde-
pendent films in order to maintain a strong distribution network grew more common 
at other major film studios as well.
　　Lastly, I aim to summarize the ideas I have presented. The collapse of the studio 
7 　‘Tōkei hen,’ Eiga nenkan 1967 nen ban （Tokyo: Jiji tsūshin sha, 1967）, p. 49.
8 　‘Nikkatsu ōsōji no toshi,’ Ibid pp. 126―127.
9 　‘Daiei no saiken to akaji mondai,’ Gōdō tsūshin tokushin ban, August 27, 1967, p. 1 .
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system, which led to the participation in film production of various companies from 
other industries, began in the 1960s with disruptions to “block booking,” which was 
closely linked to production, distribution, and screening. Major film studios ceased the 
mass production approach of the more prosperous 1950s, shifting to a focus on distri-
bution and screening in the less prosperous 1960s. They began to also distribute out-
side films even if those films did not fit their established image. Through this, the 
major studios tried to maintain control of distribution and screening.
　　In 1969, the television networks that play a central role in present-day production 
committees became involved in filmmaking （Fuji Television joined with Tōhō to cre-
ate Goyōkin）. If the studio system had remained stable and continued, the film indus-
try would not have had to accept capital support from the television industry, which 
had a certain influence on the decline of the film industry. The opening that would 
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“I don’t mind being poor”
In a song from 2014, the Japanese rapper Kohh offers an intriguing perspective on 











　　I don’t mind being poor
　　Even without money, I’m fortunate in many ways
　　I’ll be OK, and there’s lots I want to do
　　It’s meaningless to be rich, if your heart is poor
　　I don’t need to show off with expensive Louis Vuitton, Gucci or Versace
　　Really, unnecessary things, I can do without
　　If I have trouble, I’ll get help from my friends
　　Actions are more important than 
　　Saying “Thank you” and “I’m sorry”
　　Everyone says, love is more important than money
Kohh, “Binbō nante ki ni shinai” from his album Monochrome （2014）
Such a view likely echoes the feelings of many young people who have grown up 
during the years of Japan’s economic malaise, and it is small wonder that young peo-
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ple are looking for satisfaction beyond economic success. As such, the song offers a 
view of youth culture increasingly divorced from the vacillations of economic growth 
and decline, focused instead on peer-group support, generosity, and sharing. How 
widespread are these views? It’s impossible to know from a single song. But what’s in-
triguing is that this view, which moves away from individualistic, rational self-interest 
as a defining motivator, also echoes some developments in the emerging industries 
around music.
　　Music provides an intriguing perspective on industry transition, both in Japan and 
beyond. In particular, in some realms of popular culture, social value within communi-
ties leads to the possibility of extracting economic value by businesses. By this I mean, 
if we want to see how new industries can develop, and which ones offer models of 
more inclusive forms of capitalism, we might first attend to creative communities 
driven by passion and commitment. These spaces form the foundation upon which 
new business models can develop, even amidst a continuing decline in recorded music 
sales. Music is particularly intriguing because we are witnessing a variety of new 
businesses that depend on a balance between social and economic value, whether 
through merchandising pop idols or crowdfunding as a means to gain capital for artis-
tic production. Such new business models offer a new perspective on contemporary is-
sues around income inequality.
　　Recently, we see a growing interest both in the public and the academic literature 
regarding worsening income inequality, a topic that extends from questions of precar-
ity, for example in new “gig economies” （Berlant 2011）, to historical and contemporary 
understandings of economic inequality （Piketty and Goldhammer 2014）. Music is par-
ticularly interesting as an industry in transition, “hollowed out” by both technological 
and cultural shifts, and yet demonstrating a remarkable vibrancy in adapting to new 
socio-economic contexts. The variety of responses are resulting in a panoply of busi-
ness models. From J-pop idol culture to underground DJ culture, from global tech 
companies’ work in streaming music such as Spotify and YouTube to crowdfunding 
initiatives for supporting new music projects through sites like Kickstarter and Pat-
reon （Palmer 2014）. This diversity of approaches gives us a chance to assess what 
this variety of efforts at achieving sustainable livelihoods within music can tell us 
about the dynamics that can lead to more inclusive forms of capitalism, as opposed to 
reproducing the exceeding concentrations of wealth. Can music alone solve inequality? 
I don’t think so. But music can allow us to see and compare different social-economic 
assemblages―an awkward term but meant to signal something more than “business 
models”―for their inclusiveness or lack thereof. 
　　Focusing on creative communities as the harbinger of new businesses reminds us, 
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as many scholars have argued （Miller 1997; Graeber 2011）, that capitalism is not a 
single, monolithic system, but a diverse mix of socio-economic relations. Even so, the 
French economist Thomas Piketty, in his 2014 book Capital in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, identifies a troubling trend in which those who have extreme wealth have been 
able to capture a growing share of the economy, eating away at economic growth 
from labor productivity. Put simply, the super-rich extract “rent,” a term that refers 
not only to real estate rentals, but more broadly financial extraction based on a power 
relationship （e.g., monopoly rents） in contrast to productive labor. Piketty calls this 
relationship r ＞ g, where “r” is the rate of return on capital, historically since the late 
1800s around 5 ％, and “g” is the growth rate from gains in labor productivity, histori-
cally about 2 ％. Since “r” is greater than “g,” each younger generational cohort is 
being used as a means to further enrich a historically already-very-rich cohort. Thus, 
Piketty’s main finding is that over time the super-rich, many of whom achieved their 
wealth from inheritance, are able to extract income from those who are working now. 
Put simply, “the past devours the future.” That’s why I think it is reasonable to call 
this dynamic “zombie capitalism,” because, figuratively at least, the dead are eating 
the living. 
　　What can be done? Piketty’s response is to call for a global tax on wealth, an idea 
widely ridiculed for being impossible to achieve. But Piketty’s aim may be more im-
portant than the policy itself. Such a tax would not be aimed at substantial redistribu-
tion, Piketty argues, but rather at achieving greater transparency, which, he hopes, 
will lead to a stronger political movement to do something significant about income in-
equality. He also calls for more cooperation among the social sciences, and he criticizes 
Economics departments for leveraging elite privilege and going it alone rather than 
working more closely with other academic disciplines.
The truth is that economics should never have sought to divorce itself from the 
other social sciences and can advance only in conjunction with them. The social 
sciences collectively know too little to waste time on foolish disciplinary squab-
bles. If we are to progress in our understanding of the historical dynamics of the 
wealth distribution and the structure of social classes, we must obviously take a 
pragmatic approach and avail ourselves of the methods of historians, sociologists, 
and political scientists as well as economists. We must start with fundamental 
questions and try to answer them. （Piketty 2014: 32―33）.
In reading Piketty’s book, I was struck by how anthropologists too can contribute to 
this work on inequality, especially by asking, what would constitute more inclusive 
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forms of capitalism and how might they develop? What forms of social value lead to 
economic value? In other words addition to identifying the super-rich and their ex-
tractive ways, it seems to me that we must also identify what kinds of investments 
can lead to more productive, less extractive, economic forms. It is here that an ethno-
graphic approach to different ways of achieving livelihoods in music can offer a win-
dow on a diversity of socio-economic models and outcomes. Fieldwork is particularly 
well-suited to this kind of investigation because there is nothing like “being there” as a 
means to evaluate what kinds of events, collectives, and happenings are “where the 
action is.” This essay is an early attempt to explore some of those possibilities.
　　I would argue that in contrast to zombie capitalism we can observe a counterveil-
ing tendency towards what might be called “cyborg capitalism.” The image in my 
head is drawn from the “Ghost in the Shell” manga and anime series, in which, in the 
future, a person’s living consciousness （or “ghost”） can be ported to a technological 
body （the “shell”） which is also connected to a wider information network, both static 
data and person-to-person communication. In this context, a cyborg is characterized 
by a symbiosis between humans and technology, embedded in, but also enlivening the 
networks of relations that are physical, social, technological, political and economic. 
　　It is this idea of “community and network symbiosis” that lies at the heart of I 
propose calling “cyborg capitalism,” and offers a contrast to “zombie capitalism,” 
whereby the dead devour the living （i.e., inherited wealth increasingly extracts income 
from productive labor）. Of course, there are not only two kinds of capitalism, but this 
contrast is meant to highlight some of the distinctions that can help us evaluate differ-
ent forms of social-economic assemblages. Cyborg ideals are clearly evident in Kohh’s 
song, which emphasizes an alternative vision of value, beyond the purely economic. As 
he says, “love is more important than money,” and “I don’t mind being poor” because if 
necessary, I can get help from friends. This move away from an instrumental, rational 
actor individualism is characteristic, I would say, of a sensibility that is more cyborg 
than zombie. Before turning to this distinction, let’s consider how Japan’s lost decades 
look in terms of inequality. 
Japan’s lost decades seen through the lens of inequality （not so bad）
Another aspect of viewing youth culture during the lost decades in Japan involves 
considering how varieties of capitalism are related to government policies. In some 
ways, the lost decades of Japan look less worrisome when compared with develop-
ments in the US. This reminds us that “zombie capitalism” and “cyborg capitalism” 
are just ways of evaluating different processes of economic development and change. 
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　　In his 2015 book, Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz collected a range 
of his essays viewing recent economic developments through the lens of inequality. 
Contrary to my understanding of Japan’s lost decades, he highlights contrasts that 
make Japan look better than the US in measures of inequality since the 1990s. He 
identifies the time when the expansion of inequality takes off, in the 1980s, with the 
reforms of government leaders like Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Yasuhiro 
Nakasone. Stiglitz （2013: 416） explains: “The ‘reforms’ that were part of the zeitgeist 
of the 1980s” contributed to the growth in inequality in country after country, “includ-
ing tax changes that were of enormous benefit to the very rich and the liberalization 
of financial markets.” So, inequality worsened in advanced nations, including Japan, the 
US and many European countries. 
　　I’ve always associated Japan’s lost decades with the idea of “anemic growth,” 
measured in terms of gross domestic product. But Stiglitz adds an important layer of 
nuance to this common understanding. 
Japan’s slow growth does not look so bad under close examination. Any serious 
student of economic performance needs to look not only at overall growth, but at 
growth related to the size of the population. Japan’s working age population （ages 
15―64） shrank 5．5 percent from 2001 to 2010, while the number of Americans 
that age increased by 9．2 percent, so we should expect to see lower growth. （Sti-
glitz 2013: 335）
This means, Stiglitz adds, “Japan’s real economic output, per member of the labor 
force, grew at a faster rate over the first decade of the century than that of the 
United States, Germany, Britain, or Australia” （Ibid.）. America’s millennial decade was 
worse than Japan’s when measured in terms of this more nuanced analysis of growth. 
　　Japan is also better than the US in addressing inequality. Consider the Gini coeffi-
cient, a standard measure of inequality, with zero as perfect equality, and 1 for perfect 
inequality. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
（OECD）, the Gini coefficient for both countries before taxes and transfer payments is 
about the same for the two countries: 0．499 for the US, and 0．488 for Japan （Stiglitz: 
336）. But the US does less to mitigate inequality than Japan, bringing it down to 0．38 
for the US and 0．33 for Japan. Or, consider another measure of inequality: the average 
income of the top 10％ is 15．9 times that of the bottom 10 percent in the US, com-
pared with 10．7 times for Japan （Ibid）. Such variation reinforces our understandings 




　　On still other measures of inequality, Japan does better than the US as well, even 
if there is still work to be done. Stiglitz notes that Japan needs to do better in caring 
for its “older old,” those over 75. In 2008, the OECD estimated that 25．4％ of Japan’s 
“older old” lived in relative poverty, that is, with incomes less than half of the national 
median, which is still marginally better than the US （27．4％）, but far worse than the 
OECD average of 16．1％ . But Japan does much better than the US in terms of child-
hood poverty: Some 14．9％ of Japan’s children are poor, compared to a shocking 23．1 
％ of American children. It’s hard to know how directly to relate this to Japan’s glob-
ally successful, youthful popular culture, but it does indicate that there should be a 
higher percentage of young people in Japan with spare money to spend, thus being 
consumers who support new businesses. 
Where do new jobs come from?
For both Japan and the US, a common concern, especially for the younger generation, 
is what new industries might emerge to replace formerly good-paying jobs in manu-
facturing. Will there be sufficient economic growth to support new jobs? Piketty points 
out that even relatively low growth rates, for example of 1 ％ or 1．5％ per year can 
still mean large changes when measured over the course of a generation. Over a pe-
riod of thirty years, he says, a growth rate of 1 ％ per year corresponds to cumulative 
growth of 35％ , and 1．5％ growth corresponds to cumulative growth of 50％ （Piketty: 
95）. Piketty adds that such changes will have a powerful impact on the structure of 
employment: “when output per head increases by 35 to 50 percent in thirty years, that 
means that a very large fraction―between a quarter and a third―of what is produced 
today, and therefore between a quarter and a third of occupations and jobs, did not 
exist thirty years ago” （Piketty: 95―96）. You can’t work in bridge repair until bridges 
are built. Those who maintain the Internet, hardware and software, are in jobs that 
didn’t exist before the Internet. While some scholars focus on the various jobs that are 
lost （Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014）, we should also turn our attention to the possibil-
ities for future industries to emerge. It is here that I think anthropology can provide 
useful insights into where new jobs can come from, through the advantages of re-
search by fieldwork and ethnography. 
　　I learned from doing ethnographic research into cultural production that fieldwork 
can give one a very clear sense of which groupings have a kind of positive energy, a 
forward momentum. By “being there,” we can see where the action is. Although there 
many types of “action,” and defining once and for all what that means is impossible, 
nevertheless, I would say that there would be wide agreement on where the action 
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isn’t, where negative social forces conspire to limit the possibilities for creative pro-
duction. Furthermore, anthropology provides a way of thinking about the democratiza-
tion of social research. By living among the people, learning their language, and to 
some extent participating in their worlds, ethnographers can learn about the things 
that matter to people, their daily struggles and aspirations. If we take a more demo-
cratic and open approach to observing what people value, this can provide insight into 
where new industries can and should emerge. This would be a contrast to beginning 
discussions of new jobs from the perspectives of short-sighted elites who try to main-
tain older, exploitative systems, just like zombies that devour the living. 
　　Stiglitz offers a striking insight for thinking about where new jobs come from. 
Rather than pointing to the super-rich as “job creators,” he argues instead that con-
sumers, especially those who have the wherewithal to purchase things, are the real 
drivers of new job creation.
Around the world there is a wealth of creativity, an abundance of entrepreneur-
ship, if there is adequate demand （and if certain other preconditions are satisfied, 
such as access to capital and adequate infrastructure）. In this view, the real “job 
creators” are consumers; and the reason that American and European countries 
have not been creating jobs is that stagnant incomes mean stagnant demand. （Sti-
glitz 2013: 415）
This perspective reinforces the idea that creative communities, as they build audi-
ences and participants, can drive the creation of new industries. We can see this in 
many ways, notably in history of the animation industry and in the phenomenon 
around Hatsune Miku（初音ミク）, Japan’s leading virtual idol. First, animation.
　　A century ago, animation was just being invented as a ludicrously labor-intensive 
media form, merging cartoon drawing with film, such that frames of film would need 
to be drawn, and then filmed, one frame at a time, to create the illusion of movement. 
It is an insane idea, and very few people can get rich in such a field. Yet animation 
has become a multi-billion dollar industry. Why Japan? Because it had a consumer 
base that was broader and more engaged than in the US. By some estimates, 60％ of 
the world’s TV broadcast cartoons are Japanese in origin （JETRO 2005）. In simple 
terms, I would argue that Japan’s success highlights Stiglitz’s notion that consumers 
are job creators. Again, a comparative study is instructive.
　　Both Japan and the US had vibrant comic book publishing in the early 1950s, but 
publishers in the two countries took different paths in the mid-fifties. In the US, the 
research of psychiatrist Frederic Wertham and his sensationalist book, The Seduction 
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of the Innocent, led to widespread concern that American comic books were harming 
children through their violent and sexy content. The research was later debunked 
when Wertham was found to have distorted his findings and misrepresented his inter-
viewees. At the time, however, congressional hearings were held, and American pub-
lishers, feeling the pressure, acted by developing the Comics Code Authority in 1954, 
which screened American comic books for offensive content （Hajdu 2008）. US comic 
authors were required to produce works suitable only for children. In Japan as well, 
there was outcry against violent and salacious comic books, but manga publishers 
were able to keep producing works for a larger and older audience, in addition to 
works for children. This meant a much broader fan-base for manga, the most success-
ful of which were then turned into anime. Anime’s global success, in other words, 
hinges in part on the broader audience for manga in Japan. Consumers were job cre-
ators, just as Stiglitz argues. Because Japan has a comic fandom that spans all genera-
tions and well represents content for both men and women, this group of consumers 
underpins the later globalization of anime. The social value of manga characters is 
what lays the foundation for economic value in business models. The large and varied 
audience for manga characters is further reinforced through fan-made manga （dōjin-
shi） and the annual Comic Market, which draws upwards of half a million people to 
its largest summertime convention. 
Hatsune Miku as Cyborg Capitalism
　　Another example of this principle of “community first, business second” can be 
seen in the case of Japan’s leading virtual idol, Hatsune Miku. 1 In a video of a concert 
in Japan, we see about a thousand fans packed into a Tokyo music club, many with 
glow sticks in the shape of green leeks, eagerly anticipating the arrival of the star of 
the show. As the music starts, suddenly Miku appears, as if rising through the stage. 
There is a live band behind her, but all the focus is on Miku herself, a life-size ani-
mated cartoon image of a teenage girl with long blue ponytails and enormous anime 
eyes, singing and dancing on stage. As she waves her willowy arms, she belts out the 
first words to her song “World Is Mine” （Wārudo izu main）: 
　　世界で一番のお姫さま
　　そういう扱い心得てよね
1 　These sections on Miku are adapted from an essay in the Japanese Popular Culture Reader, 
edited by Alisa Freedman and Toby Slade （forthcoming from Routledge）.
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　　I’m the number one princess in the world 
　　And you’re going to treat me that way. Right? 
Then she coquettishly wags a finger, and the crowd goes wild. 
　　I saw Miku perform at a concert in New York City in October 2014, and earlier 
in Los Angeles at the fan convention Anime Expo in July 2011. The Los Angeles show 
sold out within days of going on sale, with one commentator saying 6，000 tickets were 
sold. In the concert hall, before the show began, the air was festive and electric. I 
overheard a fan sitting next to me, speaking to her friend, both in costume. “We’re 
making history,” she said, and her friend nodded solemnly. 
　　Hatsune Miku is Japan’s leading virtual idol. She began life as voice synthesizer 
software released in 2007 by Crypton Future Media Inc., a company based in Sapporo 
in northern Japan. Crypton sells the software, but takes a more open-source approach 
to the use of Miku’s image, generally allowing fans to use the image for free. Over 
time, an enormous fan community has emerged around Miku, primarily in Japan but 
extending worldwide. 
　　In Japan, Miku’s world is recognizable as part of a dōjin （pronounced “dough 
gene”） culture populated by fans who create derivative works, such as comic books, 
figurines, illustrations, and so on, based on their favorite 2 D characters. The term 
dōjin uses the characters “same” and “person,” implying a peer but also an amateur, 
generally more than a consumer, someone who makes things, usually in a group. Fan 
“circles” （sākuru） are the groups that make dōjinshi （fan comics）, dōjin music, dōjin 
games, and so on. For lack of a better term, I would propose “fan-made” as the trans-
lation for dōjin, with “fan” representing the active amateur aspect and “made” refer-
ring to the circles and creators who churn out projects. 
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　　How did the Miku community emerge, and what does it tell us about the mix of 
social and economic values involved? In 2007, the Miku voice-synthesizer software 
gave desktop musicians a new instrument: a woman’s singing voice. This was Cryp-
ton’s business, namely, selling digital sounds and software to be used in audio produc-
tion. But as music creators began sharing their songs online, others in the online （and 
offline） world participated in other ways, making illustrations or animated dance vid-
eos to go with the songs. With the explosion of this online production, a crowd of audi-
ence members also emerged through commenting―positively, negatively, sometimes 
seriously, often irreverently―and in the process lent moral support, engaged in aes-
thetic criticism, or just aimed to have fun. In the first couple years, the business of 
Miku was Crypton selling the software, and all the other fan activity was in a largely 
non-commercial space. I mean “non-commercial” in the sense that fan producers pay, 
but do not get paid for their productivity. 
　　Creative communities are spaces where social value takes precedence over eco-
nomic exchange. It was through the interactions of fans―creating lyrics, fashion 
styles, dance movements, and in the process her personality―that Miku changed from 
a vocal instrument into a “vocal character,” as Crypton calls her. The crowd of ama-
teur creators and active audiences became a kind of foundation upon which economic 
activity would later develop. And businesses did develop, with a popular videogame 
for arcades and handheld devices, songs popular for karaoke singing, and CDs that 
have become bona-fide hits, including the “World Is Mine” song mentioned above. 
　　The larger significance is that we can see how new areas of the music world are 
developing new audiences and in the process new models of support at a time when 
the market for recordings is in steep decline. Though it’s worth noting that spending 
for other aspects of music are increasing, such as for live shows and musical instru-
ments. In contrast to record companies, might Miku offer a more equitable and demo-
cratic realm of popular culture? It’s too soon to tell, but there are some promising 
signs. Miku illuminates the ways that creative communities, often energized by 
non-economic motivations, can form the basis for the emergence of new businesses, in-
deed, whole new kinds of industries. The significance of those industries depends not 
only on their capitalization but also on the social dynamics that underpin the econo-
mies. This is not to say this “foundation” is devoid of exploitation, discrimination, and 
excess, but, as we will see, what is interesting is how the maker of Miku software, 
Crypton Future Media, has attempted to deal with the challenges of mediating be-
tween the social communication aspect of Miku and the businesses that are emerging 
around the phenomenon. 
　　Music journalist Shiba Tomonori describes the effect of Miku as nothing less than 
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“sekai o kaeta” （changing the world）. He notes, for example, that everyone can be a 
kuriētā （creator） and, more importantly perhaps, can connect with like-minded cre-
ators.
With the Internet of the twenty-first century, anyone can make a name for his or 
herself by becoming a creator. Nowadays, it’s become normal for amateur cre-
ators, not only professionals, to make various kinds of content and have it con-
sumed. Moreover, the Net is giving rise to creators making relationships among 
themselves. A new culture is blossoming, nurturing collaborations across fields. 
Put simply, this is an entry to an era of “100 million creators” （Shiba 2014: 4 ）
In the case of Miku, according to Crypton’s website, over 100，000 songs have been 
produced by “Miku-P” （that is, Miku producers）, and over 170，000 videos have been 
uploaded featuring her songs. By far the largest participation is the over one million 
fan-made artworks that are in circulation as well. 
　　How did Crypton nurture these creators? By developing a relatively open ap-
proach to copyright. In Japan （as of 2015）, Crypton describes a three-tier system of 
copyright control, which they call the PiaPro Character License （PCL）. （PiaPro is 
short for “peer production.”） They have adapted this license for Japan’s specific legal 
and cultural context, part of which includes a long history of dōjin works. In an online 
video, Crypton’s describes their license like this: 
（ 1 ）If you are making images but not selling them in any way, you may do so 
without getting permission from Crypton. 
（ 2 ）If you are making goods and selling them, but only at a level to support the 
activities of your club or group （i.e., “non-profit” but enforced through an 
honor system rather than official legal designation）, then you are asked to 
send a merchandise sample to Crypton and in return, Crypton will send a 
2 D barcode （QR code） that you can reproduce and affix to your goods to 
show that you are officially approved. 
（ 3 ）If your Miku goods sell profitably, Crypton expects to be part of the process, 
and there should be negotiations on a case-by-case basis （Crypton Future 
Media, Inc.）.
This is a very interesting approach to creating multiple tiers of copyright depending 
on the users and their profitability, rather than on the type of work （i.e., original or 
derivative）. These rules are shifting, and depend on the acceptance of the broader 
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community to exist. In some ways, this is not so different from the informal operation 
of music sampling for DJs. If you are an indie-level DJ, you can often get away with 
sampling famous artists and sometimes even selling the works. But if you are famous 
or backed by a major recording company, then the artists being sampled can expect 
（and are more likely to demand） payment for sampling. What’s different about Cryp-
ton is that they are attempting to make this informal treatment of copyright some-
thing that is official and central to their business. For me, this is a perfect example of 
“cyborg capitalism,” whereby Crypton prioritizes the ethics of the fan community, al-
lowing fan production and sharing, and even some sales of derivative character goods, 
without requiring royalties to be paid. Rather than being zombie-like in extracting 
every bit of possible monetization, Crypton’s practices more closely resemble a cyborg 
ethic of respecting its connection and reliance upon its fan community. 
Conclusion
As we struggle to reformulate our political economic sphere to combat the negative 
consequences of rising inequality, the question of where new jobs and new industries 
might come from becomes increasingly important. Over the past 20 years, my re-
search has focused on forms popular culture, such as hip-hop in Japan and anime as a 
worldwide phenomenon, that can be described as globalization from below. They can 
also be seen as examples of emerging industries that, initially at least, generally lacked 
the support of elite power brokers, spreading instead though the efforts of passionate, 
somewhat underground communities. To me, this is cyborg capitalism because it illu-
minates the unseen synergies, what I’ve also called “dark energy,” among fans as 
much as, if not more than, the marketing muscle of major corporations. In realms 
where the super-rich have more sway―such as expensive real estate and high-end 
contemporary art―we witness more extractive forms of economic exchange, that is, 
zombie capitalism, as the super-rich attempt to move assets and hide money from the 
prying eyes of tax agencies. In this essay, I’ve offered a picture of some forms of popu-
lar culture that demonstrate how creative communities can be the foundation of new 
business models, or better, new social-economic assemblages, in which valuing and 
nurturing fan communities is as important as figuring out how to monetize them. 
　　To return to Kohh’s song, we can see how the cultural underpinnings of ideas 
about restructuring the economy through new measures of value are already under-
way. Arguably, this has always been the case for every generation. Kohh’s contempo-
rary voice highlights that he worked hard to get to his position as an artist, “but 
without those around me, I wouldn’t be here either.” We are seeing new thinking 
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